He simply had no expectation of privacy in that item after repeatedly denying that it was his.
State v. Olive
Fifth District Appellate Court
Fairfield County, Ohio
June 4, 2026
Why is this case important?
State v. Olive is important because it demonstrates how a suspect’s own statements can determine the outcome of a Fourth Amendment challenge before a court ever reaches the question of whether the search itself was lawful. Mr. Olive denied ownership of the safe that contained narcotics. By denying ownership, he avoided admitting possession of the safe at the roadside but he simultaneously destroyed his ability to challenge the search later. This is what I have coined the apex of the ideological culde-sac; arguing one point, then arguing the exact opposite.
Background
Defendant Frederick Mr. Olive argues in this appeal that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress because, in his view, law-enforcement officers improperly carried out a warrantless search of a locked safe that was found in his vehicle during a traffic stop. We conclude that Mr. Olive, who told the arresting officer at the roadside that the safe was not his and that he did not know whose it was, gave up any right to challenge that warrantless search. For that reason, we affirm the trial court’s decision denying Mr. Olive’s suppression motion. The Key Facts
Dispatch and Trooper Ashbaugh Observed Multiple Moving Traffic Offenses
While on duty, Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP) Trooper Tazz Ashbaugh received a radio report from a dispatcher about a motorist who was driving erratically nearby. The trooper drove in his cruiser to the area where the vehicle in question was reportedly traveling, and once he found a vehicle matching the dispatcher’s description, the trooper saw the vehicle’s driver — Mr. Olive — commit multiple moving traffic offenses. The trooper then activated the cruiser’s overhead flashing lights — and eventually his siren too — and Mr. Olive in turn moved his vehicle to the roadside and stopped there.
Mr. Olive’s droopy eyelids and constricted pupils, his slow and lethargic movements.
Trooper Ashbaugh then parked his cruiser at the roadside and approached the passenger side of Mr. Olive’s vehicle on foot. At a suppression hearing held in the trial court several months later, the trooper testified that he noticed at the roadside Mr. Olive’s droopy eyelids and constricted pupils, his slow and lethargic movements, and the fact that Mr. Olive had not moved his gear shift or transmission selector from drive mode into the park position.
Mr. Olive Arrested for OVI
Next, the trooper asked Mr. Olive to exit the vehicle and participate in some field-sobriety tests. After observing Mr. Olive’s performance on those tests, Trooper Ashbaugh arrested Mr. Olive for operating his vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol (OVI).
Mr. Olive’s Vehicle Needed to be Towed
Trooper Ashbaugh and another trooper who had arrived at the scene determined that Mr. Olive’s vehicle needed to be towed in accordance with an OSHP policy because the vehicle was obstructing one lane of travel on the road. (Mr. Olive had been traveling alone that day, so no other licensed driver was with him who could move the vehicle, and Mr. Olive, when he parked at the roadside, had moved only the vehicle’s right tires off the road, leaving the bulk of the vehicle jutting into the roadway.)
Inventory Search – Locked Safe in Center Console
When the troopers, before the tow truck had arrived, began conducting what Trooper Ashbaugh described at the suppression hearing as an inventory or administrative search of Mr. Olive’s vehicle, they found a locked safe in the vehicle’s center console. Trooper Ashbaugh testified that, under OSHP policy, closed containers found inside stopped vehicles may be opened at the roadside so that the contents can be recorded by troopers conducting an inventory or administrative search.
Mr. Olive Disclaimed Ownership of the Safe
After finding the locked safe in Mr. Olive’s vehicle at the roadside, Trooper Ashbaugh walked from that vehicle to the patrol car where Mr. Olive was seated and asked Mr. Olive for the combination to the safe, explaining that he planned to list the contents of the safe on an inventory sheet. Mr. Olive then told the trooper several times that the safe did not belong to him and that he did not know who the owner was. Mr. Olive, according to Trooper Ashbaugh’s suppression-hearing testimony, said that the safe had been in the center console when Mr. Olive purchased that console and installed it in his vehicle. (The trooper’s testimony about that and other statements by Mr. Olive at the roadside was corroborated by a video recording from the trooper’s body-worn camera that was played for the trial judge at the suppression hearing.)
Trooper Ashbaugh Used a Universal Key to Access the Safe
After hearing Mr. Olive disclaim any ownership interest in the locked safe, Trooper Ashbaugh used some tools from his patrol car to open it at the roadside. Inside it, the trooper found a white crystalline substance as well as some suboxone strips, a scale, a spoon, and several small plastic bags. That discovery in turn led to the filing of an aggravated-possession-of-drugs charge against Mr. Olive.
Motion to Suppress is Denied
Mr. Olive’s suppression motion in the trial court challenged the warrantless search of the safe. After the trial court denied that motion, Mr. Olive pled no contest to both the drug-possession charge and an OVI charge. He now appeals. Mr. Olive Lacks Any Standing to Challenge the Search of the Safe
Mr. Olive Appeal – Trooper Ashbaugh Should Have Obtained a Search Warrant
In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Olive urges us to find that the troopers should have sought and secured a search warrant before opening the locked safe. We are not persuaded.
Did Mr. Olive Have an Expectation of Privacy in the Safe?
The Fourth Amendment of course protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. State v. Jackson, 2004-Ohio-3206, ¶ 8. A search conducted without a warrant is unreasonable unless an established exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applies. State v. Nicholson, 2017-Ohio2825, ¶ 19 (5th Dist.). Evidence obtained through government conduct that violates an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights may not be used against him or her at trial. State v. Lemaster, 2012-Ohio-971, ¶ 8 (4th Dist.).
Established Case Law – Expectation of Privacy
The suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, however, “can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-172 (1969). See also State v. Granados, 2014-Ohio-1758, ¶ 58 (5th Dist.) (“A defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy rather than that of a third party”).
Standing has been defined as a party’s “‘right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.’” Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 2007-Ohio-5024, ¶ 27, citing Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004). In order to have standing to challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment, an individual “must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the evidence seized.” Jackson at ¶ 8. A legitimate expectation of privacy arises when an individual has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. United States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041, 1044 (6th Cir. 1982).
A defendant does not have standing to assert a Fourth Amendment challenge to the search of property that the defendant has voluntarily abandoned. State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291 (1980), paragraph two of the syllabus. See also State v. Gould, 2012-Ohio-71, ¶ 20 (“the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches does not apply to property that has been voluntarily abandoned, because society does not recognize an expectation of privacy in abandoned property as being objectively reasonable”).
Yet a defendant may have standing to challenge the search of property if he or she abandoned the property involuntarily “in response to illegal police conduct.” State v. Cosby, 2008-Ohio-3862, ¶ 32 (2d Dist.). The existence of a police investigation, though, does not in itself render abandonment involuntary. Freeman at 297.
Established Case Law – Abandoned Property
Whether property has been abandoned should not be determined based on the owner’s subjective intent but should instead be premised on the objective facts that are available to the investigating officer.
“Abandonment” of property in the context of the Fourth Amendment is a question of intent, and an individual’s intent may be inferred from his or her words, actions, or other objective facts. State v. Martin, 2019-Ohio-2792, ¶ 16 (12th Dist.). The central issue is whether the person who was prejudiced by the search “had voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property in question” in such a way that he or she “could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy” in the item at the time of the search. Freeman at 297. Whether property has been abandoned should not be determined based on the owner’s subjective intent but should instead be premised on the objective facts that are available to the investigating officer. State v. Camper, 2023-Ohio-4673, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.).
State and federal appellate courts in Ohio have consistently agreed that an individual lacks standing to later raise a Fourth-Amendment claim when he or she, before the search, disavowed any possessory interest in the property in question. See, e.g., Martin at ¶ 17 (“when a person denies ownership in property there is no longer an expectation of privacy in the disclaimed property”); State v. Conner, 2005-Ohio-1971, ¶ 66 (8th Dist.) (“Conner had no standing to challenge the search of bags that he has maintained were not his”); State v. Carter, 2004-Ohio-1181, ¶ 31 (11th Dist.) (“A person who denies ownership of an item does not possess an expectation of privacy in the item to which he or she disclaimed ownership”); United States v. Peters, 194 F.3d 692, 696 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Defendant vigorously denied that the black attaché case was owned by him or put on the bus by him, and thus he has no interest in preserving the secrecy of the contents of the bag and has no legitimate expectation of privacy, which would confer standing”).
Mr. Olive Repeatedly Denied Ownership of the Safe
Here, Trooper Ashbaugh testified at the suppression hearing that he had asked Mr. Olive for the combination to the safe so that the troopers at the scene could open it and catalog its contents as part of their roadside inventory search. In response to that inquiry, Mr. Olive said that the safe did not belong to him and that it had been inside the center console when Mr. Olive purchased that console as an aftermarket addition to the vehicle. According to Mr. Olive’s roadside explanation, he had simply left the locked safe in the new console and had no idea whose it was. When Ashbaugh, during the roadside encounter, questioned Mr. Olive about the logic of that claim, Mr. Olive continued to assert that it was not his safe and that he did not know who it belonged to. Mr. Olive can be heard disclaiming ownership of the safe numerous times in the video footage from the trooper’s body-worn camera.
Mr. Oliver Lacks Standing to Allege Unlawful Police Conduct
Mr. Olive challenges on appeal only the warrantless search of the locked safe itself. And Mr. Olive, in response to the state’s assertion that Mr. Olive lacks standing to challenge the search, does not claim that any illegal police conduct compelled him to disavow ownership of the safe.
Mr. Olive Asserts Inapplicable Case Law
Instead, Mr. Olive points to State v. Carter, 69 Ohio St.3d 57 (1994), and argues that he enjoys automatic standing to challenge the search because (1) he was charged with a crime for which “possession” is an essential element, and (2) he was legitimately on the premises where the search occurred. The language from Carter that he cites, though, appears as part of the court’s summary of past rulings addressing the Fourth-Amendment rights of vehicle passengers, and that language is immediately followed by the words “[a]utomatic standing was eliminated” in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). Carter at 62. The Carter decision says nothing further about automatic standing, and that ruling certainly cannot accurately be described as embracing such a concept.
Conclusion and Holding
We conclude that Mr. Olive lacks standing to raise a Fourth-Amendment challenge to the search of the safe. He simply had no expectation of privacy in that item after repeatedly denying that it was his. See Tolbert, 692 F.2d at 1045 (“Tolbert can hardly assert that she ‘exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy’ respecting the luggage when she specifically disclaimed ownership thereof”); State v. Thompson, 2025- Ohio-3262, ¶ 21 (9th Dist.) (“an individual must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an item to have standing to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge . . . Mr. Thompson could only seek suppression of the evidence uncovered in the bookbag if he admitted a possessory interest in it”).
The trial court properly denied Mr. Olive’s motion to suppress, and Mr. Olive’s assignment of error is overruled.
The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County is affirmed. Costs are to be paid by Appellant Frederick Olive
Information for this article was obtained from State v. Olive, 2026 – Ohio – 2150.
State v. Olive, 2026 – Ohio – 2150 was issued by the Fifth District Appellate Court on June 4, 2026 and is binding in the following Ohio Counties: Ashland, Coshocton, Delaware, Fairfield, Guernsey, Holmes, Knox, Licking, Morgan, Morrow, Muskingum, Perry, Richland, Stark and Tuscarawas.
Lessons Learned
What is Legal Standing? Standing is a requirement that the [civil] plaintiffs [or criminal defendant] have been injured or been threatened with injury by governmental action complained of and focuses on the question of whether the litigant is the proper party to fight the lawsuit, not whether the issue itself is justiciable. Blacks Law Dictionary, 1405 (6th Ed, 1990). In other words, Defendant A cannot appeal the case of Defendant B conviction because Defendant A did not have legal standing to appeal Defendant B’s case.
For example, a person generally cannot complain about the violation of someone else’s rights. For example, Defendant A cannot appeal Defendant B’s conviction because Defendant A was not the person convicted and therefore lacks standing to challenge Defendant B’s case.
Rudimentary to Everyone Except Mr. Olive – On December 30, 1980 the Supreme Court of Ohio explained “It is rudimentary that one does not have standing to object to a search and seizure of property that he has voluntarily abandoned.” State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291 (1980). In this case Mr. Olive repeatedly denies ownership of the locked safe in his center console. Because Mr. Olive denied ownership, he does not have legal Standing to challenge the search of the safe. Had Mr. Olive claimed ownership in the safe, he may have succeeded in getting the narcotics suppressed. A key to Mr. Olive’s failure was that Trooper Ashbaugh repeatedly inquired about ownership of the safe and Mr. Olive repeatedly denied ownership; all of which was recorded on body camera video.
Was the Search of the Locked Safe Lawful? Mr. Olive did not have the legal standing to challenge the search because disavowed ownership. However, did Trooper Ashbaugh lawfully enter the locked safe? Maybe. Trooper Ashbaugh may have been able to enter the locked safe if the Ohio State Highway Patrol inventory policy would have permitted him to force open the locked safe. Another possible way to search a locked container are other established cases; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) – a lawfully stopped vehicle may be searched with probable cause. U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) – A container inside of a lawfully stopped vehicle may be searched if probable cause is established that the container contains contraband; and State v. Vega, 2018 – Ohio – 4002 – law enforcement may open a sealed container in a lawfully stopped vehicle if probable cause is established that the container contains contraband. See the following articles for more information: The officer not only ‘pushed the envelope’ he opened two and found gummy bears, two appeals and a supreme court ruling https://www.objectivelyreasonable.com/2020/10/12/the-officer-not-only-pushed-the-envelope-he-opened-two-and-found-gummy-bears-two-appeals-and-a-supreme-court-ruling/ Can law enforcement search a locked safe discovered inside a vehicle based on probable cause? https://www.objectivelyreasonable.com/2022/05/09/can-law-enforcement-search-a-locked-safe-discovered-inside-a-vehicle-based-on-probable-cause/
Pre-Sent Arms! Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Tazz Ashbaugh and the Fairfield County Prosecutor’s Office should be highly commended for the investigation, arrest, conviction and successful appeal defense of Mr. Olive. Well done.
Does your agency train on Vehicle Searches?
Don’t fail your training.
Don’t let your training fail you!
Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!