But the government’s analogy fails under every measure it asks us to consider: The historical laws on which it relies targeted different kinds of people, did so for different reasons, and operated in different ways. And faced with all these shortcomings in the government’s submission, we cannot say it has carried its conceded burden of showing its prosecution of Mr. Hemani complies with the Second Amendment.
U.S. v. Hemani
U.S. Supreme Court
June 18, 2026
Why is this case important?
U.S. v. Hemani is important because it represents the U.S. Supreme Court’s latest application of the historical tradition requirement for modern day firearm restrictions. Now a person’s demonstrated dangerousness must be established before that person’s Second Amendment right to possess a firearm becomes unlawful. The U.S. Supreme Court did not hold that drug consumers have an unrestricted right to possess firearms. Rather, it held that the government failed to justify this prosecution using the historical laws on drunkards that it presented.
Background
Ali Hemani uses marijuana a few times a week. That fact alone, the government says, means he is automatically banned from possessing a firearm under federal law. And because Mr. Hemani admits he owns a gun despite this ban, the government now seeks to prosecute him, imprison him for up to 15 years, and disarm him for life. This case poses the question whether the government’s prosecution of Mr. Hemani is consistent with the Second Amendment.
The federal Gun Control Act prohibits various categories of people from possessing guns. These categories, listed in 18 U.S.C. §922(g), include individuals convicted of crimes “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” §922(g)(1), fugitives from justice, §922(g)(2), and those convicted of domestic violence crimes, §922(g)(9). This case concerns another of the statute’s provisions— §922(g)(3). Under its terms, anyone who is an “unlawful user of ” or “addicted to” a “controlled substance” is automatically banned from possessing a gun. And for defying this ban, an individual can face up to 15 years in federal prison, §924(a)(8), and disarmament for life, §922(g)(1).
18 U. S. C. §922(g)(3) makes it illegal for anyone who unlawfully uses any drug found on any of the CSA’s schedules to possess a firearm for any reason, upon threat of imprisonment and permanent disarmament.
To define the term “controlled substance,” §922(g)(3) relies on the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Enacted to protect “the health and general welfare of the American people,” 21 U. S. C. §801(2), the CSA sets forth five schedules of “controlled substances” subject to varying degrees of regulation, §802. They range from Schedule I drugs with a high potential for abuse and no currently accepted medical uses (like heroin) to Schedule V drugs with the lowest potential for abuse and many accepted medical uses (like Tylenol with codeine). §§802, 812. By incorporating the CSA definition of the term “controlled substance,”
Convictions for violations of §922(g)(3) account for only about 5% of all §922(g) convictions. Congressional Research Service, Guns and Drugs: A Brief History of 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(3) (2026). But, the government insists, a conviction is warranted in this case, and the facts giving rise to it unfolded this way.
Mr. Hemani Lives With His Parents and Uses Marijuana about Every Other Day
Mr. Hemani is a dual citizen of the United States and Pakistan who was born in Texas and has spent most of his life there. In recent years, he has lived in the Dallas area with his parents and worked a stable job. But, suspecting Mr. Hemani and his family members of terrorism-related activities, the government conducted a search of the family home in 2022. Throughout the process, Mr. Hemani proved cooperative. He surrendered a gun he kept in the house and pointed agents to some marijuana on the property. He also consented to an interview, telling law enforcement agents that he used marijuana “about every other day.” After the agents found cocaine in his parents’ closet, Mr. Hemani claimed ownership of that as well, though he maintained that his mother had hidden it from him and that he had not used any recently.
Mr. Hemani Possessed a Firearm in Home – Along with the Cocaine His Mom Hid from Him
More than six months after the search, the government brought a single-charge indictment against Mr. Hemani. The charge had nothing to do with terrorism—the reason for the search in the first place. Nor did the charge involve possession of cocaine, drug trafficking, or anything like that. Instead, relying solely on his admitted use of marijuana about every other day, the government prosecuted Mr. Hemani for knowingly possessing a gun in his home while being an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance. For that alone, the government claimed, Mr. Hemani faced up to 15 years in prison and disarmament for life. No matter that the government did not assert Mr. Hemani was a drug addict. No matter that it did not contend his drug use had ever led him to pose a danger to himself or others. No matter, too, that the government did not claim Mr. Hemani had done anything with his gun other than possess it in his home.
District Court Granted Motion to Suppress and Fifth Circuit Upheld the Motion
Mr. Hemani moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the government’s effort to enforce §922(g)(3) against him violated the Second Amendment. The district court granted the motion and, after an unsuccessful appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the government asked us to review the case. We agreed to do so. 607 U. S. 992 (2025).
Courts Have a Duty to Identify Unconstitutional Actions by the Government
The Second Amendment protects the right of “all Americans” to keep and bear firearms for self-defense. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 581 (2008). Of course, like most individual rights, the Second Amendment has its limits. Id., at 626. American legislatures have long regulated the possession and use of firearms to some degree. See New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, 17 (2022). But when the government crosses the line from permissible regulation into unconstitutional infringement, courts have a duty to say so in the cases before them—no less in the Second Amendment context than in any other. See ibid.; Heller, 554 U. S., at 606.
[T]he government then bears the burden of showing its regulatory efforts are “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”
To determine when the government infringes the Second Amendment, we begin by asking whether the Amendment’s terms cover the conduct in question. Bruen, 597 U. S., at 24. If so, the Constitution “presumptively” protects it. To overcome that presumption, the government then bears the burden of showing its regulatory efforts are “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Ibid.
[W]e do not require the government to point to a “historical twin”.
Our cases demand this attention to history, we have said, because the Second Amendment was designed to codify a “pre-existing” individual right and guard against its later erosion by majoritarian legislation or judicial fiat. Id., at 25 (emphasis deleted). At the same time, we have recognized that “[t]he regulatory challenges posed by firearms today are not always the same” as those earlier generations faced. Id., at 27. Accordingly, to show that a contemporary regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, we do not require the government to point to a “historical twin” or “precis[e] . . . historical precursors.” United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 692 (2024). Instead, we have said, “the appropriate analysis involves considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” Ibid. And, to that end, the government may “reaso[n] by analogy,” showing that its contemporary regulation is “relevantly similar” to ones “well-established” in the Nation’s history. Bruen, 597 U. S., at 28–30.
The more closely a contemporary law mirrors a well-established historical analogue in purpose and operation, the more likely it is to be upheld.
While we have not yet had cause to “exhaustive[ly] survey” the features that may render a modern law “relevantly similar” to historical ones, we have said two play a “‘central’” role. Id., at 29. Call them the “why” and “how.” Ibid.; see also Rahimi, 602 U. S., at 692. The more closely a contemporary law mirrors a well-established historical analogue in purpose and operation, the more likely it is to be upheld. Conversely, the more a modern law diverges from traditional laws in purpose and operation, the less likely it is to survive review. See Bruen, 597 U. S., at 29; Rahimi, 602 U. S., at 692.
[T]he government acknowledges, it has a burden to carry.
The government accepts all this. It agrees, too, that §922(g)(3)’s unlawful user provision burdens conduct presumptively protected by the Second Amendment. After all, that statute bans a class of people including Mr. Hemani from possessing essentially any firearm for any purpose. As a result, the government acknowledges, it has a burden to carry.
[T]he law automatically bans an individual from possessing a gun from the moment he becomes an unlawful user of any controlled substance until he ceases being one.
The burden the government sets for itself in this case is a considerable one. As the government construes §922(g)(3) and seeks to apply it here, the law automatically bans an individual from possessing a gun from the moment he becomes an unlawful user of any controlled substance until he ceases being one. The law, says the government, doesn’t require anything more. It doesn’t matter what controlled substance an individual uses, in what amounts he does so, or whether his drug use has ever made him a danger to himself or others. It doesn’t even matter why he keeps a gun or how safely he does so. And for violating this automatic ban, the government insists, an individual like Mr. Hemani may be sent to prison for up to 15 years and disarmed for life.
Is a Habitual Drunkard Like a Habitual Drug User?
To meet its burden of showing a law like that is consistent with the Nation’s tradition of firearm regulation, the government relies on an analogy to what it calls “habitual drunkard” laws. These laws, the government submits, enjoy deep roots in the country’s history and are “relevantly similar” to the regulation it wishes to enforce against Mr. Hemani. Bruen, 597 U. S., at 29.
Habitual Drunkard Historical Categories
In truth, the habitual drunkard laws the government invokes fall into three general categories. First are vagrancy laws. Both at the founding and in the decades following it, vagrants—a group that sometimes included habitual drunkards—could be “confine[d] in a workhouse” or “jail[ed].” Second are civil-commitment statutes. Around the same time, many States allowed courts to appoint guardians for various individuals, including habitual drunkards, or authorized their “commit[ment] to asylums.” Id., at 21. Third are surety laws. Under them, judicial officers, again in the founding era and later, could compel habitual drunkards and others to post surety bonds to ensure their good behavior. “A person who failed to post bond,” the government explains, “would be jailed, while a person who posted bond and then misbehaved would forfeit the bond.” Id., at 22.
Habitual Drunkard Laws Resemble the Modern Day §922(g)(3)
These laws, the government insists, mirror §922(g)(3)’s unlawful user provision in three important respects. Two might be said to concern the “why” associated with these laws, the last their “how.” First, the government says, historical laws targeted habitual drunkards for the same reason §922(g)(3) targets unlawful users—because they regularly use intoxicants. See id., at 17 (calling habitual drunkards and unlawful users “closely analogous”). Second, the government submits, habitual drunkard laws restricted the liberties of people to the same end §922(g)(3) does—to protect the public from “unusually dangerous” individuals who commit “violent crime[s].” Id., at 11, 13–14, 22, 34. Finally, the government argues, the historical laws it cites operated in practice much like §922(g)(3) works— the former allowed governments to detain people in places where they could not bear arms while §922(g)(3) temporarily disarms unlawful users. All told, the government contends, because historical habitual drunkard laws resemble §922(g)(3)’s unlawful user provision in so many pertinent respects, that provision must be constitutional as applied in this case and others.
[T]he government has not even attempted to prove that any other specific historical principle might justify its prosecution in this case.
We disagree. We appreciate that drugs and guns can sometimes make for a dangerous mix. We appreciate, too, that the government’s effort to analogize a modern statute addressing drug use to historical laws must be approached with a sensitivity to the fact that many drugs well known today were unknown in early America. As we have put it, the Second Amendment “can, and must, apply to circumstances beyond those the Founders specifically anticipated.” Bruen, 597 U. S., at 28. But, even taking all that into account, the government cannot carry the burden it has set for itself. We decide cases “based on the historical record” and arguments “compiled by the parties” before us. Id., at 26, n. 6. And the habitual drunkard laws on which the government relies here differ dramatically from §922(g)(3)’s unlawful user provision on every single metric the government invites us to consider: They targeted different kinds of people, did so for different purposes, and operated in different ways. Whether any one of these problems taken in isolation would prove fatal to the government’s cause, we need not decide. Taken cumulatively, we hold, they certainly do. And, apart from pointing to habitual drunkard laws, the government has not even attempted to prove that any other specific historical principle might justify its prosecution in this case.
Habitual Drunkards and Drug Users Regularly Use Intoxicants
Start with the government’s first point of comparison. In its view, the reason why vagrancy, civil-commitment, and surety laws targeted habitual drunkards is “closely analogous” to the reason why §922(g)(3)’s unlawful user provision targets unlawful users: Both groups regularly use intoxicants. It’s a claim difficult to square with the historical record.
Court Distinguishes Between a Drunkard and a Habitual Drunkard
Around the time of the founding and for decades following it, a habitual drunkard was, as one court put it, someone who “for any considerable part of his time [was] intoxicated to such a degree as to deprive him of his ordinary reasoning faculties.” In re Tracy, 1 Paige Ch. 580, 582–583 (N. Y. Ch. 1829). A regular or even frequent drinker did not usually fit the bill. A “man who [was] intoxicated or drunk one-half his time” was more like it. See Ludwick v. Commonwealth, 18 Pa. 172, 175 (1851). In an early American medical treatise, Dr. Benjamin Rush, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, offered this description from a habitual drunkard about the depths of his condition: “‘Were a keg of rum in one corner of a room, and were a cannon constantly discharging balls between me and it, I could not refrain from passing before that cannon, in order to get at the rum.’” Medical Inquiries and Observations, Upon the Diseases of the Mind 266 (1812).
Established Case Law – Habitual Drunkard
Just consider how some of the statutes the government relies on defined the term. To qualify as a habitual drunkard under an early Arkansas law, someone had to drink to such excess that he was “incapable of conducting [his] own affairs.” Ark. Rev. Stat., ch. 78, §1 (1838) (W. Ball & S. Roane eds.) (Ball & Roane). A statute in the Minnesota Territory required an individual to be “mentally incompetent.” Minn. Terr. Rev. Stat., ch. 67, §12 (1851). A Connecticut law spoke of a person who had “lost the power of self-control.” Act of July 25, 1874, §1, in 1874 Conn. Pub. Acts 256. And in a statute governing the District of Columbia Congress defined a habitual drunkard as “any person who, by the use of intoxicating liquors . . . has lost self-control, or become incapable of proper attention to the care and management of his affairs, or habitually or periodically neglectful thereof, or dangerous to himself or others.” Act of Mar. 30, 1876, §9, 19 Stat. 10–11.
Were the Founding Fathers Habitual Drunkards?
Had habitual drunkard laws applied to those who simply drank regularly, many notable early Americans could have faced trouble. John Adams took “a tankard of hard cider” with his “daily breakfast.” W. Rorabaugh, The Alcoholic Republic 6 (1979) (Rorabaugh). Some say James Madison “consumed a pint of whiskey daily.” D. Okrent, Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition 8 (2010); but see M. Will Weber, Mint Juleps with Teddy Roosevelt: The Complete History of Presidential Drinking 29 (2014) (arguing Madison “championed wine . . . as a healthier and more respectable choice”). George Washington often drank three glasses of madeira in the evening—“not enough to be considered a heavy drinker in his day.” Id., at 5. Thomas Jefferson enjoyed “3 or 4 glasses [of wine] at dinner.” J. Gabler, Passions: The Wines and Travels of Thomas Jefferson 223 (1995). In fact, just a few days before the framers signed the Constitution, a farewell party gathered for General Washington at Philadelphia’s City Tavern where 55 guests are said to have ordered 54 bottles of madeira, 60 bottles of wine, 8 bottles of “Old stock,” 22 bottles of porter, 8 bottles of cider, 12 bottles of beer, and 7 large bowls of punch. National Park Service, C. Hershey, Historic Furnishings Plan: City Tavern 64–65 (1974).
Distinguishing Between Occasional Drunkard and Confirmed Drunkard
There was, in short, a “culture of copious drinking” in early America. D. Korostyshevsky, Incapable of Managing His Estate: Habitual Drunkards and the Expansion of Guardianship in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 43 Law & Hist. Rev. 795, 800 (2025). Indeed, in 1829 the “secretary of war estimated that three-quarters of the nation’s laborers drank . . . at least 4 ounces of distilled spirits” every day. Rorabaugh 15. Even the American Temperance Society called those who drank 12 ounces of hard liquor daily mere “‘occasional drunkards.’” Id., at 11. As the Society saw things, it took 24 ounces to qualify as a “‘confirmed drunkar[d].’” Ibid.
Court Equates Alcohol and Drugs as Intoxicants
Given all this, it seems the government’s historical laws targeted habitual drunkards not merely because they regularly used intoxicants, or even sometimes used them to excess. Instead, those laws focused on habitual drunkards because their drinking rendered them practically incapacitated and incapable of managing their affairs. And that hardly compares to whom §922(g)(3)’s unlawful user provision targets on the government’s account. To be sure, the government construes the term “unlawful user” to embrace only “habitual or regular” users, not those who use drugs irregularly. But even on that understanding, §922(g)(3) automatically disarms anyone who regularly uses any amount of any controlled substance for anything other than its “prescribed purpose.” The law, the government insists, does not require it to show that a particular individual is regularly incapacitated, much less incapable of conducting his affairs or a threat to himself or others. Put simply, on the government’s telling, §922(g)(3) sweeps in large numbers of people without regard to whether their substance use has the kind of incapacitating effect on them that historical habitual drunkard laws normally required.
Court Minimizes Every Other Day Cannabis Consumption
This case illustrates the disconnect. The government considers Mr. Hemani an unlawful user of a controlled substance because he admits to using marijuana about every other day. But how much marijuana does Mr. Hemani use, in what potency, and to what effect? Is he routinely unable to manage his affairs, a risk to himself or his family? Or does he use a mild gummy as a sleep aid a few times a week? We do not know and, the government says, it doesn’t matter. The government asks us to analogize him to a habitual drunkard all the same.
The drug involved makes no difference.
Nor does the government’s theory stop at Mr. Hemani. It extends equally to a husband who regularly takes his wife’s prescription Ambien to sleep and a college student who routinely uses a friend’s Adderall to cram for exams. The drug involved makes no difference. Nor, again, does it matter how much an individual uses or the effects it has on him. That someone regularly uses any substance found on any of the CSA’s five schedules for anything other than its “prescribed purpose” is enough. Id., at 57. Without more, the government asks us to analogize all such persons to habitual drunkards. To state the analogy is to expose its deficiency.
Does Regular Cannabis Use Render Him a Danger to Himself or Others?
In many respects, this case is a narrow one. We do not address efforts to ban addicts, or those presently intoxicated, from possessing a firearm. We do not address other prophylactic laws Congress might adopt after determining that users of a particular drug pose a special risk of misusing firearms. We do not address 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1)’s provision disarming individuals convicted of felonies (often including drug-related ones). Ibid. We do not even address whether the government could bring a prosecution under §922(g)(3) accompanied by individualized proof that the defendant’s use of marijuana (or any other drug) renders him a danger to himself or others. Or proof that a certain drug always renders its users dangerous because of its potency or for some other reason. None of those issues is before us and we do not pass on them either way.
The only thing the government must show, it says, is that an individual like Mr. Hemani regularly uses any amount of any controlled substance.
All that is before us is one, if surely ambitious, theory. The government maintains that it may automatically strip Mr. Hemani of his Second Amendment right to possess a firearm because he uses marijuana a few times a week. More than that, because he possessed a gun despite this prohibition, the government insists it may imprison him for up to 15 years and disarm him for life. According to the government, none of this turns on how much marijuana Mr. Hemani uses or what effect it has on him. It makes no difference either if he keeps a firearm only in his home for self-defense, never misuses a gun while intoxicated, and never poses a danger to himself or others as a result of his marijuana use. The only thing the government must show, it says, is that an individual like Mr. Hemani regularly uses any amount of any controlled substance.
Conclusion and Holding
To square that expansive theory with the Second Amendment, the government invites us to draw an analogy between its present regulation and historical laws addressing habitual drunkards. Those laws, the government contends, demonstrate a tradition of firearm regulation consistent with its effort to disarm any regular user of any controlled substance without any further showing. But the government’s analogy fails under every measure it asks us to consider: The historical laws on which it relies targeted different kinds of people, did so for different reasons, and operated in different ways. And faced with all these shortcomings in the government’s submission, we cannot say it has carried its conceded burden of showing its prosecution of Mr. Hemani complies with the Second Amendment. The judgment of the Fifth Circuit is affirmed.
Note: The U.S. Supreme Court wrote thirty-nine pages to come to the conclusion that prosecution of possessors of firearms who regularly consume intoxicants, legal or illegal, is not prohibited by law. I redacted much of the court’s discussion in this article. Click the links below to read the thirty-nine page decision.
Information for this article was obtained from U.S. v. Hemani, No. 24 – 1234.
U.S. v. Hemani, No. 24 – 1234 was issued by the U.S. Supreme Court on June 18, 2026 and is binding throughout the United States.
Lessons Learned
In 2022 the U.S. Supreme Court held that there Must be a Historical Tradition of Firearms Restrictions – On June 23, 2022 the U.S. Supreme Court held “[T]he government must affirmatively prove that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” New York State Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc. et. al., v. Bruen, Superintendent of New York State Police et. al. No. 20 – 843 (2022)
In 2024 the U.S. Supreme Court held that Firearms Restrictions of Today Must Only Comport to the Historical Traditions of Second Amendment Principles and does not have to be a Dead Ringer or Historical Twin – On June 21, 2024 the U.S. Supreme Court held “Why and how the regulation burdens the right are central to this inquiry. For example, if laws the founding regulated firearm use to address particular problems, that will be a strong indicator that contemporary laws imposing similar restrictions for similar reasons fall within a permissible category of regulations. Even when a law regulates arms-bearing for a permissible reason, though, it may not be compatible with the right if it does so to an extent beyond what was done at the founding. And when a challenged regulation does not precisely match its historical precursors, “it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.” The law must comport with the principles underlying the Second Amendment, but it need not be a “dead ringer” or a “historical twin.”. United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 692 (2024).
Is a 2026 Law Similar to 1791 Law? The U.S. Supreme Court applied Bruen and Rahimi, to the marijuana consuming Mr. Hemani that the government bears the burden of demonstrating that a modern firearm regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Courts will not uphold a firearm restriction merely because it appears reasonable or serves a public-safety purpose. The government must identify historical laws that are sufficiently similar in purpose and operation.
A Drug is a Drug is a Drug – The court began the lengthy analysis with a history of how much alcohol our Founders drank and that led to the conclusion “Nor does the government’s theory stop at Mr. Hemani. It extends equally to a husband who regularly takes his wife’s prescription Ambien to sleep and a college student who routinely uses a friend’s Adderall to cram for exams. The drug involved makes no difference.”.
Mr. Hemani’s ‘Affairs’ – The Court rejected the government’s argument that a person may automatically lose Second Amendment rights merely because he regularly uses a controlled substance. The opinion repeatedly emphasized that the government’s theory depended entirely on Mr. Hemani’s status as a marijuana user rather than any evidence that he was dangerous, impaired or incapable of managing his affairs. Of course, there was no analysis of how well Mr. Hemani ‘managed his affairs’, even if he did live with his parents AND his mother had to hide his cocaine, as the court identified “After the agents found cocaine in his parents’ closet, Mr. Hemani claimed ownership of that as well, though he maintained that his mother had hidden it from him and that he had not used any recently.”. Online information states that Mr. Hemani was twenty-five years old when he was arrested. https://www.change.org/p/help-us-free-ali-danial-hemani
Unlawful Acts 18 U.S.C. §922 (g) It shall be unlawful for any person … (3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (9) to … possess … any firearm or ammunition.
The Court did not hold that §922(g)(3) is facially unconstitutional. Rather, it repeatedly describes the case as an as-applied challenge and limits its holding to Mr. Hemani’s circumstances. The court explained that the statute could be constitutionally applied in other factual settings.
Where do we go from here? Law enforcement should identify how any person is a danger to himself or others. If and when addiction of ‘intoxicants’ as the court describes alcohol and drugs, is present, officers should provide a detailed explanation of how the impairment impacted the persons dangerousness.
Does your agency train on Firearms?
Don’t fail your training.
Don’t let your training fail you!
Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!