Dep. Harper, through his questioning regarding Mr. Moffitt’s activities at the hotel, moved beyond the scope of the traffic stop and began probing Mr. Moffitt’s unrelated actions. Because this probing of unrelated actions occurred at a time when no investigatory tasks tied to the original traffic infraction were ongoing, the traffic stop was extended in contravention of Mr. Moffitt’s Fourth Amendment rights.
U.S. v. Moffitt
Sixth Circuit Appellate Court
September 23, 2025
Why is this case important?
U.S. v. Moffitt provides legal guardrails as to traffic stop extensions and prior to the issuance of a written ticket, the officer may unreasonably extend a traffic stop.

Traffic Stop for Swerving
On the night of Monday May 17, 2021, Mr. Frankie Moffitt was pulled over by law enforcement officers from the Simpson County Sheriff’s Office while driving along Nashville Road in Simpson County, Kentucky.
One of those officers was Deputy Sheriff Wyatt Harper, whose activation of his patrol car’s emergency police lights prompted Mr. Moffitt to pull over to the side of the road. Once Mr. Moffitt pulled over and Dep. Harper parked his patrol car behind Mr. Moffitt’s vehicle, Dep. Harper exited the patrol car, approached Mr. Moffitt’s driver’s side door, and greeted Mr. Moffitt before remarking that Mr. Moffitt had been “swerving all over the place.”
GPS Usage
Mr. Moffitt, who was retrieving his wallet from his pants pocket with his driver’s side window rolled down at the time Dep. Harper approached, then handed Dep. Harper two items, including his driver’s license, from his wallet while explaining that he had been attempting to use a GPS device prior to being pulled over.
Traveling to See His Romantic Partner
As Mr. Moffitt handed Dep. Harper the first item, Dep. Harper asked Mr. Moffitt where he was heading. Mr. Moffitt responded that he was driving to see his romantic partner in Franklin, Kentucky. After Mr. Moffitt handed Dep. Harper the items from his wallet, Dep. Harper asked Mr. Moffitt to pull into a nearby parking lot so that their vehicles would not obstruct traffic.
Move to a Parking Lot and Trying to Tuck Stuff
Dep. Harper then returned to his patrol car, and he and Mr. Moffitt drove their respective cars to the parking lot. After arriving at the parking lot, Dep. Harper directed a fellow officer to exit the patrol car, stand behind the bumper of Mr. Moffitt’s car, and observe Mr. Moffitt in case Mr. Moffitt was “trying to tuck stuff.”
No Active Warrants
Dep. Harper then used information from Mr. Moffitt’s driver’s license to run a search for outstanding arrest warrants. Dep. Harper’s search did not identify any arrest warrants for Mr. Moffitt. Dep. Harper then exited his patrol car and returned to the driver’s side window of Mr. Moffitt’s car.
Registration Nestled in a Plastic Bag
Once at the window, Dep. Harper asked Mr. Moffitt for his vehicle registration. Mr. Moffitt then leaned over to his car’s glove compartment, where he retrieved a clear plastic bag containing multiple pieces of paper. While Dep. Harper shined a flashlight inside Mr. Moffitt’s car, Mr. Moffitt emptied the bag’s contents onto his lap, retrieved his car registration from the documents, and handed the registration to Dep. Harper. Mr. Moffitt then proceeded to put the remaining pieces of paper back into the plastic bag.
What is the Street Name of Your Romantic Partner
While Mr. Moffitt put the documents into the bag, Dep. Harper, who was still holding Mr. Moffitt’s vehicle registration, asked Mr. Moffitt several questions. First, Dep. Harper asked Mr. Moffitt where his romantic partner lived. Mr. Moffitt responded to Dep. Harper by naming the street on which his romantic partner resided.
Where Do You Live and What Were You Doing at the Hotel?
After clarifying the street name, Dep. Harper next asked Mr. Moffitt if he previously lived in Springfield, Kentucky. Mr. Moffitt answered that he still lived in Springfield. Following that response, Dep. Harper asked Mr. Moffitt what he had been doing at a hotel before the traffic stop.
Anything Illegal in the Car?
Mr. Moffitt explained again that he had been entering an address into his GPS device prior to the traffic stop. Immediately after Mr. Moffitt finished detailing his use of the GPS device, Dep. Harper, who remained in possession of Mr. Moffitt’s vehicle registration, asked Mr. Moffitt during the following colloquy if he had any illegal items in the car and if he would consent to a search of the car:
Consent to Search
Dep. Harper: Is there anything illegal in the vehicle?
Mr. Moffitt: Nope.
Dep. Harper: None whatsoever?
Mr. Moffitt: Nope.
Dep. Harper: You have any issues with me searching it?
Mr. Moffitt: Um, no.
Dep. Harper: You don’t have any issues with it?
Mr. Moffitt: No.
Dep. Harper: I can search, is that what you’re saying?
Mr. Moffitt: Yeah, you can search.
Dep. Harper: Okay, alright—no weapons or anything?
Mr. Moffitt: Nothing.
Dep. Harper: Okay, hop out for me real quick, bud. I’ll make it quick for you.
Mr. Moffitt then opened the driver’s side door and exited his car. Dep. Harper subsequently directed Mr. Moffitt to the back of the car so that another deputy sheriff could frisk Mr. Moffitt to detect potential weapons. After frisking Mr. Moffitt, the officer directed Mr. Moffitt to the rear of the patrol car, which was parked behind Mr. Moffitt’s car.
While at the rear of the patrol car, Mr. Moffitt spoke with the officers who were not searching his vehicle. At one point, Mr. Moffitt asked one officer if he wanted Mr. Moffitt to open his car’s trunk to aid the search. The officer deferred, stating, “That’s up to you, man. If [Dep. Harper] wants to look in there, he’ll ask.”
Dep. Harper located a bag containing a nine-millimeter pistol in the car’s engine compartment.
Meanwhile, after Mr. Moffitt had exited his car, Dep. Harper began searching inside the vehicle, including by shining his flashlight in the car’s interior, opening crumpled napkins on the car’s seats, and rummaging through the contents of the glove compartment and a small bag located in the front of the car. After searching the interior of Mr. Moffitt’s car for approximately five minutes, Dep. Harper eventually proceeded to the front of the car, where he lifted the car’s hood. After lifting the hood, Dep. Harper located a bag containing a nine-millimeter pistol in the car’s engine compartment. Following his discovery of the pistol, Dep. Harper walked to the patrol car, where Mr. Moffitt was standing with another law enforcement officer, and directed the other officer to handcuff Mr. Moffitt.
Arrested
Mr. Moffitt then asked if he had an outstanding arrest warrant, to which Dep. Harper responded that Mr. Moffitt had a gun under the hood of his car.
Dep. Harper next walked back to the hood of Mr. Moffitt’s car before returning to where Mr. Moffitt stood, now handcuffed, by the rear of the patrol car.
Dep. Harper and Mr. Moffitt then had the following exchange:
Dep. Harper: Alright, I’m going to read you something real quick.
Mr. Moffitt: I thought you said you wanted to search my car, though?
Dep. Harper: I did. Isn’t the hood a part of the car?
Mr. Moffitt: I guess, if that’s what you want to say.
Miranda
Dep. Harper then advised Mr. Moffitt of his rights to counsel and to remain silent.
Federal Indictment
Procedural History Following this encounter and his arrest, on December 15, 2021, a federal grand jury in the Western District of Kentucky returned a one-count indictment charging Mr. Moffitt with possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).
Motion to Suppress
Mr. Moffitt eventually moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the May 17, 2021, search of his vehicle. The district court referred Mr. Moffitt’s motion to a magistrate judge, who held a suppression hearing on Mr. Moffitt’s motion at which Mr. Moffitt testified and the body camera footage from the traffic stop was submitted into evidence. During the suppression hearing, Mr. Moffitt testified that he intended to give the officers searching his car consent “[T]o search the inside of [his] car and possibly the trunk,” but not to search the engine compartment or otherwise disassemble the car during the search.
Police Never Searched the Hood Before
Perhaps That is Why the Gun was Secreted Therein
Mr. Moffitt further explained that, during his three decades of driving, including multiple experiences of being pulled over by police, officers had never searched under the hood of the cars he drove. Following the suppression hearing, Mr. Moffitt and the government filed dueling briefs in support and opposing Mr. Moffitt’s motion to suppress. Mr. Moffitt argued that his motion to suppress should be granted because (1) the officers unconstitutionally prolonged the traffic stop past the time necessary to investigate and issue a citation for the traffic violation; (2) his consent to search the vehicle and subsequent failure to revoke consent during the search were involuntary; and (3) his consent to Dep. Harper’s search of the car did not extend to a search of the car’s engine compartment. In contrast, the government contended that Mr. Moffitt’s motion should be denied because the traffic stop was validly extended by Mr. Moffitt’s consent to the search of his car, which was voluntary, unequivocal, and permitted Dep. Harper to search the entirety of the car.
Motion to Suppress is Granted and Gun is Suppressed
The magistrate judge ultimately issued findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that the district court grant Mr. Moffitt’s motion to suppress. In doing so, the magistrate judge held that (1) Dep. Harper unreasonably extended the traffic stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment by asking Mr. Moffitt about illegal items in his car and (2) Mr. Moffitt had consented to a search of his entire vehicle, including under the hood of the car.
Government and Mr. Moffitt Appeals
The government and Mr. Moffitt subsequently filed timely objections to the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations, with the government objecting to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the traffic stop had been unreasonably extended, and Mr. Moffitt objecting to the magistrate judge’s recommendation concerning the scope of Mr. Moffitt’s consent to search his car. On September 1, 2023, the district court issued a written order sustaining the government’s objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation and denying Mr. Moffitt’s objections and motion to suppress.
The district court held that Dep. Harper did not impermissibly extend the vehicle stop in contravention of the Fourth Amendment because “[T]he request to search and Mr. Moffitt’s consent occurred during the time period when tasks tied to the traffic infraction [were]—or reasonably should have been ongoing.” In addition, the district court held that Mr. Moffitt’s consent to the search provided the officers “permission to search the vehicle without limitations” because the consent “lacked an express limitation which would have put an objectively reasonable person on notice that the scope of the consent was constrained.”
Following the district court’s ruling, Mr. Moffitt entered into a plea agreement with the government and pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a prohibited person.5 The district court subsequently sentenced Mr. Moffitt to 37 months in prison and three years of supervised release.
Mr. Moffitt filed a timely notice of appeal on June 4, 2024.
Mr. Moffitt – Traffic Stop was Unreasonably Prolonged
Mr. Moffitt does not contend on appeal that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop which led to Dep. Harper’s discovery of the pistol under the hood of his car. Instead, Mr. Moffitt argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Dep. Harper violated his Fourth Amendment rights by (1) prolonging the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to account for the alleged traffic violation and (2) exceeding the scope of Mr. Moffitt’s consent to the vehicle search by searching under the hood of Mr. Moffitt’s car.
Established Case Law – Mr. Moffitt was Seized
Police-initiated traffic stops like the one experienced by Mr. Moffitt constitute “a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Jackson, 682 F.3d 448, 453 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 748 (6th Cir. 2008)).
Accordingly, if we determine that the traffic stop at issue in this case was unconstitutional, all evidence seized from Mr. Moffitt’s car “must be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree.” Id. (quoting Blair, 524 F.3d at 748); see also United States v. Marsh, 95 F.4th 464, 467 (6th Cir. 2024) (“The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable traffic stops by law enforcement officers.”). or the safety of the officer are the sorts of classic context-framing questions directed at the driver’s conduct at the time of the stop that rarely offend our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” United States v. Lyons, 687 F.3d 754, 770 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In contrast, “[E]ven minor police actions aimed at ‘detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing’ or any purpose beyond addressing the traffic infraction are not tasks incident to the stop.” United States v.Lott, 954 F.3d 919, 924 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355).
Established Case Law – Traffic Stops Cannot be Extended
As we will explain, a few questions unrelated to a suspected traffic infraction may be permissible in limited circumstances. As to the permissible duration of a traffic stop, however, “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350.
Applying the above routine-traffic-violation-task framework to the instant case, Dep. Harper’s initial question to Mr. Moffitt concerning Mr. Moffitt’s travel destination was an “inquir[y] related to the traffic stop,” and thus does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Collazo, 818 F.3d 247, 257 (6th Cir. 2016).
Mr. Moffitt Argues Dep. Harper Extended the Stop with Questions
Mr. Moffitt does not contend otherwise as to that question. Instead, Mr. Moffitt argues that Dep. Harper’s questions concerning illegal items in the car and requesting consent to search were unrelated to the traffic stop and thus improperly extended the traffic stop. We agree.
In doing so, we note the fact-specific nature of this conclusion. At the time that Dep. Harper asked Mr. Moffitt about illegal items in the car, Dep. Harper had already received information from Mr. Moffitt in response to the “context-framing” questions typical of routine traffic violation inquiries. Williams, 68 F.4th at 307.
Questions on the Same Topic Twice Extended the Traffic Stop
Indeed, Mr. Moffitt provided an explanation for both his alleged erratic driving and his intended destination when Dep. Harper first approached Mr. Moffitt’s driver’s side door after pulling Mr. Moffitt over. When Dep. Harper returned to Mr. Moffitt’s driver’s side door—after running a license check for Mr. Moffitt that did not reveal any outstanding warrants—Dep. Harper returned to questioning Mr. Moffitt on these very same topics. In doing so, Dep. Harper also extended his inquiry beyond the reasons for the initial traffic stop by asking Mr. Moffitt about his activity at a hotel before the traffic stop.
Were Dep. Harper’s Questions Reasonably Related?
Thus, when Dep. Harper next asked Mr. Moffitt if he had any illegal items in his car, Dep. Harper was no longer asking questions “‘reasonably related’” United States v. Bell, 555 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Townsend, 305 F.3d 537, 541 (6th Cir. 2002)). Instead, Dep. Harper had begun an “[O]n-scene investigation into other crimes,” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356, and thus “abandoned [his] investigation of the traffic violation,” Whitley, 34 F.4th at 530.
Measurably Extend?
Nevertheless, the government correctly notes that Dep. Harper’s questions seeking Mr. Moffitt’s consent to search and inquiring about illegal items may still have been permissible even if unrelated to Mr. Moffitt’s traffic infraction if they “did not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”
This is true because “the Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain unrelated investigations that d[o] not lengthen the roadside detention.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354; see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) (“An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”).
Questions Were Not Per Se Unreasonable
For that reason, that Dep. Harper’s questioning did not relate directly to Mr. Moffitt’s alleged traffic infraction does not amount to a per se violation of Mr. Moffitt’s Fourth Amendment rights. Indeed, albeit before Rodriguez, we have previously declined to suppress evidence when similar questions unrelated to a traffic infraction have been posed by officers to drivers during routine traffic stops. See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 497 F.3d 606, 610, 613-15 (6th Cir. 2007) (reversing grant of a motion to suppress where an officer asked a driver “if there was anything illegal” in their truck).
Were the Questions Within the Proper Duration and Scope of the Traffic Stop?
Accordingly, instead of focusing solely on the content of Dep. Harper’s questions to resolve our Fourth Amendment inquiry, we must determine whether Dep. Harper’s actions “remained within the proper duration and scope of a traffic stop.” Whitley, 34 F.4th at 530. As explained above, Dep. Harper’s questioning of Mr. Moffitt regarding illegal items inside his car fell outside the proper scope of a traffic stop initiated to investigate a minor traffic infraction.
Established Case Law – Duration
Determining whether the questions also fell outside the proper duration of the traffic stop requires a context-specific analysis because “[T]he maximum acceptable length of a routine traffic stop cannot be stated with mathematical precision.” United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008).
Therefore, we must heed the Supreme Court’s directive that, absent reasonable suspicion of additional wrongdoing, individual traffic stops “may ‘last no longer than is necessary’” to address the traffic infraction, Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion)).
Therefore, we must assess Dep. Harper’s actions by considering what he “‘in fact d[id],’ not whether ‘the overall duration of the stop remains reasonable in relation to the duration of other traffic stops involving similar circumstances.’” United States v. Gomez, 877 F.3d 76, 91 (2d Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357).
In making this assessment, a brief sampling of our past cases applying these principles may prove instructive because determining whether officers’ actions unconnected to the initial traffic stop are permissible requires a fact-sensitive approach. In United States v. Garrido-Santana, for example, we held that an officer’s questioning of a driver about contraband during a traffic stop “did not exceed the time necessary to complete the original purpose of the traffic stop” because the officer “was still filling out [a] courtesy citation and . . . waiting for the return of the computer check on the vehicle’s license plate.” 360 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2004).
Similarly, in United States v. Whitley, which the government relies upon before this court, we determined that an officer’s questions to a driver concerning whether he “had anything illegal in the vehicle and where he was coming from” were “permissible only because [the officer] asked these questions during the time that [the driver] was retrieving his license and registration.” 34 F.4th at 530.
In discussing the traffic stop, Whitley did note that “[W]ithin a few seconds of receiving the requested documents, [the officer] noticed a scale in Whitley’s lap and asked what the scale was for and if Whitley was going to buy weed.” Id.
Whitley acknowledged some ambiguity regarding whether those questions were permissible, but it ultimately determined that “Whitley’s detention objectively exceeded the relevant scope of the traffic stop” when the officer then walked away from Whitley to confer with another officer about the scale because, “[a]t that point, the traffic stop had morphed into a drug investigation.” Id.
More recently, in United States v. King, to which the government also directs our attention, we held that an officer’s inquiry into a driver’s potential drug possession, although “unrelated to the traffic stop,” “did not unreasonably prolong the stop” because the question occurred while the officer “was in the process of verifying [the driver’s] information.” No. 24-1089, 2025 WL 2172432, at *6 (6th Cir. July 31, 2025).
The scenarios presented in Garrido-Santana, Whitley, and King differ from the facts of the instant case. As detailed above, by the time Dep. Harper inquired about illegal items in Mr. Moffitt’s car, Dep. Harper had already run a check for outstanding warrants and asked Mr. Moffitt various questions concerning his activities that night.
And unlike the questioning in Whitley, Mr. Moffitt had already provided Dep. Harper with his license and registration by the time Dep. Harper inquired about illegal items in Mr. Moffitt’s car.
When Did the Traffic Stop Transition to a Separate Investigation?
Dep. Harper was holding Mr. Moffitt’s vehicle registration while he inquired about illegal items in the car, but there is no indication from the record that Dep. Harper was actively reviewing the registration at the time that he posed this question to Mr. Moffitt. “At that point, the traffic stop had morphed into a [separate] investigation.” Id. at 530.
That this transformation occurred earlier here than in Whitley is of no moment, given the distinct factual circumstances as compared to the timing of the officer’s receipt of Whitley’s documents and the questions about the scale in that case.
In King, bodycam footage produced by the government depicted the relevant officer “using the computer in his patrol car” to conduct a license check while questioning the driver about illicit drug possession. 2025 WL 2172432 at *6.
No such license check or other inquiry into the circumstances leading to the traffic stop in the present case was ongoing at the time Dep. Harper asked Mr. Moffitt about illegal items because, by that point, Dep. Harper had completed the license check and begun asking about Mr. Moffitt’s actions at the hotel.
Can a Traffic Stop be Unreasonably Extended Prior to the Issuance of a Traffic Citation?
While Dep. Harper had not yet issued a traffic ticket to Mr. Moffitt for his alleged erratic driving, that fact alone does not guide our determination of a traffic stop’s permissible length or whether tasks reasonably tied to the traffic stop were still ongoing because “[A] stop may be unlawfully extended beyond the initial purpose even if the officer never formally completes the citation.” Bell, 555 F.3d at 541. Rather, as we explained in Whitley, the relevant inquiry in determining whether a traffic stop has been prolonged such that additional reasonable suspicion of illegal activity is required is whether “the stopped party can show either that the [police activity] was not tied to the traffic infraction or that the traffic stop reasonably should have been already completed.” 34 F.4th at 531–32
[U]nder the Fourth Amendment, even the briefest of detentions is too long if the police lack a reasonable suspicion of specific criminal activity.
Here, for the reasons explained above, Dep. Harper’s question concerning illegal items in Mr. Moffitt’s car was not tied to the traffic infraction that led to the traffic stop. While Dep. Harper posed that question shortly after asking Mr. Moffitt questions permitted by our caselaw, “[U]nder the Fourth Amendment, even the briefest of detentions is too long if the police lack a reasonable suspicion of specific criminal activity.” United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569, 578 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Williams, 68 F.4th at 309 (“[A]ny time (no matter the duration) added to a traffic stop beyond what was reasonably necessary to investigate the original cause for the stop must be grounded in independent reasonable suspicion.”); Hernandez v. Boles, 949 F.3d 251, 256 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[A]ny extension of a traffic stop absent independent reasonable suspicion is improper.”).
Dep. Harper, through his questioning regarding Mr. Moffitt’s activities at the hotel, moved beyond the scope of the traffic stop and began probing Mr. Moffitt’s unrelated actions.
Such is the case here, where Dep. Harper, through his questioning regarding Mr. Moffitt’s activities at the hotel, moved beyond the scope of the traffic stop and began probing Mr. Moffitt’s unrelated actions. Because this probing of unrelated actions occurred at a time when no investigatory tasks tied to the original traffic infraction were ongoing, the traffic stop was extended in contravention of Mr. Moffitt’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Law Enforcement Must Establish Reasonable Suspicion to Extend an Investigative Detention
The district court’s conclusion to the contrary is erroneous. This result is consistent with both our circuit precedent and the analyses of other federal courts of appeal presented with similar circumstances. We have repeatedly held that an officer’s “action extend[ing] the scope and duration of [a] stop beyond that necessary to issue a citation” violates a driver’s Fourth Amendment rights when the officer “ha[s] not developed reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity by that point.” Blair, 524 F.3d at 752.
Established Case Law – Unrelated Questioning
Such actions by officers which may unconstitutionally extend a traffic stop include mere “unrelated questioning.” Lott, 954 F.3d at 924. Accordingly, in United States v. Stepp, we held that an officer’s questions unreasonably “prolonged [a] traffic stop beyond its original purposes because the topics covered more than just context-framing questions.” 680 F.3d 651, 663 (6th Cir. 2012).
Persuasive Case Law – Traffic Stop Extension
Our sister circuits have also held that officers’ questions during traffic stops to drivers and car passengers concerning potential criminal conduct of which the officers had no reasonable suspicion violate the Fourth Amendment when asked in a manner that extends the stop. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 885 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (holding that an officer “unlawfully prolonged [a traffic] stop” by questioning the driver about potential illegal items in the car); United States v. Landeros, 913 F.3d 862, 868–70 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that officers’ questioning of car passenger during a traffic stop unlawfully extended the stop); United States v. Clark, 902 F.3d 404, 411 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that an officer “impermissibly extended [a traffic] stop” by asking the driver about his criminal history).
We reach the same conclusion here.
Conclusion
A decision to the contrary would effectively “[S]anction th[e] kind of brief prolongation” of a traffic stop which the Supreme Court has expressly labeled unconstitutional. Williams, 68 F.4th at 309. Mindful of the Supreme Court’s directive, we hold that Officer Dep. Harper unconstitutionally prolonged Mr. Moffitt’s traffic stop to probe for potential criminal conduct for which he lacked independent reasonable suspicion.
Because we hold that the traffic stop was prolonged in contravention of the Fourth Amendment, we do not address Mr. Moffitt’s and the government’s competing arguments concerning the scope of Mr. Moffitt’s consent to search his vehicle. No matter the scope which we might ascribe to Mr. Moffitt’s consent, “the consent was tainted by the illegality” of the prolonged traffic stop and therefore “ineffective to justify the [subsequent] search.” Royer, 460 U.S. at 507–08.
Holding
We therefore reverse the district court’s judgment on the sole ground that its determination regarding the traffic stop extension was erroneous.
For the reasons stated above, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Information for this article was obtained from U.S. v. Moffitt, No. 24 – 5536.
U.S. v. Moffitt, No. 24 – 5536 was issued on September 23, 2025 and is binding in the following states: Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee.
Lessons Learned:
- Routine Tasks Define the Traffic Stop Boundary – On May 17, 2023 the Sixth Circuit issued U.S. v. Williams, 68 F.4th 304 (2023) and the court explained “The initial length of the stop may stretch as long as the officer reasonably needs to complete the “mission” for which it began. Ordinarily, as here, the mission includes issuing a ticket for the violation that occasioned the stop and attending to “related safety concerns.” Rodriquez, 575 U.S. at 354. But once that initial mission has (or reasonably should have) concluded, if the officer wants to continue the stop for other reasons, she must demonstrate an additional modicum of reasonable suspicion.”. The Sixth Circuit quoted from Williams throughout this case. What is instructive is that law enforcement may extend the stop for ‘related safety concerns’ that are outside the scope of the mission of the traffic stop. Otherwise, officers must establish independent reasonable suspicion for some other criminal activity. In this case, Dep. Harper crossed the Fourth Amendment Constitutional line at this moment “Dep. Harper, through his questioning regarding Mr. Moffitt’s activities at the hotel, moved beyond the scope of the traffic stop and began probing Mr. Moffitt’s unrelated actions. Because this probing of unrelated actions occurred at a time when no investigatory tasks tied to the original traffic infraction were ongoing, the traffic stop was extended in contravention of Mr. Moffitt’s Fourth Amendment rights.”.
- Issuance of the Ticket is Not the Constitutional Benchmark – On February 19, 2009 the Sixth Circuit issued U.S. v. Bell, 555 F.3d 535 (6th Cir., 2009) and held “A stop may be unlawfully extended beyond the initial purpose even if the officer never formally completes the citation. Therefore, we do not focus on the length of this stop as compared with the average traffic stop, but rather on “whether [the Officers] improperly extended the duration of the stop.”. Consequently, the physical issuance of a written ticket or warning is not the benchmark that courts will singularly be evaluated. The physical issuance of the ticket is ‘a’ factor but not the only one. The court explained in this case “While Dep. Harper had not yet issued a traffic ticket to Mr. Moffitt for his alleged erratic driving, that fact alone does not guide our determination of a traffic stop’s permissible length or whether tasks reasonably tied to the traffic stop were still ongoing.”.
- The Timing of the Questions Matter Just as Much Content – On January 26, 2009 the U.S. Supreme Court issued Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) and the court explained “An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as the inquiries do not measurably extend the stop’s duration.”. Therefore law enforcement may ask unrelated questions but the stop cannot be ‘measurably extended’. What amount of time is and is not ‘measurably extended’? That is not a question that can be answered with a stop watch or specific time. Criminal defendants may argue that a stop is ‘measurably extended’ so officers should be sure to ask questions within the context of the traffic stop unless reasonable suspicion can be established for an additional crime.
Does your agency train on Traffic Stops?
Don’t fail your training.
Don’t let your training fail you!
Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!