Relief from a firearms disability is therefore granted on a conviction-by-conviction basis.
State v. Heffley
Supreme Court of Ohio
June 2, 2026
Why is this case important?
State v. Heffley is the Supreme Court of Ohio’s most significant recent decision interpreting Relief from Weapons Disability O.R.C. §2923.14. As a practical matter, the decision preserves the viability of Ohio’s firearm-rights restoration process and confirms that trial courts—not automatic federal disqualifications—will determine whether deserving applicants may regain their firearm rights.
Background
In 2006, Mr. Patrick Heffley was found guilty of domestic violence, a fourth degree felony, in violation of O.R.C. §2919.25(A) and (D)(3). He served a prison term, paid his fines and court costs, and was successfully discharged from post-release control. But as a result of being convicted of a felony offense of violence, Mr. Heffley was prohibited from owning a firearm “[u]nless relieved from disability under operation of law or legal process.” O.R.C. §2923.13(A); see also O.R.C. §2901.01(A)(9) (defining “[o]ffense of violence”).
Ohio Revised Code – Release from Felon Disability to Possess a Firearm
Seventeen years after his conviction, Mr. Heffley filed an application for relief from his Ohio firearms disability under O.R.C. §2923.14. That statute allows a person who is “prohibited from acquiring, having, carrying, or using firearms [to] apply to the court of common pleas in the county in which the person resides for relief from such prohibition.” O.R.C. §2923.14(A)(1). If a person meets the requirements of the statute—including having “led a law-abiding life since discharge or release, and appears likely to continue to do so,” O.R.C. §2923.14(D)(2)— a trial court has discretionary authority to grant relief from the disability.
What is the Applicability of the Word ‘Otherwise’?
The trial court denied Mr. Heffley’s application. One requirement for a successful O.R.C. §2923.14 application is that the applicant is “not otherwise prohibited by law from acquiring, having, or using firearms.” O.R.C. 2923.14(D)(3). Federal law, however, prohibits anyone “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from having “any firearm or ammunition” unless their civil rights have been restored and the restoration of rights does not explicitly bar the person from having a firearm. 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1); see also 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20) (defining “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”). Because Mr. Heffley’s felony domestic violence conviction was punishable by a prison term up to 18 months, see O.R.C. §2929.14(A)(4), he was also under a federal firearms disability. The trial court reasoned that because Mr. Heffley was under a federal firearms disability, he was otherwise prohibited by law from acquiring, having, or using firearms.
Third District Appellate Court Application of ‘Otherwise’
Mr. Heffley appealed to the Third District. He argued that his federal disability, which arose from his state conviction, did not mean he was otherwise prohibited by law from having firearms. The Third District agreed and reversed the judgment of the trial court. 2024-Ohio-2218, ¶ 36 (3d Dist.). The court of appeals recognized that under federal law, a person does not have a federal firearms disability if his civil rights have been restored under state law, unless state law precludes the person from having a firearm. Id. at ¶ 24. Because the granting of Mr. Heffley’s application for relief from his state firearms disability would restore the rights suspended by Mr. Heffley’s domestic-violence conviction, it would also provide relief from his federal disability. Therefore, the Third District saw Mr. Heffley’s federal disability as no obstacle to his O.R.C. §2923.14 application. Id. at ¶ 29.
Established Case Law – Relief from Firearms Disability
But the Third District did not summarily grant Mr. Heffley’s application. It recognized that even if a person meets the statutory criteria for relief from firearms disability, it is within the trial court’s discretion whether to grant or deny the application. Id. at ¶ 34, citing State v. Lerch, 2016-Ohio-2791, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.) (noting R.C. 2923.14’s use of “may” rather than “shall”). So, it remanded the case “to the trial court to determine based upon the record whether to grant or deny Mr. Heffley’s motion for relief from disability.” Id. at ¶ 35.
We accepted the State’s appeal on the question whether a federal firearms disability arising from a state conviction prevents a trial court from granting relief from a state firearms disability. See 2024-Ohio-5529. Because this case involves the interpretation of an Ohio statute and its intersection with federal law, we begin with the Ohio statute and the relevant federal authorities.
State and Federal Firearms Disabilities
O.R.C. §2923.14 allows qualifying individuals to apply for relief from an Ohio firearms disability. If an applicant has a federal firearms disability because of a criminal conviction but Ohio does not independently disable the applicant because of that conviction, then R.C. 2923.14 is inapplicable. State ex rel. Suwalski v. Peeler, 2021-Ohio-4061, ¶ 28.
Relief from Weapons Under Disability – O.R.C. §2923
An applicant under O.R.C. §2923.14 must provide “[a]ll indictments, convictions, or adjudications upon which the applicant’s disability is based” and “[f]acts showing the applicant to be a fit subject for relief.” O.R.C. §2923.14(B). Following a hearing, a court “may grant” relief if three criteria are met:
. . . (a) If the disability is based upon an indictment, a conviction, or an adjudication, the applicant has been fully discharged from imprisonment, community control, post-release control, and parole, or, if the applicant is under indictment, has been released on bail or recognizance. . . .
The applicant has led a law-abiding life since discharge or release, and appears likely to continue to do so. (3) The applicant is not otherwise prohibited by law from acquiring, having, or using firearms. R.C. 2923.14(D). The statute further provides, “Relief from disability granted pursuant to this section restores the applicant to all civil firearm rights to the full extent enjoyed by any citizen . . . .” O.R.C. §2923.14(F).
Federal Law
Unlawful Acts – 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1)
Federal law also may impose firearms disabilities. Relevant here is 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1), which prohibits any person convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a firearm. But the statute specifically exempts from its application “[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored . . . , unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.” 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20). So, a person is no longer prohibited from possessing a firearm by 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) if the person’s civil rights limited by the disabling conviction have been restored and the restoration of rights does not expressly limit the person’s right to have a firearm.
Established Case Law – Unlawful Acts
“[T]he civil rights relevant under [18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20)] are the rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury.” Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 28 (2007). Mr. Heffley lost those rights as a result of his felony conviction. O.R.C. §2961.01(A)(1). But they were restored by operation of law following his release from prison. See O.R.C. §2961.01(A)(2) and §2967.16(C). Thus, Mr. Heffley is not under a federal firearms disability unless the “restoration of [his] civil rights expressly provides that [he] may not ship, transport, possess or receive firearms.” 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20).
In Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308 (1998), the United States Supreme Court dealt with the question whether a former offender who had been convicted under state law had been relieved of his federal firearms disability. The Court first explained that what constitutes a restoration of civil rights is determined “by reference to the law of the convicting jurisdiction.” Caron at 313, citing Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994). The parties agreed that Massachusetts, by operation of law, had restored the petitioner’s civil rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury. Id. The question, though, was whether the petitioner was nonetheless barred from owning firearms under federal law by the provision of 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20), providing that a restoration of civil rights relieves a firearms disability “unless . . . such restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess or receive firearms.” Massachusetts law allowed the petitioner to possess rifles and shotguns, but it did not allow him to possess handguns outside his home or business. Id. at 311. Under these circumstances, the Court concluded that the petitioner was not relieved from his federal firearms disability. It reasoned that the “unless clause” in the federal statute precluded relief from the firearms disability because Massachusetts law prohibited the petitioner from possessing certain types of guns that other citizens were allowed to own. Id. at 315. According to the Court, because Massachusetts law treated the petitioner as “too dangerous to trust” with certain types of guns, he had not been relieved of his federal disability. Id. at 316-317.
Relief from Firearms Disability
After the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Caron, the General Assembly amended O.R.C. 2923.14. The amendment added the language in O.R.C. §2923.14(F) providing that a granted application “restores the applicant to all civil firearm rights to the full extent enjoyed by any citizen.” 2011 H.B. No. 54. It also removed a requirement in O.R.C. §2923.14(A) that had limited the statute’s application to situations in which a disability existed “solely by reason” of the person’s state firearms disability. Id. And in an uncodified section of the amendment, the General Assembly stated that it was explicitly making this amendment to clarify that relief from a weapons disability granted under section 2923.14 of the Revised Code restores a person’s civil firearm rights to such an extent that the uniform federal ban on possessing any firearms at all, 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1), does not apply to that person, in correlation with the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20) in Caron v. U.S. (1998), 524 U.S. 308. Id. at Section 3.
Mr. Heffley Is Eligible to Have His State Firearms Disability Removed
Under federal law, relieving Mr. Heffley from his Ohio firearms disability will also relieve him from his federal firearms disability stemming from the same conviction. The question we confront is whether a trial court may grant an O.R.C. §2923.14 application for relief from a state firearms disability when an Ohio conviction creates both the state and federal disabilities. On a fair reading of O.R.C. §2923.14, we conclude that the answer is yes.
The Meaning of ‘Otherwise’
Both Mr. Heffley and the State rely largely on textual arguments to support their positions. The State argues that under O.R.C. §2923.14(D)(3), a person who is under a federal firearms disability is “otherwise prohibited by law” from possessing a firearm and is thus ineligible to have his state firearms disability removed. Even though removing the state disability would remove the federal one, the State maintains that removal of the federal disability must come first. Mr. Heffley rejoins that the phrase “otherwise prohibited by law” refers to the source of the disability and thus permits a trial court to remove a disability if the federal disability arises only because of the state conviction. Although both parties raise reasonable arguments in support of their construction of the statute, we conclude that Mr. Heffley’s reading is the better one.
Help from Daniel Webster Descendants
The operative word here is “otherwise.” “Otherwise” means “in a different way or manner.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002). So, what is the “different way” in the context of O.R.C. §2923.14 that a person may be prohibited by law from possessing a firearm? We look to the structure and text of R.C. 2923.14 for the answer.
Relief from a firearms disability is therefore granted on a conviction-by-conviction basis.
Every O.R.C. §2923.14 application must contain, among other things, “[a]ll indictments, convictions, or adjudications upon which the applicant’s disability is based.” O.R.C. §2923.14(B)(1). And if the applicant omits such a conviction from the application, the applicant’s disability arising from that conviction is not relieved. O.R.C. §2923.14(F)(1). Relief from a firearms disability is therefore granted on a conviction-by-conviction basis. Understood in this light, the statute’s use of “otherwise” refers to whether a separate conviction—i.e., one other than those identified in the application—otherwise imposes a firearms disability on the applicant.
Only One
In this case, Mr. Heffley’s state and federal firearms disabilities arise from a single state conviction—his 2006 domestic-violence conviction—which is the subject of his application for relief. Mr. Heffley has only one disabling conviction. He is not otherwise prohibited by law from having a firearm.
Clarification Language
Other portions of the statute support this reading. OR.C. §2923.14(F) provides that removal of the state disability “restores the applicant to all civil firearm rights to the full extent enjoyed by any citizen.” This language suggests that the General Assembly understood that a successful application would relieve not only state firearm disabilities but also attendant federal disabilities caused by the state conviction. This understanding is strengthened by the uncodified part of the statute, which provides that this language was added to clarify that a restoration of a person’s civil rights would remove a federal firearms disability under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1).
A Legal Cul-de-sac
The State’s contrary position would lead to a stalemate: theoretically, a federal disability could be removed by an Ohio court’s restoration of the applicant’s Ohio firearm rights, but an Ohio court would be powerless to restore the applicant’s Ohio rights because of the federal disability. Because every Ohio violent-felony conviction would trigger both state and federal firearm disabilities, an O.R.C. §2923.14 application would be futile. But “when the text of a statute makes its purpose clear, and we must choose between two permissible readings of the statutory text, an interpretation that advances the purpose of the statute is to be preferred over one that would thwart that purpose.” State ex rel. More Bratenahl v. Bratenahl, 2019-Ohio-3233, ¶ 15; see also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56-57 (2012). Mr. Heffley’s reading of “otherwise prohibited by law” is consistent with the purpose that is conveyed by the statutory text, while the State’s reading would render the statute largely unavailable to those with firearms disabilities resulting from a felony conviction.
Was the Dissent Half-Hearted?
The dissenting opinion begins with a half-hearted textual attempt to support its preferred reading of the law, but quickly betrays that its true aim has everything to do with policy and little to do with what the law actually says. It proclaims that “even if state law did not prohibit Mr. Heffley from possessing firearms, 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) would still apply to him.” Dissenting opinion, ¶ 34. But, of course, that’s not true. As explained above, the statute specifically exempts from its application “[a]ny conviction . . . for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored” unless the restoration of rights “expressly provides” that the person may not own firearms, 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20).
The Majority Informs the Dissenting Justice to ‘take that up’ with her Representative in Congress
Unable to muster a coherent textual argument, the dissenting opinion switches gears and charges that our interpretation “creates a galling disparity in the law,” leads to an “absurd result,” and “harm[s] the rule of law.” See dissenting opinion at ¶ 37-38. The dissenting opinion bases these allegations on the fact that Congress has allowed States to remove federal firearms disabilities only when the disability is created by state law, meaning that state law cannot remove an independently created federal disability flowing from a misdemeanor conviction. See 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); Suwalski, 2021-Ohio-4061, at ¶ 28. But if the dissenting jurist does not like the law that Congress enacted, she should take that up with her representative in Congress. Our task is to apply the laws that have been enacted, not the ones that the dissenting jurist thinks should have been enacted.
Congress left the restoration of rights to the States …
[I]t is the author of the dissenting opinion who would “harm the rule of law.”
The author of the dissenting opinion seems particularly concerned that applying the laws that Congress and the General Assembly enacted will “lessen[] the protection for future victims of felony-level domestic violence.” Dissenting opinion at ¶ 37. But, of course, Congress and the General Assembly could have removed felony domestic violence from the crimes for which a former offender may have his firearms rights restored. Neither chose to do so. Instead, Congress left the restoration of rights to the States, and the General Assembly entrusted trial judges with the responsibility of making an individualized determination of whether an eligible former offender has sufficiently demonstrated that his firearms rights should be restored. In implying that policy rationales justify departing from the legislatively enacted scheme, it is the author of the dissenting opinion who would “harm the rule of law.”
Remand to the Trial Court
The trial court incorrectly concluded that Mr. Heffley was ineligible to have his firearms disability removed because Mr. Heffley was “otherwise prohibited” from owning a firearm under federal law. Our decision today reverses that determination and remands the matter to the trial court to make a discretionary decision whether to grant Mr. Heffley’s request for relief from his disability.
Conclusion and Holding
Because Mr. Heffley’s state and federal firearm disabilities stem from the same Ohio conviction, he is not “otherwise prohibited by law” from possessing a firearm for purposes of O.R.C. §2923.14. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals. We remand this matter to the Allen County Court of Common Pleas to determine whether to grant or deny Mr. Heffley’s application for relief from his firearms disability.
Information for this article was obtained from State v. Heffley, 2026 – Ohio – 1990
State v. Heffley, 2026 – Ohio – 1990 was issued by the Supreme Court of Ohio on June 2, 2026 and is binding throughout the State of Ohio.
Lessons Learned
Relief from Weapons Disability – On September 14, 2016 O.R.C. §2923.14(A)(1) became effective and states in pertinent part “Except as otherwise provided in division (A)(2) of this section, any person who is prohibited from acquiring, having, carrying, or using firearms may apply to the court of common pleas in the county in which the person resides for relief from such prohibition.” O.R.C. §2923.14(D)(2) states “Upon hearing, the court may grant the applicant relief pursuant to this section, if all of the following apply: (2) The applicant has led a law-abiding life since discharge or release, and appears likely to continue to do so.”.
What is the Impact of State v. Heffley? The Supreme Court of Ohio did not restore Mr. Heffley’s firearm rights. The court merely held that he was eligible to apply for relief under O.R.C. §2923.14. Trial courts still retain discretion to grant or deny relief after evaluating the applicant’s history, rehabilitation, and current circumstances. Under O.R.C. §2923.14(D)(2), there is no time limitation at a minimum or maximum that a convicted person may obtain relief from weapons disability. The key issue was not whether Mr. Heffley was under a federal disability, but why he was under that disability. Because both the state and federal disabilities stemmed from the same domestic violence conviction, the Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that the federal disability was not an independent barrier to relief. All future cases will be decided by a trial court judge based on a case-by-case analysis.
Does your agency train on Firearm Offenses?
Don’t fail your training.
Don’t let your training fail you!
Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!