Based on Lieutenant #1’s comments, we find that Lieutenant #1’s handcuffing of Mr. Clark and his companion was to permit Lieutenant #1 to conduct his investigation safely, considering he was the only law enforcement officer on the scene at that time. Under these facts, we find that Mr. Clark was under an investigative detention. Thus, he was not free to leave, but he was also not under arrest.
State v. Clark
Fourth District Appellate Court
Ross County, Ohio
February 5, 2026
Why is this case important?
State v. Clark is important because it demonstrates that handcuffing a suspect during an investigative detention does not mean the suspect is under arrest and courts will closely examine the officer’s words, timing and actions to determine when an arrest actually occurred. The case also warns law enforcement that a vehicle search cannot be justified after the fact as an inventory search or inevitable discovery unless the arrest, impoundment and agency policy are clearly established before the search begins.
Background
On June 20, 2025, the State charged Mr. Daniel Clark with aggravated possession of methamphetamine in violation of O.R.C. §2925.11, which is a second degree felony.
Camera Surveillance Sign
On August 7, 2025, Mr. Clark filed a motion to suppress the State’s evidence. His motion alleged that Ross County Lieutenant #1 was dispatched to investigate a trespass complaint on a “dead-end portion of Plano Road” when he encountered Mr. Clark and a female companion in a parked car. The motion asserted there was a small sign indicating camera surveillance, but no sign prohibiting trespassing.
Note: Lieutenant #1’s name is used in the case but has been redacted in this article.
‘it does not mean that you are going to jail.
The motion claimed that Lieutenant #1 approached the vehicle and informed Mr. Clark and his companion that they were trespassing. Mr. Clark told Lieutenant #1 that there was a pellet gun “in the back.” Mr. Clark maintained that Lieutenant #1 then ordered him out of the vehicle and placed him in handcuffs, telling him that “ ‘it does not mean that you are going to jail.’ ”
Handcuffed and Questioned
After Lieutenant #1 conducted a consensual pat-down search of Mr. Clark, he had the female exit the vehicle and placed her in handcuffs as well. The motion contended that Lieutenant #1 began questioning them about why they were on this property. Mr. Clark claimed they had the owner’s permission.
Trespass Arrest and Methamphetamine
The motion claimed that after further discussion, Lieutenant #1 told Mr. Clark and his companion that they might not be charged with trespassing. He then requested dispatch to contact the property owner to determine if he wanted to press charges. The dispatcher informed Lieutenant #1 that the owner wanted to press charges. Lieutenant #1 then began searching Mr. Clark’s car and found a baggie containing a crystalline substance. The State charged Mr. Clark with trespassing and aggravated possession of methamphetamine.
Arrest then Vehicle Search or Vehicle Search then Arrest?
Mr. Clark’s motion argued that Lieutenant #1 lacked probable cause to believe he knowingly trespassed, as there was no posted sign and the property was frequently used by others. He further argued that even if Lieutenant #1 had probable cause to believe Mr. Clark was knowingly on the property, no arrest was made before the vehicle was searched and the baggie with crystalline substance was discovered. Therefore, Mr. Clark claimed that the search leading to the drug discovery was conducted without a warrant, and, as a result, the court should suppress the drugs found in his vehicle.
[N]0 one “could point to the exact moment an arrest was legally effective with certainty.”
In response, the State acknowledged that no one “could point to the exact moment an arrest was legally effective with certainty.” Yet, the State argued that the evidence should not be excluded because it would have been discovered “in the lawful course of action.” The State maintained Lieutenant #1 was not attempting to act unlawfully; he had a reasonable good-faith belief that he was conducting an inventory search of Mr. Clark’s vehicle.
Absent Lieutenant #1’s “oversight” in failing to inform Mr. Clark that he was under arrest, the search would have been a lawful inventory search. Therefore, the State moved the court to deny Mr. Clark’s motion to suppress.
Motion to Suppress Hearing
On September 12, 2025, the court held a suppression hearing. The State called a single witness, Lieutenant #1. Lieutenant #1 stated that he was wearing a body cam that recorded his encounter with Mr. Clark. The video was then played for the judge.
Parked on a Leaf Covered Roadway with a Sunshade in the Windshield
The video shows Lieutenant #1 exiting his patrol vehicle and walking down a leaf-covered roadway until he sees Mr. Clark’s vehicle. As he approaches the vehicle, it can be seen that there is a sunshade in its front windshield. Lieutenant #1 approaches the partially-open window of the back passenger door on the driver’s side and asks the occupants to put their hands on the dash. With his sidearm drawn, Lieutenant #1 then opened the driver’s door and informed Mr. Clark and his female companion that they were trespassing. Lieutenant #1 asked if there were any guns or knives, and Mr. Clark advised that there was a ”pellet gun in the back.”
Exited the Vehicle – Handcuffed – Does Not Mean Jail
Pursuant to Lieutenant #1’s request, Mr. Clark exited his vehicle, and Lieutenant #1 handcuffed him, explaining that he was alone, Mr. Clark was trespassing, and he needed to assess the situation. While Lieutenant #1 was handcuffing Mr. Clark, he informed Mr. Clark that this did not mean he was going to jail. After receiving consent, Lieutenant #1 conducted a pat-down search of Mr. Clark. Lieutenant #1 then checked Mr. Clark’s license, which confirmed his identity. Lieutenant #1 had Mr. Clark move to the front of the car, then he had Mr. Clark’s companion exit the vehicle and handcuffed her as well.
Owner Wants Trespass Charges
Lieutenant #1 again informed Mr. Clark and his companion that they were trespassing, but that did not necessarily mean they would be “charged or ticketed.” He called dispatch and asked that the property owner be contacted and asked if they wanted to press charges. Shortly thereafter, dispatch informed Lieutenant #1 that the property owner wanted to pursue a trespassing charge. Lieutenant #1 then asked dispatch to acquire the property owner’s contact information.
Handcuffed – Vehicle Search – Methamphetamine
Lieutenant #1 informed Mr. Clark and his companion that there was a no trespassing sign and a camera on the property, which they denied seeing. After briefly discussing with Mr. Clark and his companion why they believed they could be on the property, Lieutenant #1 left them handcuffed at the front of Mr. Clark’s vehicle and proceeded to search Mr. Clark’s vehicle. Lieutenant #1 inquired about the pellet gun, and Mr. Clark responded that it was in the back. Lieutenant #1 unsuccessfully attempted to open the rear hatch and then proceeded to search the back-passenger seat on the driver’s-side, examining a small black pouch, a small case, and the pocket on the back of the driver’s seat. He then looked over the seat into the rear-storage area and located the pellet gun. Lieutenant #1 then proceeded to search the driver’s seat area and discovered a baggie containing a crystallized substance near a boot on the floor, which formed the basis of the drug charge in this case.
Request for Tow Truck and the Not Mine Defense
Immediately after discovering what appeared to be contraband in the baggie, Lieutenant #1 requested dispatch to send the “next available 31” which Mr. Clark claimed is the code for requesting a tow truck. Lieutenant #1 then proceeded to the front of the vehicle and read Mr. Clark and his companion their Miranda rights. He reminded both of them that the property owners wanted to press charges and, therefore, they would be charged for trespassing. He then stated: “keeping your rights in mind, there’s a little blue bag with crystal stuff in it” i.e., the baggie he discovered in Mr. Clark’s vehicle. Mr. Clark denied knowledge of the baggie. Later during the detention, Lieutenant #1 requested dispatch to inform Detective Davidson that Mr. Clark’s vehicle would be towed, and Mr. Clark and his companion were going to jail. Although there was additional video that showed Lieutenant #1 continuing his search of Mr. Clark’s vehicle, the arrival of Lieutenant #1’s backup, etc., none of it is probative in addressing the State’s appeal
Lieutenant #1 Testified He Conducted an Inventory of the Vehicle
On direct examination, Lieutenant #1 testified that he decided to arrest Mr. Clark instead of issuing a summons after learning the property owner wanted to press charges. He stated that “when people are caught actively trespassing on property, I generally take the person to jail.” Lieutenant #1 explained that he conducted an inventory search of Mr. Clark’s vehicle since it was going to be towed. Lieutenant #1 testified that a plea deal was reached on the trespass charge that resulted in Mr. Clark being convicted.
Lieutenant #1 stated that the baggie that contained the crystalline substance, which he suspected was drugs, was sent to the lab for testing.
Cross Examination
Defense counsel then cross-examined Lieutenant #1. Lieutenant #1 confirmed that he told both Mr. Clark and his companion that being handcuffed did not mean they were going to jail. Lieutenant #1 also confirmed that he never explicitly told either of them they were under arrest when dispatch informed him that the owner wanted to press charges, but that it was nevertheless at that moment he decided he was going to arrest them. Defense counsel asked Lieutenant #1: “Now the, uh, decision to impound the vehicle, that was made after the search, wasn’t it?”
Lieutenant #1: No, the, if they were both being arrested, which is what was my intent, as soon as I heard that the property owners wanted them charged, again, I didn’t vocalize this out loud to myself or anybody else, but when I find people actively trespassing on someone else’s property, I usually take them to jail unless there’s extinu, some kind of extenuating circumstances, but I also realize about that time that hey, I am still by myself, backup still hasn’t arrived and is it’s taking my officer this long to get here, it’s going to take the tow truck longer to find us, so I might as well get ahead of the game and call for a tow truck now, versus wait until everything is done.
Lieutenant #1 testified that he did not expect to find any evidence to support a trespassing charge in Mr. Clark’s vehicle. He stated that the search was to inventory property since Mr. Clark was going to jail and his vehicle was going to be towed.
Lieutenant #1 Requested a Tow Truck after Discovery of the Methamphetamine
After the hearing, the court announced its decision in open court and issued a one-page entry reflecting that decision. The court granted Mr. Clark’s motion to suppress adopting the reasoning from Mr. Clark’s “post hearing memorandum.” Mr. Clark’s post-hearing memorandum maintained that two minutes prior to learning that the property owner would press trespassing charges, Lieutenant #1 had suggested to Mr. Clark and his companion that they might not be charged or go to jail. Yet, two minutes later, when Lieutenant #1 and Mr. Clark overheard the dispatcher indicate that the property owner wanted to press changes, the deputy did nothing “to divest [them] of that notion[.]” Further, despite testifying that he wanted to “get ahead of the game and call for the tow truck now[,]” Lieutenant #1 did not call for a tow truck until immediately after he discovered the baggie of drugs in Mr. Clark’s vehicle. It was then that he also approached Mr. Clark and his companion and read them their Miranda rights.
Court Inferred that Mr. Clark’s Arrest Occurred after Discovery of the Meth
From these facts, consistent with Mr. Clark’s memorandum, the court inferred that Lieutenant #1 did not arrest Mr. Clark until after he discovered the baggie of drugs in Mr. Clark’s vehicle. Consequently, because the baggie was seized without a warrant and no exception applied, the court found that the seizure of the baggie was unreasonable and excluded it from evidence. It is this judgment that the State appeals
Established Case Law – Arrest
The State argues that the trial court’s determination that Mr. Clark was not under arrest at the time that the inventory search began is not supported by competent credible evidence. The State acknowledges that Lieutenant #1 never explicitly told Mr. Clark that he was under arrest prior to searching Mr. Clark’s vehicle, but claims that such words are not required to constitute an arrest. The State posits that any confinement beyond that permitted for an investigative detention permitted by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) is integral in determining what constitutes an arrest. Citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, and State v. Mauer, 15 Ohio St. 3d 239, the State claims that “if one is deprived of his movement by the State, he is in custody and considered under arrest.”
Prosecution Argues when Radio Advised the Victim Wanted to Press Charges, Mr. Clark was Under Arrest
The State asserts that when dispatch informed Lieutenant #1 that the property owner wanted to press charges, it was also heard by Mr. Clark. The State claims that Mr. Clark “visibly reacted and appeared upset.” The State maintains that Mr. Clark was clearly aware that he was going to be charged at that point in time. The State claims that being handcuffed and now being aware that he was facing criminal trespass charges was sufficient to put Mr. Clark on notice that he was under arrest.
Prosecution Explains a Vehicle Inventory
The State also argues that Mr. Clark’s vehicle could not remain on private property following his arrest. An inventory search is routine practice when vehicles are impounded. Thus, the State contends that Lieutenant #1 conducted an inventory search to document any of Mr. Clark’s belongings in the vehicle, which did not require probable cause. In the course of that search, Lieutenant #1 discovered a baggie containing a crystalline substance on the driver’s side floor. The State maintains that this discovery was lawful under the inventory search exception, one of the few exceptions where a warrant is not needed to search private property.
Prosecution Argues the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine
Even if there was a technical violation, the State argues that the exclusionary rule should not be applied because the evidence discovered during the inventory search of Mr. Clark’s vehicle would have been inevitably discovered through lawful means—specifically, when the vehicle was towed and inventoried after the occupants were arrested and transported to jail, as required by departmental policy for all towed vehicles. The State further contends that Lieutenant #1 acted with an objectively reasonable, good-faith belief that his actions were lawful because he was alone in a remote location, the suspects were inevitably going to jail after the property owner pressed charges, and the administrative inventory search was undertaken in accordance with established practice rather than as a pretext for investigation. Additionally, the State asserts that suppression would not achieve any appreciable deterrent effect because there was no unlawful intent or attempt to circumvent constitutional protections, and, therefore, applying the exclusionary rule would place the State in a worse position than if the evidence had never been discovered, contrary to its intended purpose.
Was the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Argument Tardy?
In response, Mr. Clark maintains that the State’s assertion that the trial court erred in granting his motion to suppress is predicated upon an invited error. Mr. Clark claims that the State’s post-suppression hearing brief conceded that he was not under arrest prior to the initial search. Thus, the State cannot now be permitted to argue that Mr. Clark was lawfully arrested prior to the initial search.
A Motor Vehicle Inventory Cannot be a Pre-Text for a Search for Evidence
Mr. Clark further argues that there was no lawful impoundment of Mr. Clark’s vehicle. Lieutenant #1’s discovery of drugs in Mr. Clark’s vehicle prior to his arrest cannot provide the basis for a lawful impoundment of Mr. Clark’s vehicle. Mr. Clark maintains that an inventory search must follow a lawful impoundment, by conduct that complies with a standard practice or policy, and cannot be a pretext for a search for evidence.
Ross County Vehicle Inventory Policy was Not Submitted to the Court
Mr. Clark also notes that the State presented no evidence of any policy from the Ross County Sheriff’s Office regarding searches of impounded vehicles. Therefore, the trial court could not determine if such a policy could have lawfully justified Lieutenant #1’s impoundment of Mr. Clark’s vehicle.
Court Concludes without the Ross County Sheriff’s Office Inventory Policy a Legal Conclusion cannot be Reached
Finally, Mr. Clark contends that the search resulting in the discovery of drugs was not conducted in good faith. He asserts that determining whether an item is seized in good faith requires the decision to be “objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” Without a guiding policy from the Ross County Sheriff’s Office regarding inventory searches, it is impossible to determine whether Lieutenant #1’s actions in searching Mr. Clark’s vehicle were in good faith.
Established Case Law – Investigatory Detention and Arrest
“An investigative stop, or Terry stop, under the Fourth Amendment allows an officer to briefly stop and temporarily detain individuals in order to investigate possible criminal activity.” State v. Collins, 2019-Ohio-1724, ¶ 20-22, (4th Dist.), citing State v. Staten, 2003-Ohio-4592, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). During an investigatory stop the individual being investigated is not “free to go.” See State v. Heinhold, 1988 WL 45553 (1st Dist. May 11, 1988). Yet, “a person detained as a result of a[n] [investigative stop] is not in Miranda custody because such detention does not ‘sufficiently impair [the detained person’s] free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.’ ” (Third brackets original) Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 510 (2012), quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984). Thus, “the ‘temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a traffic stop or Terry stop does not constitute Miranda custody[.]’ ” Id., quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 113.
“Generally, handcuffing and detaining an individual without probable cause constitutes an illegal arrest pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Vaughters v. Scioto Cnty., Ohio, Sheriff’s Dep’t, 1997 WL 596298, *2 (4th Dist. Sept. 23, 1997), citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 94 (1964). “However, an officer may briefly detain a suspicious individual in order to determine his or her identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information if specific facts known to the officer indicate that a crime is occurring or is about to occur.” Id., citing State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.3d 58, 60 (1990), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 (1968). “Officers may [hand]cuff persons stopped pursuant to Terry for purposes of officer safety, without converting the encounter into an arrest.” State v. Drumm, 2015-Ohio-2176, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing State v. White, 2002 WL 63294, fn. 1 (2d Dist. Jan. 18, 2002), citing State v. Bradley, 1993 WL 69474, *2 (10th Dist. March 11, 1993).
The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that “[A]n arrest, in the technical, as well as common sense, signifies the apprehension of an individual or the restraint of a person’s freedom in contemplation of the formal charging with a crime.” State v. Darrah, 64 Ohio St.2d 22, 26, citing United States v. Bonanno, 180 F.Supp. 71, (S.D.N.Y.1960). The Court has recognized that “ [A]n arrest occurs when the following four requisite elements are involved: (1) an intent to arrest, (2) under real or pretended authority, (3) accompanied by an actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person, and (4) which is so understood by the person arrested.’ ” State v. Barker, 53 Ohio St.2d 135, 139 (1978). “Because this is a conjunctive test, all four of its factors must be satisfied to determine that [an arrest has occurred].” Phillips v. Regina Heath Care, 2024- Ohio-6012, ¶ 22 (9th Dist.).
“‘In determining ‘when’ an investigatory stop ripens into an arrest, no bright line exists. Instead, in determining whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, “common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.” ’ ” (Emphasis added.) State v. Ronald Stringer, 1999 WL 105095, *8 (4th Dist. Feb. 24, 1999), quoting United States v. Espinosa-Guerra, 805 F.2d 1502, 1509 (11th Cir. 1986), quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985). “ ‘In determining “when” a person is arrested, [a reviewing court should] ask at what point, “in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed he [she] was not free to leave.” ’ ” (Brackets original) Id. at *8, quoting United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1989), quoting United States v. Hammock, 860 F.2d 390, 393 (11th Cir.1988).
Furthermore, in determining when an arrest occurred, courts may consider the law enforcement officers’ behavior. Courts may examine: (1) whether the officers touched the individual; (2) whether the officers displayed a weapon; (3) whether the officers handcuffed the individual; and (4) the type of words spoken by the police officer. Id. at 110, Section 6.2. Whether the officers’ conduct contributes to a finding that the officers arrested the individual “turns upon the degree of physical force and show of authority communicated by the police.” Id. at 110, Section 6.2.
Additionally, “[I]t is well-settled that an officer’s subjective view of whether probable cause existed to arrest the suspect is not dispositive of the issue.” Id., citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). “Rather, the reviewing court should examine the objective facts and circumstances when determining whether the defendant was under arrest.” Id., citing Katz and Gianelli, Criminal Law, 107, Section 6.2 (1996). “ ‘[C]ourts have disregarded officers’ rationale for a search as inconclusive, finding that “it is of no importance that the police may have thought [regarding their authority to conduct a search]; the test is what could lawfully be done, not what the policemen thought the source of their power to be.” ’ ” (Initial brackets original) Id., at *9, quoting State v. DiNickle, 1993 WL 545142, *7 (11th Dist. Dec. 3, 1993) (Christely J. concurring), quoting United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1256 (2d Cir. 1979).
“The benefit of the objective custody analysis is that it is ‘designed to give clear guidance to the police.’ ” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270 (2011), quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S., 652, 668 (2004). A court should examine the totality of the circumstances in determining when an investigative detention ripens into an arrest. United States v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 524, 529 (6th Cir. 2003)
Established Case Law – Inventory Search
“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment —subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). “An inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle is a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” State v. Goodin, 2000 WL 134733, *3 (4th Dist. Jan. 28, 2000), citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987). “The purpose of an inventory search is ‘aimed at securing or protecting the car and its contents.’ ” State v. Williams, 54 Ohio App.3d 117, 119, (4th Dist. November 3, 1988), quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 (1976). However, “[A] search which is conducted with an investigatory intent, and which is not conducted in the manner of an inventory search, does not constitute an ‘inventory search’ and may not be used as a pretext to conduct a warrantless evidentiary search.” Id., citing State v. Caponi, 12 Ohio St. 3d 302, 303 (1984).
Further, “an inventory search is unlawful if it is not conducted in accordance with standardized procedures or policies.” State v. Catrell, 1997 WL 414974, * 5 (4th Dist. July 21, 1997), citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 370-71 (1987). Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that:
[T]he government’s failure to submit a copy of written inventory search procedures into evidence in support of a warrantless inventory search does not render the search per se unreasonable. We further hold that a law-enforcement officer’s testimony that attributes an inventory-search policy to the law-enforcement agency that conducted the inventory search, explains when the policy must be followed, and explains whether the policy was followed, combined with body-camera footage documenting the inventory search, is sufficient evidence to establish the existence of such procedures, that the officer who conducted the search acted in accordance with the policy, and that the search was reasonable, and therefore lawful, under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Toran, 2023-Ohio-3564, ¶4
Established Case Law – Criminal Trespass
Finally, we note that criminal trespass is a fourth-degree misdemeanor offense. See State v. Wright, 2021-Ohio-2692 (4th Dist.), ¶16. “In misdemeanor cases where a law enforcement officer is empowered to arrest without a warrant, the officer may issue a summons in lieu of making an arrest, when issuance of a summons appears reasonably calculated to ensure the defendant’s appearance.” Crim.R. 4(A)(3). Therefore, when dealing with a person who has arguably committed a misdemeanor, the law enforcement officer has discretion whether to issue the defendant a summons or to arrest him or her. See City of Marysville v. Rausch, 1979 WL 207871, *2 (3rd Dist. June 6, 1979). B. Analysis
One critical question that is pertinent in making this determination is when did Lieutenant #1 arrest Mr. Clark.
When announcing its decision to the parties, the court stated: “I don’t know that the facts are really in dispute, and I think this is literally, more a question of law that applies to it.” We agree, so our review is de novo. Virtually the entire stop was recorded by the deputy’s body cam. Thus, it essentially comes to whether the search that resulted in the discovery of the methamphetamine was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, i.e., it was supported by probable cause or whether there is some exception that otherwise permitted the search. One critical question that is pertinent in making this determination is when did Lieutenant #1 arrest Mr. Clark.
After having Mr. Clark exit his vehicle, Lieutenant #1 handcuffed Mr. Clark and told him “I got to detain you for right now because I’m by myself, you guys are trespassing, I gotta figure out what’s goin on here. It doesn’t mean you gotta go to jail.” Lieutenant #1 never mentions Mr. Clark might be arrested. As he is patting down Mr. Clark for any weapons he might possess, Lieutenant #1 again tells Mr. Clark he is “investigating a trespass.” Lieutenant #1 then ordered Mr. Clark’s female companion to exit the vehicle and handcuffed her as well.
Court Concludes that Mr. Clark was Detained Not Arrested
Lieutenant #1 again told Mr. Clark and his companion that they were “actively trespassing and committing a violation that doesn’t necessarily mean you gotta get charged or ticketed, we don’t know.” Based on Lieutenant #1’s comments, we find that Lieutenant #1’s handcuffing of Mr. Clark and his companion was to permit Lieutenant #1 to conduct his investigation safely, considering he was the only law enforcement officer on the scene at that time. Under these facts, we find that Mr. Clark was under an investigative detention. Thus, he was not free to leave, but he was also not under arrest.
Court Reviews Facts as Part of the Totality of the Circumstances
Approximately 12 minutes into the detention, Lieutenant #1 requested the dispatcher to contact the property owner to see if he wanted to press trespass charges. Shortly thereafter, the dispatcher informed Lieutenant #1 that the property owner wanted to press charges. At the suppression hearing, Lieutenant #1 testified that this is when he decided to arrest Mr. Clark and his companion. However, putting Lieutenant #1’s testimony aside, none of the factors of an arrest as outlined in Stringer were present. For example, Lieutenant #1 maintained a relaxed demeanor, and although Mr. Clark was handcuffed, it had been previously determined that this was for Lieutenant #1’s protection during the investigation, and not an indication of Mr. Clark being under arrest. See Stringer, 1999 WL 105095, *8 (4th Dist. Feb. 24, 1999). Further, while Lieutenant #1 initially drew his firearm when approaching the idling car, he holstered it after opening the driver’s door and speaking with Mr. Clark and his companion, and did not draw it again during the remainder of the detention. Additionally, Lieutenant #1 informed Mr. Clark on two separate occasions that he was trespassing, but also stated that this did not mean that Mr. Clark would be jailed, charged, or ticketed.
Mr. Clark Could have been Summonsed In Lieu of Arrest
Further complicating the analysis in this particular case is the fact that charging Mr. Clark with trespass did not automatically mean he was under arrest. Because criminal trespass is a fourth-degree misdemeanor, Lieutenant #1 could have merely issued a summons for Mr. Clark to appear in court instead of arresting him. Although not legally required, Lieutenant #1 could have, and perhaps should have, informed Mr. Clark and his companion that they were under arrest once he learned that the property owner wanted to press charges, which might have prevented this appeal. Instead, Lieutenant #1 briefly chatted with Mr. Clark and his companion about who allegedly allowed them on the property.
Objectively, this timing suggests that Lieutenant #1 intended to arrest Mr. Clark only after finding the drugs.
Additionally, what is further notable and objectively quantifiable is when Lieutenant #1 called for a tow truck. Lieutenant #1 testified that because his backup was taking so long to get to the scene, it would likely take the tow truck a long time to find the property as well. Therefore, he testified that he decided to get “ahead of the game[,]” and would “call for the tow truck now, versus wait until everything is done.” Yet, at no time prior to his search of Mr. Clark’s vehicle, including after the dispatcher informed him that the property owner wanted to bring trespass charges, can Lieutenant #1 be heard calling a tow truck. It was only after discovering contraband in Mr. Clark’s vehicle that Lieutenant #1 requested the “next available 31[,]” a tow truck. Objectively, this timing suggests that Lieutenant #1 intended to arrest Mr. Clark only after finding the drugs.
Timing of Miranda Recitation
Also persuasive to our analysis is the timing of when Lieutenant #1 read Mr. Clark and his companion their Miranda rights. Immediately after discovering the contraband and calling for the tow truck, Lieutenant #1 returned to Mr. Clark and his companion and read them their Miranda rights. He further stated that “if [the owners] wanted to press charges, charges will be pressed, for trespass.” Lieutenant #1 continued: “Keeping your rights in mind, there’s a little blue bag with crystal stuff in it[.]” Thus, Lieutenant #1’s reading of Mr. Clark’s and his companion’s Miranda rights for both criminal trespass and the drugs occurred after discovery of the baggie. Again, objectively, we find that these actions support the conclusion that Lieutenant #1 did not intend to arrest Mr. Clark for trespass until after findings the drugs in Mr. Clark’s car.
Fourth District Appellate Court ‘Reluctantly Concludes’
Viewing the totality of these circumstances using an objective standard, we reluctantly conclude that Lieutenant #1’s investigative detention of Mr. Clark and his companion did not ripen into a custodial arrest until after he searched Mr. Clark’s vehicle and discovered the contraband. This means that the contraband was discovered during a warrantless search, and without an applicable exception to justify the search, it was unreasonable.
Lieutenant #1 used gloves and took photographs when he resumed the search. This indicates that Lieutenant #1’s search was investigatory, not for inventory purposes.
The State argues that this court should determine Lieutenant #1 was performing an inventory search of Mr. Clark’s vehicle when he found the methamphetamine, which falls under an exception to the Fourth Amendment. The State maintains that Lieutenant #1, knowing that he was arresting Mr. Clark, conducted an inventory search because the vehicle would need towing. However, we have determined that Lieutenant #1 did not arrest Mr. Clark until after finding the contraband, suggesting that the search may have been a pretext for a warrantless investigatory search. Notably, during the initial search that uncovered the contraband, Lieutenant #1 was not wearing gloves or taking photographs. It was only after arresting Mr. Clark, following the discovery, that Lieutenant #1 used gloves and took photographs when he resumed the search. This indicates that Lieutenant #1’s search was investigatory, not for inventory purposes. Therefore, Lieutenant #1 did not conduct a valid inventory search.
Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Analysis
Finally, the State argues that even if Lieutenant #1 found the methamphetamine before he arrested Mr. Clark, Lieutenant #1 had legal authority to arrest Mr. Clark and impound the vehicle, leading to its inevitable discovery. The State maintains that Lieutenant #1 had no motive or intent to find evidence of a crime. Therefore, the State urges that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to exclude the evidence.
Without the policy or a detailed explanation from Lieutenant #1, we cannot assess whether his search of Mr. Clark’s vehicle was a reasonable inventory search.
Even if we were to assume Lieutenant #1 acted improperly but in good faith in conducting an inventory search of Mr. Clark’s vehicle, we cannot assess the reasonableness of that search because the State did not provide sufficient evidence of any inventory search policy from the Ross County Sheriff’s Office. No written policy was admitted, and Lieutenant #1’s testimony and body cam footage were insufficient to determine if his search qualified as a valid inventory search. Aside from stating that a car is impounded when a person is arrested and searched, Lieutenant #1 failed to explain when the policy must be followed or provide details on its implementation. Without the policy or a detailed explanation from Lieutenant #1, we cannot assess whether his search of Mr. Clark’s vehicle was a reasonable inventory search.
Therefore, we reject the State’s assertion that the exclusion rule should not apply here.
Conclusion and Holding
We must uphold constitutional protections, even when unpopular, as neglecting this duty erodes the foundational principles of our country. The evidence when viewed through an objective lens showed that Lieutenant #1 did not arrest Mr. Clark until after discovering contraband in his vehicle, making the search warrantless and lacking a valid exception. Consequently, the search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. Therefore, we find that Mr. Clark’s motion to suppress should be granted, excluding the contraband from evidence, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Information for this article was obtained from State v. Clark, 2026 – Ohio – 447.
State v. Clark, 2026 – Ohio – 447 was issued on February 5, 2026 by the Fourth District Appellate Court and is binding in the following Ohio Counties: Adams, Athens, Gallia, Highland, Hocking, Jackson, Lawrence, Meigs, Pickaway, Pike, Ross, Scioto, Vinton and Washington.
Lessons Learned
- Can Law Enforcement Handcuff a Suspect during an Investigative Detention and it not Rise to the Level of an Arrest? Yes. In order to detain a suspect, the officer must have reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). But the right to detain a suspect does not permit law enforcement to handcuff the suspect every time. So what factors permit law enforcement to handcuff a detained suspect who is not under arrest? The Sixth Circuit Appellate Court addressed these factors with negative language in 2015 “If there is no specific reason for the officers to believe that the detainee poses a risk of flight or violence, “a bare inference” or speculation that the detainee may somehow be violent is not sufficient to justify the use of handcuffs. Brown v. Lewis, 14 – 392 (6th Cir. February 26, 2015). Consequently, the two factors that WILL permit law enforcement to handcuff during an investigative detention is risk of flight or risk of violence.
Sixteen years earlier the Sixth Circuit held “[T]he use of handcuffs [does not] exceed the bounds of a Terry stop, so long as the circumstances warrant that precaution. Houston v. Doe 174 F.3d 809, 815 (6th Cir. 1999). So handcuffing a suspect or in this case two suspects is not prohibited during an investigative detention.
2. What is the Legal Standard for Arrest? On November 19, 1980 the Supreme Court of Ohio issued State v. Darrah, 64 Ohio St.2d 22 (1980) ‘Darrah Doctrine’ and established the four elements of arrest: 1) Intent to arrest. 2) Under real or assumed authority. 3) Accompanied by actual or constructive custody of the person. 4) Which is so understood by the person arrested. The fourth element means the law enforcement officer must tell the suspect he is under arrest. Law enforcement must always say ‘You are under arrest.” … unless the suspect is so violent upon first contact that it is not practicle, otherwise officers must state clearly the suspect is under arrest. The Darrah Doctrine was underscored on May 28, 2009 when the Sixth Circuit Appellate Court issued Grawery v. Drury, 567 F.3d 302 (6th Cir., 2009) in a civil case where Mr. Grawery alleged Detroit Police used excessive force. In the Grawery case, the Sixth Circuit held “The general consensus among our cases is that officers cannot use force on a detainee who has been subdued, is not told he is under arrest, or is not resisting arrest.”. In this case the timing of the events were critical to the analysis as to when Mr. Clark was arrested. Upon initial contact Lieutenant #1 handcuffed Mr. Clark and his companion. Lieutenant #1 explained that they were being held under investigative detention. The property owner stated he want to press charges and Lieutenant #1 searched the vehicle. Lieutenant #1 could have impounded the vehicle without arresting Mr. Clark as he could have summonsed him for Trespassing. During the vehicle search, Lieutenant #1 discovered the methamphetamine and then a tow truck was called and Mr. Clark had his Miranda rights read to him. The court determined it was at this moment, after the vehicle search, that Mr. Clark was placed under arrest and why the meth should be excluded.
3. Why wasn’t the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Successful? On June 11, 1984 the U.S. Supreme Court established the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine. In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine allows unlawfully obtained evidence to be admitted if the prosecution proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence would ultimately or inevitably have been discovered by lawful means anyway. The doctrine is meant to place the police in the same position they would have been in absent the illegality, not a worse one. The prosecution argued the drugs would have been found anyway once the vehicle was towed and inventoried. The Fourth District Appellate Court rejected that argument because the prosecution failed to submit the Ross County S.O. inventory policy that would have inevitably led to discovery.
4. Improvement – Do not search first and justify later. In a case like this, decide and communicate whether the person is being detained, cited or arrested. This is sometimes referred to as reverse probable cause. Make the arrest, then figure out the probable cause afterwards. If the vehicle is going to be impounded, make sure the arrest and towing decision are clear and that any inventory is done under a real, standardized policy rather than in a way that looks like a hunt for evidence. Lastly work with your prosecution and assure that the court has the agency’s inventory policy when a case involves a law enforcement impound.
Does your agency train on Investigative Detention and Arrests?
Don’t fail your training.
Don’t let your training fail you!
Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!