Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search.
U.S. v. Robinson
414 U.S. 218 (1973)
U.S. Supreme Court
December 11, 1973
Mr. Robinson is a No Ops
On Tuesday April 23, 1968, at approximately 11 p. m., Officer Richard Officer Jenks, a fifteen-year veteran of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, observed the Mr. Robinson driving a 1965 Cadillac near the intersection of 8th and C Streets, N. E., in the District of Columbia. Officer Richard Jenks, as a result of previous investigation following a check of Mr. Willie Robinson’s operator’s permit four days earlier, determined there was reason to believe that Mr. Robinson was operating a motor vehicle after the revocation of his operator’s permit. This is an offense defined by statute in the District of Columbia which carries a mandatory minimum jail term, a mandatory minimum fine, or both.
Officer Richard Officer Jenks, a fifteen-year veteran of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, observed the Mr. Robinson driving a 1965 Cadillac near the intersection of 8th and C Streets, N. E., in the District of Columbia.
Officer Jenks Arrested Mr. Robinson
Officer Jenks signaled Mr. Robinson to stop the automobile, which Mr. Robinson did, and all three of the occupants emerged from the car. At that point Officer Jenks informed Mr. Robinson that he was under arrest for “operating after revocation and obtaining a permit by misrepresentation.” It was assumed by the Court of Appeals, and is conceded by the Mr. Robinson here, that Officer Jenks had probable cause to arrest Mr. Robinson, and that he effected a full-custody arrest.
Unknown Object in Mr. Robinson Left Breast Pocket
In accordance with procedures prescribed in police department instructions, Officer Jenks then began to search Mr. Robinson. He explained at a subsequent hearing that he was “face-to-face” with the Mr. Robinson, and “placed [his] hands on [the Mr. Robinson], my right-hand to his left breast like this (demonstrating) and proceeded to pat him down thus [with the right hand].” During this patdown, Officer Jenks felt an object in the left breast pocket of the heavy coat Mr. Robinson was wearing, but testified that he “couldn’t tell what it was” and also that he “couldn’t actually tell the size of it.” Officer Jenks then reached into the pocket and pulled out the object, which turned out to be a “crumpled up cigarette package.” Officer Jenks testified that at this point he still did not know what was in the package: “As I felt the package I could feel objects in the package but I couldn’t tell what they were. . . . I knew they weren’t cigarettes.”
Mr. Robinson’s Heroin
Trial Court Denies Motion to Suppress
The officer then opened the cigarette pack and found 14 gelatin capsules of white powder which he thought to be, and which later analysis proved to be, heroin. Officer Jenks then continued his search of Mr. Robinson to completion, feeling around his waist and trouser legs, and examining the remaining pockets. The heroin seized from the Mr. Robinson was admitted into evidence at the trial which resulted in his conviction in the District Court.
Court of Appeals Overturns the Trial Court
The opinion for the plurality judges of the Court of Appeals, written by Judge Wright, the concurring opinion of Chief Judge Bazelon, and the dissenting opinion of Judge Wilkey, concurred in by three judges, gave careful and comprehensive treatment to the authority of a police officer to search the person of one who has been validly arrested and taken into custody. We conclude that the search conducted by Officer Jenks in this case did not offend the limits imposed by the Fourth Amendment, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Court Reviews Past Legal Principles
It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. This general exception has historically been formulated into two distinct propositions. The first is that a search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest. The second is that a search may be made of the area within the control of the arrestee.
The justification or reason for the authority to search incident to a lawful arrest rests quite as much on the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody as it does on the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use at trial. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). The standards traditionally governing a search incident to lawful arrest are not, therefore, commuted to the stricter Terry standards by the absence of probable fruits or further evidence of the particular crime for which the arrest is made.
Nor are we inclined, on the basis of what seems to us to be a rather speculative judgment, to qualify the breadth of the general authority to search incident to a lawful custodial arrest on an assumption that persons arrested for the offense of driving while their licenses have been revoked are less likely to possess dangerous weapons than are those arrested for other crimes. It is scarcely open to doubt that the danger to an officer is far greater in the case of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station than in the case of the relatively fleeting contact resulting from the typical Terry-type stop. This is an adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search justification.
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.
But quite apart from these distinctions, our more fundamental disagreement with the Court of Appeals arises from its suggestion that there must be litigated in each case the issue of whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful arrest. We do not think the long line of authorities of this Court dating back to Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), or what we can glean from the history of practice in this country and in England, requires such a case-by-case adjudication. A police officer’s determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the search. The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a “reasonable” search under that Amendment.
The search of Mr. Robinson’s person conducted by Officer Officer Jenks in this case and the seizure from him of the heroin, were permissible under established Fourth Amendment law.
The search of Mr. Robinson’s person conducted by Officer Jenks in this case and the seizure from him of the heroin, were permissible under established Fourth Amendment law. While thorough, the search partook of none of the extreme or patently abusive characteristics which were held to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that Officer Jenks did not indicate any subjective fear of the Mr. Robinson or that he did not himself suspect that Mr. Robinson was armed. Having in the course of a lawful search come upon the crumpled package of cigarettes, he was entitled to inspect it; and when his inspection revealed the heroin capsules, he was entitled to seize them as “fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband” probative of criminal conduct. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S., at 154 -155; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 , 307 (1967); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S., at 149 .
Holding
The judgment of the Court of Appeals holding otherwise is Reversed.
Information for this article was obtained U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) and thousands of searches incident to arrest that I conducted.
U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) was issued on December 11, 1973 by the U.S. Supreme Court and is binding throughout the Unites States.
Lessons Learned:
- Fourth Amendment History – Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court issuing this decision, appellate courts throughout the United States had varying decisions on the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine. Keep in mind that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to local law enforcement until June 16, 1961 with the issuance of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Prior to Mapp the Fourth Amendment only applied to federal police agencies and the D.C. Metro Police. So, at the time that Robinson was issued the Fourth Amendment had only applied to local law enforcement for twelve years.
- Search Incident to Arrest – I am writing about this 1973 case because I have received some requests to comment on the detention of a suspect who has an unverified warrant. In most circumstances, the suspect can be detained but not arrested. The suspect may often be handcuffed, pending the verification of the warrant. However, the suspect may not be searched. If the suspect is searched and non-weapon contraband is discovered, it will likely be suppressed under the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine. To initiate this doctrine, the suspect must be under arrest. When a suspect is detained to verify a warrant, the suspect is not under arrest and hence, the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine may not be applied as the court held “It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search.”. Law enforcement must wait until the warrant is verified before a custodial search is completed. If the warrant check returns as invalid [often stated ‘no good’], then the suspect must be released without a search, unless another exception to the Fourth Amendment is identified and applied.
- How has the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine continued to develop since 1973? See https://www.objectivelyreasonable.com/category/search-incident-to-arrest/
- Pre-Sent Arms! – A belated pre-sent arms to DC Metro Police Officer Richard Jenks from his actions on Tuesday April 23, 1968. Well done! He and the U.S. Supreme Court have been responsible for countless criminal charges discovered in the pockets of suspects who were arrested for other crimes.
Does your agency train on Warrant Checks?
Don’t fail your training.
Don’t let your training fail you!
Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!