[W]e conclude that the law-enforcement officers had a reasonable belief (and even probable cause) both that Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito lived at the 2027 Cummins Court apartment and that he would be present when the officers entered the apartment on February 15, 2023.

 

U.S. v. Socrates Martinez-Hipolito

No. 25 – 5526

Sixth Circuit Appellate Court

March 5, 2026

Why is this case important?

U.S. v. Socrates Martinez-Hipolito establishes that when serving an arrest warrant the ‘Reason to Believe’ doctrine is satisfied by the totality of the circumstances.  The Sixth Circuit also emphasized that the Fourth Amendment requires officers to act reasonably, not perfectly, meaning officers are not required to eliminate every possible alternative explanation about where the suspect might be before entering the residence.

Background

Ambrose Street Gang – Probation – Living with Socrates

Socrates and his brother Hafit Martinez-Hipolito are known members of the Ambrose Street Gang in Lexington, Kentucky. In August 2021, Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito was arrested and taken into federal custody for violating the terms of his supervised release that followed a prior conviction. He was again placed on supervised release starting in January 2023. Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito submitted several supervision reports to the United States Probation Office in connection with his renewed release. The reports listed his address as 2027 Cummins Court, Apt. 4, in Lexington, Kentucky. This was the address at which he was arrested in 2021. Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito also verbally informed his probation officer that he would be living with his brother Socrates at that address.

Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito listed 2027 Cummins Court, Apt. 4, in Lexington, Kentucky as his home on his parole paperwork.  An arrest warrant was issued in his name at this address.  His half brother Socrates lived in the apartment and refused to answer the door when law enforcement knocked and announced.  Socrates failure to answer the door led to a ten year prison sentence.  Was it objectively reasonable for the officers to enter?

Marshals Attempt to Serve Warrant

When Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito subsequently violated the terms of his renewed supervised release, a warrant was issued for his arrest. Seeking to execute the warrant, the United States Marshals Service contacted the Probation Office for information about Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito. The Probation Office provided the Marshals Service with the 2027 Cummins Court address and reported that Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito was unemployed. The Marshals Service accordingly attempted to execute the warrant at that address on February 15, 2023.

Knock and Announce – No Answer – Heard Footsteps

At approximately 9:30 a.m. on that date, a group of deputy marshals, assisted by officers from the Lexington Police Department, arrived at 2027 Cummins Court, knocking and announcing their presence. They received no response even after knocking for approximately ten minutes. But the officers heard footsteps and movement near the door, which indicated that people were inside. They thus decided to forcibly enter the apartment.

Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito was Not Inside but Socrates and Ammunition, Marijuana and Drug Paraphernalia were Observed in Plain View

Upon entering, the officers found three individuals, including Socrates. They also observed ammunition, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia in plain view. But Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito was not present. Socrates informed the officers that Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito did not reside at 2027 Cummins Court, but instead lived with their other brother at an address on Dix Drive in Lexington, Kentucky. Upon hearing this information, the officers ascertained that Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito had once listed the Dix Drive address on a probation data collection form. The officers consequently left the apartment and attempted to locate Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito at the Dix Drive address.

Search Warrant Obtained to Search 2027 Cummins Court

Child Pornography

In the meantime, officers from the Lexington Police Department obtained a warrant to search the 2027 Cummins Court apartment based on the paraphernalia that they had observed in plain view. The search yielded a variety of evidence relating to drugs, firearms, and gang-related activities. The search warrant also authorized the officers to examine Socrates’s electronic devices, which revealed that Socrates possessed videos of himself having sex with a 16-year-old girl. The FBI subsequently seized these materials via a federal search warrant, resulting in the government charging Socrates with producing child pornography, which is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).

Motion to Suppress is Denied – Plea – Ten Year Prison Sentence

Socrates moved to suppress the evidence seized from his electronic devices. When the district court denied his motion, Socrates entered a conditional guilty plea that reserved his right to appeal the court’s suppression ruling. The court entered final judgment in May 2025 and sentenced Socrates to 120 months of imprisonment. This timely appeal followed.

Appeal – Crossing the Threshold was Objectively Unreasonable

The evidence that Socrates seeks to suppress was seized pursuant to a search warrant issued after law-enforcement officers observed criminal paraphernalia in his apartment when attempting to arrest his brother Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito. Socrates thus contends that this evidence is “fruit of the poisonous tree” because the officers’ initial entry into his apartment was allegedly unconstitutional.

Established Case Law – Arrest Warrant

We disagree. “[F]or Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980). “This court has elaborated on this principle, holding that ‘an arrest warrant is sufficient to enter a residence if the officers, by looking at common sense factors and evaluating the totality of the circumstances, establish a reasonable belief that the subject of the arrest warrant is within the residence at that time.’” El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 416 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 483 (6th Cir. 2006)). In other words, law-enforcement officers may lawfully enter a residence to execute an arrest warrant if they have “a reasonable belief both (1) that [the suspect] lived at the residence, and (2) that [the suspect] was inside the residence at the time that they entered.” Id. (Our circuit has not decided whether “reasonable belief” requires probable cause or some lower level of suspicion. See United States v. McKenzie, 33 F.4th 343, 348–49 (6th Cir. 2022); United States v. Baker, 976 F.3d 636, 642 (6th Cir. 2020). But we need not answer that question because the result here is the same under both standards.)

Reason to Believe Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito was Inside

Socrates does not dispute that the law-enforcement officers had a reasonable belief that Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito lived at the 2027 Cummins Court apartment. Instead, his sole argument on appeal is that the officers could not have reasonably believed that Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito was inside the apartment at the time that they entered. We conclude otherwise, however, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s decision.

Reliance on the Address on the Arrest Warrant was Reasonable

First, one of the officers who entered Socrates’s apartment testified at the suppression hearing that the Marshals Service typically relies on information provided by the Probation Office to determine a suspect’s location. Accordingly, because 2027 Cummins Court was the only address for Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito that the Probation Office provided to the Marshals Service, the officers had reason to believe that they could find him at the apartment located there.

Socrates notes, however, that Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito had previously listed a different address on a probation data-collection form. But that form was not the proper method for him to register a change of address with the Probation Office. In any event, Socrates concedes that the law-enforcement officers reasonably believed that 2027 Cummins Court was Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito’s residence. Socrates acknowledges that this reasonable belief “increases the likelihood” that Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito “c[ould] be found” there. See United States v. Vasquez-Algarin, 821 F.3d 467, 481 (3d Cir. 2016).

Officers Heard Footsteps

Second, multiple officers testified that, after they knocked and announced their presence, they heard footsteps and movement near the door. This indicated that there were people inside the apartment. Given the officers’ reasonable belief that Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito lived there, they had every reason to think that he was among the occupants. See Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 483 (explaining that the sound of a television from inside the house and the presence of a car in the driveway gave rise to a reasonable belief that the suspect was at home (citing United States v. Route, 104 F.3d 59, 62–63 (5th Cir. 1997))).

Circumstantial Evidence Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito was Inside

Third, law-enforcement officers had previously arrested Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito at that very apartment in August 2021. Two of the officers who had participated in the 2021 arrest were in fact present during the later attempted arrest in February 2023. These officers testified that, during the 2021 arrest, Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito did not respond for “well over five minutes” after officers knocked and announced their presence, and that Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito seemed “[v]ery reluctant” to open the door.” Consequently, when no one answered the door for approximately ten minutes after the officers knocked and announced their presence in February 2023, the officers could have reasonably believed that Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito was similarly attempting to avoid contact. This would be consistent with his prior conduct at the same residence. See United States v. Barrera, 464 F.3d 496, 504 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that law enforcement officers’ reasonable belief that a suspect was inside a residence was bolstered by the suspect’s previous arrest at the same location).

Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito’s lack of employment further supported the likelihood that he would be present in the apartment.

Finally, the timing of the officers’ entry based upon Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito’s lack of employment further supported the likelihood that he would be present in the apartment. See El Bey, 530 F.3d at 417 (noting that “the ‘suspect’s presence may be suggested by . . . the time of day [and] the circumstances of a suspect’s employment’” (quoting Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir. 1999))). One of the officers testified that, “generally, [unemployed] individuals that I deal with will sleep late and maybe go look for work later in the day.” Because the Probation Office reported that Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito was unemployed, the officers’ morning visit to the apartment was based on the reasonable assumption that Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito would be at home. See Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 483 (explaining that an informant’s tip that the suspect was unemployed and liked to sleep late was sufficient to establish reasonable belief that the suspect was in the apartment (citing United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1995))).

What is ‘Reason to Believe’?

Socrates nevertheless argues that “more is required to establish a reasonable belief that Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito was inside [the] apartment than that it was mid-morning and he had no job.” But Socrates cites no authority in support of that contention. And, in any case, this argument overlooks the additional factors supporting the officers’ reasonable belief—namely, the address information provided by the Probation Office, the sounds of movement coming from inside the apartment, and the circumstances surrounding Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito’s prior arrest at the same location.

[T]he Fourth Amendment requires officers to act only “reasonably,” not “flawlessly.”

Socrates also contends that, even given these facts, Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito “could just as easily been” elsewhere. But we are aware of no authority requiring law-enforcement officers to rule out all other possibilities regarding a suspect’s location before entering the residence in question. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 184 (1990) (explaining that “reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment “does not demand that the government be factually correct in its assessment” regarding “what a search will produce”); United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1524 (6th Cir. 1996) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment requires officers to act only “reasonably,” not “flawlessly.”).

Conclusion and Holding

In sum, “looking at common sense factors and evaluating the totality of the circumstances,” Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 483, we conclude that the law-enforcement officers had a reasonable belief (and even probable cause) both that Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito lived at the 2027 Cummins Court apartment and that he would be present when the officers entered the apartment on February 15, 2023. The officers’ entry into the apartment was accordingly not unconstitutional, so the evidence against Socrates derivatively obtained from that entry was not subject to being suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.

Information for this article was obtained from U.S. v. Socrates Martinez-Hipolito, No. 25 – 5526 (6th Cir., 2026). 

U.S. v. Socrates Martinez-Hipolito, No. 25 – 5526 (6th Cir., 2026) was issued by the Sixth Circuit Appellate Court on March 5, 2026 and is binding in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee.

Lessons Learned 

  1. Ohio Statutory Standard to Enter a Home with an Arrest Warrant – To force entry in Ohio both the statutory and Constitutional standards must be met. The statutory standard Nonconsensual, Forcible Entry O.R.C. §2935.12 states in pertinent part “When making an arrest or executing an arrest warrant the … law enforcement … may break down an outer or inner door or window of a dwelling house or other building … if, after notice of his intention to make the arrest or execute the warrant or summons.”. This is the standard that mandates law enforcement must knock and announce prior to forcing entry.
  2. Constitutional Standard to Enter a Home with an Arrest Warrant – On April 15, 1980 the U.S. Supreme Court issued Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) held “[A]n arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives … when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.”.
  3. Reason to Believe Standard – What has been challenging for Ohio law enforcement and law enforcement throughout the country is what is ‘Reason to Believe’? This is not a legal standard that solid language for law enforcement to apply in practical application.  Now, with the holding in this case, the Sixth Circuit established a clearer baseline as the court explained “In sum, “looking at common sense factors and evaluating the totality of the circumstances,” Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 483, we conclude that the law-enforcement officers had a reasonable belief (and even probable cause) both that Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito lived at the 2027 Cummins Court apartment and that he would be present when the officers entered the apartment on February 15, 2023. The officers’ entry into the apartment was accordingly not unconstitutional.”.  Reason to Believe is based on the totality of circumstances.  The Marshals and Lexington Police had determined that Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito listed 2027 Cummins Court, Apt. 4, in Lexington, Kentucky as his home on his parole paperwork.  When the arrest team arrived at that location, they knocked and announced their presence, heard footsteps therein and the occupant refused to answer the door.  Based on these factors the arrest team had ‘reason to believe’ Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito was inside.  As later determined, he was not inside but Mr. Socrates Martinez-Hipolito was, along with his ammunition, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia observed in plain view.  Subsequently a search warrant was lawfully obtained that discovered Mr. Socrates Martinez-Hipolito child pornography.
  4. Knock and Announce – On May 14, 1991 the Fourth District Appellate Court issued State v. Valentine, 74 Ohio App.3d 110 (4th, 1991) “Furthermore, we note that the executing officer, [Deputy] James Howard, failed to properly announce himself … O.R.C. §2935.12 requires ‘notice of [the officer’s] intention to make … such a search. It is not sufficient for the officer to merely identify himself as a police officer.”. Consequently, when knocking and announcing, law enforcement must both 1) Identify self as a police officer. 2) Announce the intent to search.
  5. Absolutely Certain? On June 21, 1990 the U.S. Supreme Court issued Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) and held “[P]olice officers conducting a search or seizure under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement – is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.”.   The Sixth Circuit recognized this holding in this case as it explained “Socrates also contends that, even given these facts, Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito “could just as easily been” elsewhere. But we are aware of no authority requiring law-enforcement officers to rule out all other possibilities regarding a suspect’s location before entering the residence in question.”. Simply because Mr. Hafit Martinez-Hipolito was actually not inside the apartment or that he could have been in many other locations was irrelevant.  Law enforcement does not have to be right … only objectively reasonable.
  6. Pre-Sent Arms! The U.S. Marshals, Lexington Police and federal prosecutors should be highly commended for their investigation, arrest, conviction and successful appeal defense of Mr. Socrates Martinez-Hipolito. Well done!  I also want to commend the Sixth Circuit Appellate court for providing clarity on the Reason to Believe doctrine for law enforcement in five states!

Does your agency train on Crossing the Threshold?

Don’t fail your training.

Don’t let your training fail you!

Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!

Robert H. Meader Esq.