Because Mr. Helman’s consent did not extend to validate the search of Ms. Mort’s purse, any evidence obtained in or after that improper search was inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree.
State v. Mort
Seventh District Appellate Court
Mahoning County, Ohio
January 28, 2026
Why is this case important?
State v. Mort significantly narrows how courts may interpret third-party consent in vehicle searches by requiring a closer examination of ownership, access and control over containers within the passenger compartment. It signals to law enforcement that consent to search a vehicle does not automatically extend to all containers inside, particularly those associated with passengers – even when the officer doesn’t know that the container belongs to the passenger. The decision also raises practical concerns by importing home-search consent principles into the vehicle context, creating uncertainty for officers making real-time decisions during traffic stops. Lastly, the Seventh District Appellate Court permitted body camera video analysis and conclusions without the benefit of sworn testimony.
Background
Ms. Jessica Ann Mort appeals the July 18, 2025 decision of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas denying her motion to suppress evidence. The motion was based on the assertion that her boyfriend lacked the ability to consent to a search of her purse, which was inside of his truck. In her motion she sought to exclude drugs found in that purse. Because this discovery led to the discovery of drugs on her person, she sought exclusion of this evidence also, as well as certain incriminating statements. Ms. Mort contends that neither she nor her boyfriend exhibited behavior that would lead police officers to believe they were engaging in criminal activity. Even so, she argues that her boyfriend’s consent to a police search of his vehicle did not extend to include a search of her purse. Because she contends this search was improper, she argues that any evidence from the subsequent search of her person and any statements she made after the search should also be deemed inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. For the reasons provided, Ms. Mort’s arguments have merit. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the matter is remanded for the state to determine if it can proceed without the evidence obtained from the search of Ms. Mort’s purse and her person, along with any statements she made after the search. Factual and Procedural History
Expired Tags – Traffic Stop
This appeal stems from a traffic stop that occurred at approximately 5:00 p.m. on January 12, 2024. Robert Helman, Ms. Mort’s boyfriend, was operating a green F-150 Ford pickup truck eastbound on route 224 in Canfield. Ms. Mort was in the passenger seat. Sergeant #1 observed expired registration tags on the truck. Sergeant #1 then saw the truck abruptly turn into the parking lot of a restaurant. Based on the expired tags, Sergeant #1 initiated a traffic stop of the truck. The following events occurred in the restaurant parking lot.
Note: Sergeant #1 is identified in the case by name but is redacted in this article.
Inoperable Window and Robust Criminal Histories
As Sergeant #1 approached the truck, Mr. Helman opened his door, because the window apparently did not open. Sergeant #1 stood towards the back of the driver’s door and Mr. Helman had to look backwards and lean out in order to speak to him. Mr. Helman informed Sergeant #1 that he planned to go to a friend’s house. When asked why he pulled into the restaurant parking lot, he responded that he and Ms. Mort intended to eat dinner before heading to the friend’s house. Again, it was 5:00 p.m. at the time of the stop. Sergeant #1 obtained Mr. Helman and Ms. Mort’s names and searched them in the LEADS system, which revealed Mr. Helman had prior breaking and entering and concealed carry convictions and Ms. Mort had been convicted of disorderly conduct in the past.
Abrupt Hunger?
Sergeant #1 wore a body camera. Sergeant #1 and an unidentified officer, who provided backup, discussed the stop, and their conversation was recorded. Sergeant #1 expressed curiosity as to why Mr. Helman turned suddenly into the parking lot. He posited that there were multiple possibilities, but wondered whether a gun may be inside the vehicle due to Mr. Helman’s past concealed carry conviction.
Possibly True
Sergeant #1 conceded on the recording that Mr. Helman’s quick turn into the parking lot was equally likely the result of Mr. Helman’s awareness that his registration tags had expired two months earlier, and speculated that Mr. Helman sought to avoid a traffic infraction by preventing the officer from clearly seeing his license plate. Also, although he appeared not to find Mr. Helman’s story plausible, it was possible he was being truthful when he told Sergeant #1 that they simply wanted to eat dinner before heading to a friend’s house.
Sergeant #1 did not believe Mr. Helman entered the parking lot to eat dinner in the restaurant.
From this recorded exchange it can be gleaned that even though Sergeant #1 did not believe Mr. Helman entered the parking lot to eat dinner in the restaurant, he understood that he lacked conclusive reasons to further detain Mr. Helman, because he recognized there could be several plausible explanations for Mr. Helman’s action in quickly entering the parking lot, and these were not necessarily criminal. Despite conceding that he had no probable cause that any crime had been committed or was being committed, Sergeant #1 informed the other officer that he intended to “get [Mr. Helman] out, gonna chat him up a little bit.”
Mr. Helman Consented to a Search of the Truck
Sergeant #1 then ordered Mr. Helman out of the truck. Sergeant #1 took Mr. Helman behind the vehicle, near the police cruiser. During this conversation with Sergeant #1, Mr. Helman acknowledged his prior convictions but denied currently having weapons or contraband on his person or inside of his truck. When Sergeant #1 asked if he could search the truck, Mr. Helman consented. After a search of Mr. Helman’s person revealed no contraband, Sergeant #1 walked over to the passenger side of the truck and ordered Ms. Mort out.
Ms. Mort was Unaware Mr. Helman Consented to a Vehicle Search
Ms. Mort had been sitting inside the truck in the passenger seat while Sergeant #1 and Mr. Helman were interacting outside, behind the truck. Hence, Ms. Mort had no idea that Mr. Helman had consented to a search. Ms. Mort was in the midst of a call on her cell phone, which she held in one hand. In her other hand, she held a lit cigarette. As she exited the truck, she appeared confused on the video and asked Sergeant #1 if “everything was ok,” to which he responded, “yes” and said that he would explain shortly. Instead of offering her an explanation, he walked her back to where Ms. Mort and the other officer stood and immediately returned to the truck to begin his search. We do not know whether the other officer offered her any explanation as to what was occurring.
Court Implies that Four to Six Inches is Not Within Reach
While the search of the vehicle itself proved to be fruitless, Sergeant #1 can be seen removing Ms. Mort’s purse from its position on the center console and searching the purse. We note that the video of the search reveals several important facts. First, the truck did not have a backseat. Thus, there were no rear seats or flooring behind the driver and passenger seats. The truck had no interior cargo area, as the seats were positioned in the cab closely against the bed area. The state contends Ms. Mort’s purse was within easy reach of the driver, but this appears not to be the case. It appears that four to six inches separated the driver and passenger seats from the rear window. The center console stretched between the driver and front passenger seat areas from midseat and extended to and abutted against the back window. There is no space between the back of the console and the rear window. We can see that the console was considerably raised above seat level, possibly more than twelve inches, and was very wide. The purse had been turned sideways on the console and pushed up against the window, as closely as was possible to the bed. Thus, while the purse was technically not in the “backseat,” it was pushed as far away from the front seat area as it could be located. In order to reach the purse, Ms. Mort or Mr. Helman would have needed to reach behind their seats and over the console. From the video, it is clear the top of the purse, containing its opening, would probably have been as high as chin level for the driver and passenger, due to both the height of the console and size of the purse.
When Paper Becomes a Zipper
The state asserts that the purse was open inside the vehicle. While this is technically true, in that from the video the purse does not appear to have a closing mechanism, such as a zipper or latch, there were several sheets of neatly placed and undisturbed pieces of paper that were laid on top of the purse opening, acting as a lid. This coverage also prevented an observer from looking inside of the purse and from observing its contents. The papers were pulled through both purse handles, securing the papers in place. Thus, in order to retrieve an item or place an item in the purse, the papers would first have to be unsecured from the straps and removed from the purse opening. This placement reveals that the papers were deliberately placed and intended to act as a closure, substituting for a zipper or latch. Nothing about the state of these papers suggested that they had been moved since their placement.
Court Establishes that the Purse Would Have Been Difficult to Reach
Is this a Constitutional Limitation to the Consent to Search Doctrine?
The video also shows there was a medium to large sized red plastic bag, apparently from a convenience store, placed on the center console in front of the purse. This bag sat almost directly between Mr. Helman and Ms. Mort. While both occupants could certainly retrieve items from this plastic bag easily, its location (along with the height of the console) made it much more difficult for either the driver or passenger to reach the purse. It appears that the driver, who would have been forced to reach both up and back to retrieve the purse and attempt to remove its covering could not have done so while driving, and it would have been difficult even with vehicle at a stop.
Court Presumes that the Purse is Ms. Mort’s
Sergeant #1 did not ask Ms. Mort for permission to search her purse prior to searching it. Inside the purse, Sergeant #1 discovered a silver vile that contained an unknown white, powdery substance. While opening the vile, Sergeant #1 fumbled. As a result, he dumped the entire contents into Ms. Mort’s purse. Sergeant #1 approached Ms. Mort and inquired what the substance was, to which she responded that it was a crushed “Norco” pill from a “busted” bottle. She later explained that she received the vile from her brother and was not entirely certain if it was a crushed prescription drug or cocaine, which her brother uses and she had used in the past. Sergeant #1 performed a field test which revealed the substance as cocaine.
Ms. Mort had a Small Spoon with White Powder, a Cut Straw and a Razor Blade
Based on this discovery, Sergeant #1 subsequently searched Ms. Mort’s person and located a metal tin with two multi-colored vials containing unknown substances, a small spoon with a white powder, a cut straw, and a razor blade. Ms. Mort told Sergeant #1 that one of the vials might contain cocaine.
Ms. Mort is Arrested
As no contraband was discovered during the search of the truck itself or Mr. Helman’s person, he was issued a traffic citation and permitted to leave. However, Ms. Mort was arrested and taken into custody based on discovery of the drugs and paraphernalia.
Indicted – Motion to Suppress is Denied
On February 27, 2024, Ms. Mort was indicted on one count of aggravated possession of drugs, a felony of the fifth degree in violation of O.R.C. §2925.11 (A)(C), (1), (a), and one count of possession of cocaine, a felony of the fifth degree in violation of O.R.C. §2925.11 (A)(C), (1), (a). {¶16} On April 28, 2025, Ms. Mort filed a motion to suppress the drugs discovered during the search of her purse, drugs subsequently found on her person, and statements she made following these searches. On May 23, 2025, the court held a pretrial conference. The parties agreed to submit only briefs on the motion, along with Sergeant #1’s body camera video, and waive oral argument. Because no hearing was held on the matter and no other evidence was introduced, we are limited to what can be heard and observed on the body camera video. The record contains no independent evidence as to Sergeant #1’s thoughts and impressions before or during his searches. On June 3, 2025, the court denied Ms. Mort’s motion to suppress. While the court referenced consent, it appears that the court based its decision on the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. However, the court did not provide a detailed analysis of its decision to deny the motion. On July 1, 2025, Ms. Mort filed a motion to reconsider which was denied.
No Contest – Two Years Community Control
On July 2, 2025, Ms. Mort pleaded no contest to both counts as charged, aggravated possession of drugs and possession of cocaine. On July 18, 2025, the court sentenced Ms. Mort in accordance with the parties’ agreement. The court did not set forth individual sentences, instead imposing a single two-year community control term. The court noted that violation of community control would result in Ms. Mort serving a two-year prison term and 360 days of local incarceration. It is from this entry that Ms. Mort timely appeals.
Appeal – Was there a Limitation on Mr. Helman’s Consent?
In the trial court’s entry, it determined: “The Defendant’s [sic] argues the driver’s consent to search did not extend to her purse. The Court finds the Defendant is mistaken. Under the automobile exception, the permissible search extends to passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing objects.” From this, it appears the court’s decision is based on the vehicle exception but also mentions consent.
Did Sergeant #1 Unreasonably Extend the Traffic Stop?
Our analysis begins with the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement, as this is the theory the trial court relied on in denying the motion. Ms. Mort explains that the automobile exception is two pronged, in that an officer must have probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal activity is contained within the vehicle sought to be searched and also that the vehicle must be readily mobile. It springs from the fifth exception to the warrant requirement discussed in McGee. Ms. Mort argues that the first prong has not been satisfied, as Sergeant #1 did not observe any contraband or criminal activity from his vantage point that provided probable cause to believe a crime had been committed or was in the process of being committed. Ms. Mort cites to the body camera footage, where Sergeant #1 admits that his purpose for stopping the vehicle was related to the registration tags and observing the vehicle abruptly turn into the parking lot. He conceded that he had no reason to believe Mr. Helman’s quick turn was caused by fear that he would be pulled over and a firearm might be found in the vehicle, because his actions could be explained as he simply sought to avoid a traffic citation related to his expired registration tags. To prolong the stop, Sergeant #1 stated that he was “going to get [Mr. Helman] out and chat him up a little bit,” suggesting he was engaging a stalling tactic to try to obtain information that might support probable cause. Ms. Mort believes this violates Ohio law, which requires an officer to limit the scope and duration of a traffic violation if the officer does not have probable cause to believe criminal activity is afoot. While Sergeant #1 knew Mr. Helman had a prior firearm conviction, Ms. Mort argues that this fact, alone, cannot serve as a basis for prolonging a traffic stop based on the expired registration.
The state does not respond to Ms. Mort’s arguments pertaining to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, and instead relies only on Mr. Helman’s consent to search his truck.
Court Explains Sergeant #1 was Lawful to Stop the Pickup and Remove the Occupants
Our analysis must begin with the traffic stop, itself. There is no question that Sergeant #1 was entitled to initiate a traffic stop of the vehicle after observing it operating on the road with expired registration tags. There is also no question that Sergeant #1 was permitted to engage in questioning with Mr. Helman related to the purpose of the stop, including asking for identification, proof of insurance, and registration of the vehicle. State v. Chapman, 2019-Ohio-3339, ¶ 36 (7th Dist.). Similarly, Sergeant #1 was permitted to order both passengers out of the vehicle while the stop was pending.
Established Case Law – Traffic Stop Questioning
During a valid traffic stop, “any questioning which occurs during the detention, even if unrelated to the scope of the detention, is valid so long as the questioning does not improperly extend the duration of the detention.” Id., citing State v. Chagaris, 107 Ohio App.3d 551, 556-557 (9th Dist.1995).
Established Case Law – Automobile Exception
Moving to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, it “was created based on the ready mobility of automobiles and the lesser expectations of privacy surrounding an automobile.” State v. Green, 2023-Ohio-4503, ¶ 23 (7th Dist.), citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985). Pursuant to the automobile exception, where “probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” State v. Vega, 2018-Ohio-4002, ¶ 13, quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982). Thus, it is insufficient to rely on only one prong of the test, the ready mobility of the vehicle, alone. Officers must have probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be found within the vehicle. Green at ¶ 24.
Established Case Law – Consent to Search the Vehicle and a Purse
The seminal case in regard to an officer’s search of a passenger’s purse which is located inside a third-party’s vehicle is Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999). In Houghton, officers initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle for speeding and operating with a faulty brake light. Id. at 297. While an officer questioned the driver, he noticed a hypodermic syringe in the driver’s shirt pocket. When asked about the syringe, the driver readily admitted that he used it to take drugs. Id. at 298.
The officer also spoke to the Ms. Houghton, a passenger in the vehicle, and asked her to identify herself. She complied, but claimed that she did not have identification. The officer noticed a purse in the backseat and the Ms. Houghton admitted that it belonged to her. The officer removed a wallet that contained an identification card which alerted the officer to the fact that she had given him a false name. Also within the purse, the officer discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia. Id. at 298. The officer saw needle marks on the Ms. Houghton’s arm.
The United States Supreme Court narrowed the issue, not to whether officers had reason to believe who owned the purse, but whether officers had probable cause to believe that a criminal offense had occurred or was in the process of occurring and whether evidence of that offense could be found within that purse. Id. at 300. The Houghton Court concluded that officers held probable cause to believe that a drug-related offense had occurred or was in the process of occurring because of the syringe that the driver admitted was used to take illegal drugs. Hence, officers were permitted to search not only the vehicle but also its contents in places where drugs could be discovered, such as a purse, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 302. The Houghton Court cautioned that the issue must be considered on a case-by-case basis, and different facts would certainly lead to different results. Id. at 305.
Established Case Law – Probable Cause Search of a Motor Vehicle
We recently applied Houghton in State v. Green, 2023-Ohio-4503 (7th Dist.). In Green, a police officer observed a driver of a vehicle engage in a “hand-to-hand transaction” with a known drug user in an area where drug deals often took place. Id. at 3. The officer also heard one of the individuals caution the other to be careful, as police were in the area. The officer approached the vehicle and spoke to the driver, who was uncooperative. Id. at ¶ 7. While talking to the driver, the officer noticed a person was sitting in the backseat with a small backpack sitting between her legs – Ms. Green.
In the meantime, a K9 dog arrived to perform a sniff around the vehicle, however, officers struggled with the driver of the vehicle who was uncooperative. During the struggle, officers noticed Ms. Green clutch the backpack and attempt to leave the area. Officers reached her and escorted her back to the area of vehicle. The K9 sniff took seven seconds to complete and resulted in an area of the vehicle. During the ensuing search, drugs and drug paraphernalia were discovered in the backpack. Id. at ¶ 9-10.
The trial court denied a motion to suppress evidence seized from the backpack, finding that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement authorized a search of the vehicle and its contents, including the backpack. On appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that officers clearly had probable cause to believe that a drug-related offense had occurred after observing an apparent drug deal in an area known for drug transactions. This probable cause authorized a search of the vehicle, including its contents, that could contain evidence of drugs. Because the backpack was inside of the vehicle and because Ms. Green attempted to evade police contact with the backpack, officers had probable cause to search the backpack for drugs. Id. at ¶ 30.
Court Evaluates that Sergeant #1 Required Probable Cause for the Consensual Search
With this in mind, the instant case hinges on whether Sergeant #1 had probable cause to believe Mr. Helman or Ms. Mort had committed or were committing a specific crime and evidence of that crime would be found in the vehicle. This probable cause must exist in addition to whatever minor traffic violation that caused the stop. In other words, the expired registration tags, alone, do not give rise for Sergeant #1 to validly search the interior of the vehicle for evidence of an unrelated criminal offense. And of course, any probable cause must exist prior to the officer’s search, otherwise the search would not be based on probable cause.
At the time of the search in this case, Sergeant #1’s body camera clearly contains his admission that he had no specific reason to believe that any crime, other than the traffic infraction, had been committed. Sergeant #1 conceded that Mr. Helman’s act of “whipping” into the parking lot could have been because he knew he was driving with an expired registration tag. Sergeant #1’s only suspicion regarding possession of a weapon arose from learning that Mr. Helman had a prior conviction involving a firearm at some time in the past.
Sergeant #1 discussed with the unidentified officer who provided backup at the stop his intention to determine what caused Mr. Helman to suddenly pull into the restaurant’s parking lot. Sergeant #1: I pulled out behind them and he immediately whipped into here [parking lot] and then I asked him where he is going and he said he is going to a friend’s house. So, he had no reason to be turning into here. So I don’t know if got a gun in there, he has a prior for carrying concealed. Or if he just whipped in because of the almost expired two month plate. So, I’m gonna get him out, gonna chat him up a little bit. We note that Sergeant #1 omitted from this discussion that Mr. Helman also told him that he and Ms. Mort intended to eat before going to their friend’s house.
Established Case Law – Prior Conviction of Yesterday Does Not Establish Probable Cause Today
The state urges that Mr. Helman’s prior concealed carry conviction gave Sergeant #1 probable cause to believe that a firearm might have been in the vehicle. The record does not contain the date of Mr. Helman’s conviction. Regardless, in Ohio a person’s criminal record can only serve as the basis for probable cause where there is additional evidence to support it. State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6667 (3d Dist.); State v. Siegel, 2021- Ohio-4208 (4th Dist.). Hence, the question becomes whether Sergeant #1 had any knowledge to support probable cause, aside from Mr. Helman’s prior conviction, to believe that a firearm was inside the vehicle.
Trial Court and Appellate Court are Content to Make Conclusions Without Testimony
We again note that the parties submitted only briefs on the motion to suppress without oral argument. There was no hearing on the matter. This is significant, as Sergeant #1’s thought processes and actions can only be determined from his statements heard in the body camera evidence. He did not testify nor did he file a police or incident report.
Could Testimony Have Emanated Additional Information?
Sergeant #1 conceded on the video that one of the reasons for Mr. Helman’s action in abruptly turning into the restaurant’s parking lot could have been because he had expired registration tags, noting that they had been expired for some weeks. He speculates that Mr. Helman knew the registration tags were long expired and noticed a police cruiser was driving behind him in a position to observe his expired registration tag. Hence, he abruptly turned into the parking lot in an attempt to avoid a traffic citation.
At no time does Sergeant #1 state there was reason to believe Mr. Helman had a gun on his person or inside his truck, nor did he provide any articulable basis to believe Mr. Helman might have possessed a weapon at the time. The record reflects Mr. Helman made no furtive movements and did not appear to have anything in his hands. The record shows that, at the dinner hour, Mr. Helman suddenly and abruptly turned his vehicle into the parking lot of a restaurant, perhaps with knowledge that his registration tags were expired and that a police cruiser was behind him.
Court Determines Body Worn Camera Video is Conclusive
While the state claims that Mr. Helman did not make eye contact during the encounter with Sergeant #1, this is unsupported by the video evidence. When Sergeant #1 approached the vehicle, Mr. Helman was forced to open the door because the driver’s window was not working. Sergeant #1 stood towards the back of the door and was positioned somewhat behind Mr. Helman, thus making eye contact difficult unless the driver was to reposition himself in the seat of the vehicle.
As to Mr. Helman’s initial statement that he was on his way to a friend’s house, again, Sergeant #1 conceded on video that Mr. Helman’s quick turn into the parking lot could easily have been an attempt to avoid a ticket, something Mr. Helman would not necessarily want to say to the officer. Also, Mr. Helman told Sergeant #1 that he and Ms. Mort planned to eat dinner before heading to a friend’s house. At the time Mr. Helman entered the restaurant parking lot, it was 5:00 p.m. It is plausible, based on the video, that he made a last-minute decision in choosing a place to eat.
Sergeant #1 conceded on the video that one of the reasons for Mr. Helman’s action in abruptly turning into the restaurant’s parking lot could have been because he had expired registration tags, noting that they had been expired for some weeks. He speculates that Mr. Helman knew the registration tags were long expired and noticed a police cruiser was driving behind him in a position to observe his expired registration tag. Hence, he abruptly turned into the parking lot in an attempt to avoid a traffic citation.
It is unquestionable that Mr. Helman gave consent to Sergeant #1 for a search of his vehicle when asked.
Again, the trial court appears to have relied on the automobile exception to the warrant requirement in denying the motion to suppress. The state also alleged that Mr. Helman’s consent would extend to Ms. Mort’s purse. It is unquestionable that Mr. Helman gave consent to Sergeant #1 for a search of his vehicle when asked. Even though this search cannot be justified by means of the automobile exception, which does not apply under the facts of this case, the court’s decision may still be affirmed if Mr. Helman’s consent to search his truck in this instance equally applied to the search of Ms. Mort’s purse.
Does Third-Party Consent Apply to Motor Vehicles?
Ms. Mort explains that, under Ohio law, before third-party consent can be valid, officers must have a reasonable belief that the third party had authority to consent to the search. Ms. Mort contends that there are no facts in this case to suggest that Mr. Helman had any control or authority over her purse and there was no evidence either of them possessed contraband at that point. If the search of her purse was invalid, the contraband taken from it and from her person, which was based solely on the search of her purse, must be suppressed. Ms. Mort also argues that any statements she made in response to questions asked by police subsequent to searching her purse are barred as fruit of the poisonous tree.
Ms. Mort Exited the Vehicle Without Her Purse
The state argues that it was reasonable for officers to believe that Mr. Helman and Ms. Mort mutually had custody and control of the purse because it was “wide open” on the center console, suggesting that both had access to it and its contents. The state also relies heavily on the fact that Ms. Mort left her purse inside of the vehicle when she was ordered out, despite the fact that officers did not order her to leave it behind.
Established Case Law on Probable Cause Searches of Motor Vehicles
Again, this search of Mr. Helman’s vehicle was not supported under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, as officers had no probable cause to believe criminal activity beyond the minor traffic infraction was taking place. Hence, the search of the purse can only be justified under the consent exception. Under Ohio law, the search of a purse must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Withrow, 2022-Ohio-2850 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Banks-Harvey, 2018-Ohio-201. The state contends that Mr. Helman’s consent to search his truck permitted a search of Ms. Mort’s purse because it was located on the center console, between she and Mr. Helman. Interestingly, the only case the trial court cited in its entry that addressed consent held that “[S]ince all are in agreement that the driver’s consent did not extend to a search of the passenger’s purse, we see little point in further discussing that issue.” State v. Raslovsky, 2020-Ohio-515, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). The court in Raslovsky ultimately held that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applied because a K9 sniff resulted in an alert, thus giving officers probable cause to search both the vehicle and contents. Id. at ¶ 14.
Established Case Law on a Probable Cause Search in a Motor Vehicle – State v. Miller
Established Case Law on Probable Cause Search Inside a Home – U.S. v. Matlock
Contrary to the state’s assertions, the fact that Ms. Mort left her purse inside the vehicle does not affect the analysis. Under Ohio law, where the driver of the vehicle leaves a bag or purse inside a vehicle, officers may search it. However, the result is different where the passenger leaves a purse inside the vehicle. Ms. Mort cites to a case arising out of the Ohio Supreme Court holding that a driver lacked the authority to consent to a search of the passenger’s purse. See State v. Caulfield, 2013-Ohio-3029. The Second District aptly explained the law as it pertains to third-party consent in Caulfield: Proper consent can be given by a third party, but the third-party must possess “common authority over the area sought to be searched.” State v. Miller, 117 Ohio App.3d 750, 759, 691 N.E.2d 703 (11th Dist.1997), citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). (Other citation omitted.) “Common authority rests ‘on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.’ ” State v. Pugh, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25223, 2013-Ohio-1238, ¶ 9, citing Matlock at 172, fn. 7. “[T]he United States Supreme Court has applied a ‘reasonable belief’ standard for determining whether a police officer’s reliance upon the consent of a third party was proper under particular circumstances.” Miller at 759, 691 N.E.2d 703. “That is, before a trial court can conclude that a warrantless search was valid on the basis of a third-party consent, it must find that the facts of the case supported a reasonable belief on the part of the police officer that the third party had the authority to consent to the search.” Id. at 759-760, 691 N.E.2d 703. Id. at ¶ 23.
Established Case Law – State v. Caulfield is Applicable to Different Facts
Caulfield makes it clear that the facts of the case must clearly demonstrate that the third party who provided consent had “mutual use” and “joint authority” to consent to a search of property not owned by him or her. Although the general law is addressed in depth, discussion pertaining to the factual application of the law regarding consent is sparse. There are facts that distinguish the instant case from Caulfield, including that the passenger of the vehicle in Caulfield knew the driver had consented to a search of the vehicle and one of the officers in Caulfield had ordered her to leave her purse inside the vehicle. Id. at ¶ 6. It is clear from this record Ms. Mort did not know Mr. Helman had consented to a search of his vehicle. While Sergeant #1 did not instruct Ms. Mort to leave her purse, it appears that the purse could not have been seen by Sergeant #1 based on his vantage point when he ordered her from the car, so he had no reason to tell her to leave an item he was unaware was in the vehicle. We note that, as Ms. Mort was holding items in both hands when ordered out of the truck and appeared startled and surprised by the order, it is unsurprising she did not think to gather her belongings.
Established Case Law – Ninth District Determined that a Purse in the Physical Possession of the Female Passenger Requires Her Consent
Although not cited by the parties, a case arising out of the Ninth District is factually similar, State v. Chojnowski, 2015-Ohio-1405 (9th Dist.). In that case, officers approached a vehicle in a parking lot based on suspicions of prostitution. After dispelling their concerns as to their stated investigation, and without additional evidence any other criminal offense was occurring, officers sought and obtained consent to search the vehicle. The defendant passenger voluntarily left her purse partially opened inside the vehicle. Id. at ¶ 6.
Officers searched the purse and discovered contraband. On appeal, the defendant argued that the owner of the vehicle could not consent to a search of a passenger’s purse. The Ninth District agreed, first noting that there was no question that officers lacked probable cause on which to search based on the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at ¶ 7. As to consent, the Court focused on whether the driver had “common authority” over the purse. Finding no facts of record to suggest common authority, the court determined that the fact that the purse was left inside the vehicle and that it was open was irrelevant. Id. at ¶ 11-12. The only distinguishing fact between Chojnowski and the instant case is that the Chojnowski Ms. Mort had held the purse on her lap at some point before the search.
The question, here, becomes whether Mr. Helman’s consent applied to Ms. Mort’s purse.
The question, here, becomes whether Mr. Helman’s consent applied to Ms. Mort’s purse. In order for Mr. Helman’s consent to search his truck to apply to Ms. Mort’s purse, the state must show the facts demonstrate that he had “common authority” over the purse. The state would need to cite to facts in the record suggesting that Mr. Helman had dominion and control over the purse or was in a position where it was likely he had accessed the contents of the purse.
[T]he state neglects to accurately describe the center console area of this vehicle.
In reviewing whether Sergeant #1 possessed a reasonable belief that Mr. Helman had common authority over Ms. Mort’s purse, we first note that the state’s argument relies on a misrepresentation of the nature and location of Ms. Mort’s purse. The state claims that the items. While a review of the body camera video confirms that the purse sat on the center console, the state neglects to accurately describe the center console area of this vehicle.
Court Explains the Positioning of the Purse
As earlier discussed, Mr. Helman’s truck did not have a backseat. There are two seats in the cab, which is then attached to the bed. There is no designated storage area behind the driver’s and passenger’s seats. The center console extends from the area between the driver/passenger seats to the back of the cab, touching the back window that separates it from the bed. The distance between the seats and the back window amounts to no more than a few inches. However, the console is raised significantly higher than the seats for its entire length, and is very wide. Ms. Mort’s purse was turned sideways and pushed as far back as possible against the back window. It was not placed in a manner to allow either occupant sufficiently easy access to reach in and retrieve items from it. Instead, it was placed as far out of the front seat area as possible.
The Bag in Front of the Purse was Mutually Accessible but the Purse Behind the Bag was Not
Ms. Mort’s purse does not sit directly between Ms. Mort and Mr. Helman. Either person was required to reach behind and over the edge of their seat to reach Ms. Mort’s purse. Because the console was raised, they would also be forced to reach up, as the top of the console may have been at shoulder height, and so the top of the bag was approximately chin height for the average person. Additionally, a medium to large sized red plastic convenience store bag sat in front of the purse on the center console. This plastic bag was positioned almost directly between Ms. Mort and Mr. Helman, further obstructing access to the purse. While the purse appears not to have been mutually accessible, the plastic bag could have been accessed by both Mr. Helman and Ms. Mort.
Court Determines a Paper Covered Purse is Not Easily Accessible
Ms. Mort’s purse was “open” in the technical sense. Apparently, it may not have a zipper or other closing mechanism, based on the video evidence. However, purse sat open, directly in between Ms. Mort and Mr. Helman in a manner where each of them could have at any time reached into the purse to retrieve apparently to correct this, full sheets of paper had been laid on top of the purse covering its opening. The papers had been laid between the two purse straps, which then secured the papers in place and effectively secured the purse closed. Neither Mr. Helman nor Ms. Mort would have been able to simply reach into the purse even if it was accessible from their positions. In order to access the contents of the purse, someone seeking access was required to remove these papers before reaching inside. This placement of the papers was clearly deliberate, and meant to act as a secure closure for the purse. Hence, it appears from this record that the purse was not within the custody and control of Mr. Helman and was not easily accessed, nor could its contents be readily viewed.
Ms. Mort was completely unaware of their conversation and did not know that Mr. Helman had consented to a search of his truck.
The state makes much of the fact that Ms. Mort left her purse inside the vehicle when she exited, essentially claiming it was thus “fair game” in a search of the truck. Again, Ms. Mort sat inside the truck while officers spoke to Mr. Helman outside and behind the truck. Ms. Mort was completely unaware of their conversation and did not know that Mr. Helman had consented to a search of his truck, and her surprise at being ordered out of the vehicle is readily apparent from the video evidence.
Significantly, there is no evidence whatsoever that she knew a search had been authorized or was about to take place before she exited the truck.
In fact, Ms. Mort was in the midst of a conversation on her cell phone at the time Sergeant #1 approached her, opened the door and told her to “step out real quick.” She appeared confused and asked him if everything was ok. Sergeant #1 replied “yes,” and that he would give her an explanation for his action “in a second.” She exited the vehicle with the phone in one hand, still actively engaged in her call, and a lit cigarette in the other hand that she placed in her mouth so that her hand was free to aid in her exit. Even assuming Ms. Mort spared a thought for her purse, which was outside of her line of vision, she could not have readily picked it up. Significantly, there is no evidence whatsoever that she knew a search had been authorized or was about to take place before she exited the truck. Although Sergeant #1 informed her that he would explain everything “in a second,” he did not. Instead, he left her with Mr. Helman and the other officer and returned to the truck to begin his search.
Based on the totality of the facts in this case, Mr. Helman’s consent to search his truck did not extend to the search of Ms. Mort’s purse.
Based on the facts in this case, there is nothing to suggest that Mr. Helman had common authority or control over Ms. Mort’s purse. Her purse was not “open” so that occupants of the vehicle could simply reach in and retrieve any of its contents. In fact, it was placed out of convenient reach of both occupants. Again, as in Chojnowski, whether Ms. Mort voluntarily left her purse when she was ordered out of the vehicle is irrelevant where there are no facts to support the reasonable belief that both occupants had common authority over it. Further, the covering over the purse meant that persons encountering it could not simply view its contents, and it is undisputed no contraband was in plain view. Based on the totality of the facts in this case, Mr. Helman’s consent to search his truck did not extend to the search of Ms. Mort’s purse. Since no warrant was obtained, the search was invalid and any evidence obtained should have been suppressed.
Contraband on Ms. Mort’s Person was Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
Turning to the question of whether the contraband found on Ms. Mort’s person after her purse was searched and statements she made following the warrantless search were inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree: The exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search and derivative evidence that is the product of the primary evidence or is otherwise acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful search, unless the connection with the unlawful search is so attenuated that the taint is dissipated. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-37, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988). The question is whether the taint is sufficiently dissipated or whether the evidence is the fruit of the poisonous tree. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804-805, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984). State v. Nickelson, 2017-Ohio-7503, ¶ 27 (7th Dist.).
Ms. Mort’s first, second, and third assignments of error have merit and are sustained.
While officers would have been permitted to frisk Ms. Mort for the purpose of officer safety upon her exit from the vehicle, apparently they did not, and officers would not have been permitted to search her for contraband. It is clear from the body camera video evidence that the contraband found on Ms. Mort’s person was found in a more extensive search conducted because Sergeant #1 found drugs in her purse. The search of her person was only conducted as a direct result of this discovery. Likewise, the questioning of Ms. Mort regarding contraband found in the illegal searches elicited incriminating statements. Neither the questions nor the statements would have taken place but for the illegal search. Because Mr. Helman’s consent did not extend to validate the search of Ms. Mort’s purse, any evidence obtained in or after that improper search was inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. Accordingly, Ms. Mort’s first, second, and third assignments of error have merit and are sustained.
Information for this article was obtained from State v. Mort, 2026 – Ohio – 249 and an interview with Sergeant #1.
State v. Mort, 2026 – Ohio – 249 was issued on January 28, 2026 by the Seventh District Appellate Court and is binding in the following Ohio Counties: Belmont, Carroll, Columbiana, Harrison, Jefferson, Mahoning, Monroe and Noble.
Lessons Learned
The Seventh District Appellate Court made clear that a driver’s consent has limits, consent to search did not extend to containers within the passenger compartment. The court emphasized that Sergeant #1 was required to establish ownership before searching each container, that consent principles from in-home searches apply to vehicles, and that a purse covered with papers is not readily accessible.
I will review most of the cases the Seventh District applied to sustain the dismissal of Ms. Mort’s contraband.
- Is a Probable Cause Search the Same as a Consensual Search? On January 17, 1997 the Eleventh District Appellate Court held “Specifically, we hold that the search of the pop can was proper because it was supported by independent probable cause.” State v. Miller, 117 Ohio App.3d 750, 759, (11th Dist.1997). Hence, the Miller case was a probable-cause based search yet the Seventh District applied the legal tenets of the probable cause search in Miller to the consent-based case of Ms. Mort.
- Is a Vehicle Search and Home Search the Same? On February 20, 1974 the U.S. Supreme Court held “[T]he Government sustained its burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that Mrs. Graff’s voluntary consent to search the east bedroom was legally sufficient to warrant admitting into evidence the $ 4,995 found in the diaper bag.” United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172, (1974). The issue in Matlock centered on joint occupancy and common authority within a residence—specifically, whether a co-occupant could consent to a search of a shared bedroom. Relying on this principle, the Seventh District in Mort reiterated that third-party consent requires “common authority over the area sought to be searched.” However, Matlock involved a search inside a home, where expectations of privacy and authority are fundamentally different. In Ms. Mort’s case the Seventh District Court “Proper consent can be given by a third party, but the third-party must possess “common authority over the area sought to be searched.” State v. Miller, 117 Ohio App.3d 750, 759, 691 N.E.2d 703 (11th Dist.1997), citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974)”. The search overturned was a search of Mr. Matlock’s bedroom INSIDE his home. Then on May 17, 2021 the U.S. Supreme Court issued Canglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194 (2021) and held “What is reasonable for vehicles is different from what is reasonable for homes.”. Despite this distinction home versus vehicle, the Seventh District extended Matlock’s home-based consent analysis to a vehicle search in Mort, applying a doctrine developed for residential settings to a materially different context.
- Does Law Enforcement have an Obligation to Distinguish Ownership of Packages in a Vehicle Prior to the Search? The Seventh District also applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) that was a probable-cause based search of a female in a vehicle. Again, Ms. Mort’s search was a consensual based search not a probable-cause based search. Justice Stephen Breyer in his concurrence in Houghton opined “If the police must establish a container’s ownership prior to the search of that container (whenever, for example, a passenger says “that’s mine”), the resulting uncertainty will destroy the workability of the bright-line rule set forth in United States v. Ross , 456 U. S. 798 (1982).”.
- Physical Possession versus Non-Possession – On July 12, 2013 the Second District Appellate Court issued State v. Caulfield, 2013-Ohio-3029 and the court explained “Tyree took the driver to his police cruiser while Wright approached Caulfield, who was sitting in the front-passenger seat. Wright asked Caulfield to exit the vehicle so that he could conduct a search. The trial court found that Caulfield attempted to take her purse with her as she exited the vehicle, but Wright ordered her to leave it in the vehicle. Wright also ordered Caulfield to stand in front of the vehicle.” Later a different deputy searched the purse that was left in the car and … “[a deputy] discovered unknown pills, syringes, marihuana, two scales, and various plastic baggies in Caulfield’s purse.” Later a female officer from a different agency discovered a black pouch in Ms. Caulfield’s bra containing crystal meth. The difference between Ms. Caulfield and Ms. Mort was that Ms. Caulfield had actual possession of the purse during her interaction with law enforcement and Ms. Mort did not.
- Physical Possession versus Non-Possession II – On April 15, 2025 the Ninth District Appellate Court issued State v. Chojnowski 2015 –Ohio – 1405. There the court explained “Deputy Shelly testified that he saw that Chojnowski had a black bag on her lap while sitting in the vehicle and that she left the bag in the vehicle when she exited.” … “Whether a vehicle owner’s consent to search the vehicle grants the authority to law enforcement to search containers like bags and purses belonging to a passenger is an issue of first impression for this Court … there was nothing in the record to demonstrate that the vehicle owner had mutual use or joint access to Chojnowski’s bag … Under these circumstances, the vehicle owner’s consent to search the vehicle did not validate the warrantless search of Chojnowski’s bag.” As the court limited ‘under these circumstances’. The facts in Mort are distinguishable. Unlike in Chojnowski, Ms. Mort was never observed in possession of the purse during her interaction with law enforcement. Additionally, as later clarified in Wyoming v. Houghton, Sergeant #1 had no legal obligation to determine ownership of the purse before conducting the search.
- Video Analysis without Testimony – On December 10, 2024 the Supreme Court of Ohio issued State v. Smith, 2024-Ohio-5745. The Smith case stands as an important reminder that body-camera evidence has constitutional and evidentiary limits. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that testimonial statements captured on an officer’s body camera cannot simply be admitted in place of live witness testimony without violating the Confrontation Clause, “We therefore conclude that B.B.’s statements to Officer Soucek captured by the officer’s body camera were testimonial in nature and that their admission into evidence at Mr. Smith’s criminal trial violated Mr. Smith’s right to confrontation.”. In Mort, Sergeant #1 never testified, yet the courts below relied on the video alone to supply conclusions about his observations, suspicions and justification for the search. That is a troubling course, because body-camera footage often shows only part of the encounter and should not become a substitute for the sworn testimony needed to fully evaluate an officer’s actions under the Fourth Amendment.
- Furtive Moments – The Seventh District Appellate Court stated “The record reflects Mr. Helman made no furtive movements and did not appear to have anything in his hands.”. I do not know if law enforcement used the word furtive or if the court did on its own. However, though ‘furtive’ is common in law enforcement, officers should never use the word furtive. Furtive simply means secretive movement and does not explain what the person actually did. Instead, describe the precise movement you observed—for example: “The driver reached between the seat and the center console” “The driver leaned behind the passenger seat” or “The driver opened the glove box.” Specific, concrete descriptions help prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel assess the facts and ultimately support law enforcement decisions. Weeks, months or even years later, furtive movement is vague and unhelpful; detailed observations preserve clarity. Be specific, not ambiguous.
- Final Thoughts – In my view, the Seventh District reached the wrong result because it imposed a level of constitutional precision on a roadside consent search that is unrealistic for officers making practical decisions during a lawful traffic stop. Mr. Helman consented to a search of his truck and the purse was located inside the passenger compartment in an area accessible to both occupants. Under those circumstances, Sergeant #1 had an objectively reasonable basis to believe the container fell within the scope of that consent, as the purse – a container was within the passenger compartment. Sergeant #1 had no legal requirement to inquire as to ownership and no probable way for the officer to know that the purse was legally insulated from the driver’s consent. By applying a home-search third-party consent case [Matlock], other vehicle searches that had significant legal differences and focusing on fine factual distinctions about the purse’s positioning and paper covering – the court created a rule that gives officers little practical guidance and risks discouraging reasonable, good-faith consent searches in the field.
Does your agency train on Vehicle Searches?
Don’t fail your training.
Don’t let your training fail you!
Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!