We … hold that as an incident to the arrest the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.
Maryland v. Buie
U.S. Supreme Court
February 28, 1990
Pizza Shop Armed Robbery in a Red Jogging Suit
On February 3, 1986, two men committed an armed robbery of a Godfather’s Pizza restaurant in Prince George’s County, Maryland. One of the robbers was wearing a red running suit. That same day, Prince George’s County police obtained arrest warrants for respondent Jerome Edward Buie and his suspected accomplice in the robbery, Lloyd Allen. Mr. Buie’s house was placed under police surveillance.
Arrest and Discover of the Red Jogging Suit
On February 5, the police executed the arrest warrant for Mr. Buie. They first had a police department secretary telephone Mr. Buie’s house to verify that he was home. The secretary spoke to a female first, then to Mr. Buie himself. Six or seven officers proceeded to Mr. Buie’s house. Once inside, the officers fanned out through the first and second floors. Corporal James Rozar announced that he would “freeze” the basement so that no one could come up and surprise the officers. With his service revolver drawn, Cpl. Rozar twice shouted into the basement, ordering anyone down there to come out. When a voice asked who was calling, Cpl. Rozar announced three times: “this is the police, show me your hands.” Eventually, a pair of hands appeared around the bottom of the stairwell and Mr. Buie emerged from the basement. He was arrested, searched, and handcuffed by Cpl. Rozar. Thereafter, Detective Joseph Frolich entered the basement “in case there was someone else” down there. He noticed a red running suit lying in plain view on a stack of clothing and seized it.
Mr. Jerome Buie’s house, 5400 67th Avenue, Riverdale, Maryland; the aqua blue right half of the double.
Motion to Suppress is Denied and Red Jogging Suit is Admissible
The trial court denied Mr. Buie’s motion to suppress the running suit, stating in part: “The man comes out from a basement, the police don’t know how many other people are down there. He is charged with a serious offense.” Id., at 19. The State introduced the running suit into evidence at Mr. Buie’s trial. A jury convicted Mr. Buie of robbery with a deadly weapon and using a handgun in the commission of a felony.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion. The court stated that Detective Frolich did not go into the basement to search for evidence, but to look for the suspected accomplice or anyone else who might pose a threat to the officers on the scene.
“Traditionally, the sanctity of a person’s home – his castle – requires that the police may not invade it without a warrant except under the most exigent of circumstances. But once the police are lawfully within the home, their conduct is measured by a standard of reasonableness . . . . [I]f there is reason to believe that the arrestee had accomplices who are still at large, something less than probable cause – reasonable suspicion – should be sufficient to justify a limited additional intrusion to investigate the possibility of their presence.” Id., at 575-576, 531
Maryland Court of Appeals held Admissibility of the Red Jogging Suit is Inadmissible
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed by a 4-to-3 vote. 314 Md. 151, 550 A. 2d 79 (1988). The court acknowledged that “when the intrusion is slight, as in the case of a brief stop and frisk on a public street, and the public interest in prevention of crime is substantial, reasonable articulable suspicion may be enough to pass constitutional muster,” id., at 159, 550 A. 2d, at 83. The court, however, stated that when the sanctity of the home is involved, the exceptions to the warrant requirement are few, and held: “[T]o justify a protective sweep of a home, the government must show that there is probable cause to believe that `”a serious and demonstrable potentiality for danger“‘ exists.” Id., at 159-160, 550 A. 2d, at 83 The court went on to find that the State had not satisfied that probable-cause requirement. Id., at 165-166, 550 A. 2d, at 86.
U.S. Supreme Court Accepts the Case for Review
We granted certiorari, 490 U.S. 1097 (1989).
Law Enforcement had the Authority to Enter the Home …
Did that Include the Basement?
It is not disputed that until the point of Mr. Buie’s arrest the police had the right, based on the authority of the arrest warrant, to search anywhere in the house that Mr. Buie might have been found, including the basement. “If there is sufficient evidence of a citizen’s participation in a felony to persuade a judicial officer that his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require him to open his doors to the officers of the law.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 -603 (1980). There is also no dispute that if Detective Frolich’s entry into the basement was lawful, the seizure of the red running suit, which was in plain view and which the officer had probable cause to believe was evidence of a crime, was also lawful under the Fourth Amendment. The issue in this case is what level of justification the Fourth Amendment required before Detective Frolich could legally enter the basement to see if someone else was there.
What Legal Standard Should be Applied to Protective Sweeps?
Petitioner, the State of Maryland, argues that, under a general reasonableness balancing test, police should be permitted to conduct a protective sweep whenever they make an in-home arrest for a violent crime. As an alternative to this suggested bright-line rule, the State contends that protective sweeps fall within the ambit of the doctrine announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and that such sweeps may be conducted in conjunction with a valid in-home arrest whenever the police reasonably suspect a risk of danger to the officers or others at the arrest scene. The United States, as amicus curiae supporting the State, also argues for a Terry-type standard of reasonable, articulable suspicion of risk to the officer, and contends that that standard is met here.
Respondent argues that a protective sweep may not be undertaken without a warrant unless the exigencies of the situation render such warrantless search objectively reasonable. According to Mr. Buie, because the State has shown neither exigent circumstances to immediately enter Mr. Buie’s house nor an unforeseen danger that arose once the officers were in the house, there is no excuse for the failure to obtain a search warrant to search for dangerous persons believed to be on the premises. Mr. Buie further contends that, even if the warrant requirement is inapplicable, there is no justification for relaxing the probable-cause standard. If something less than probable cause is sufficient, respondent argues that it is no less than individualized suspicion – specific, articulable facts supporting a reasonable belief that there are persons on the premises who are a threat to the officers. According to Mr. Buie, there were no such specific, articulable facts to justify the search of his basement.
[Detailed legal analysis is redacted.]
[W]ithout probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest
We agree with the State, as did the court below, that a warrant was not required. We also hold that as an incident to the arrest the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.
Extension of the Protective Sweep
Beyond that, however, we hold that there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. This is no more and no less than was required in Terry and Long, and as in those cases, we think this balance is the proper one.
[N]ot a full search of the premises, but may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found.
We should emphasize that such a protective sweep, aimed at protecting the arresting officers, if justified by the circumstances, is nevertheless not a full search of the premises, but may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found. The sweep lasts no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises.
Conclusion and Holding
The Red Jogging Suit IS Admissible
We conclude that by requiring a protective sweep to be justified by probable cause to believe that a serious and demonstrable potentiality for danger existed, the Court of Appeals of Maryland applied an unnecessarily strict Fourth Amendment standard. The Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. We therefore vacate the judgment below and remand this case to the Court of Appeals of Maryland for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Information for this article was obtained from Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) was issued on Wednesday February 28, 1990 by the U.S. Supreme Court and is binding throughout the United States.
Lessons Learned;
- Rooms Immediately Adjoining – When law enforcement conducts an in-home arrest, without reasonable or probable cause, the rooms that are immediately adjoining can be swept for a person posing a danger to the officers. This is the ONLY criminal procedure doctrine for law enforcement that I am aware, that does not require probable cause or reasonable suspicion before law enforcement can take enforcement action; “We also hold that as an incident to the arrest the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.”.
- Rooms Not Immediately Adjoining – At the time of an in-home arrest, if an officer has a reasonable belief that a person poses a danger beyond the areas immediately adjoining then those areas may also be swept. The U.S. Supreme Court held “Beyond that, however, we hold that there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.”. So if an officer hears a noise upstairs or in the basement, or beyond the area where the arrest is made, then the officer may conduct a protective sweep of those areas. The search is only for a person who may pose a threat of the officers conducting the arrest and only during the arrest process inside the home.
- Most Under-Utilized – The Protective Sweep inside the home is THE most under-utilized legal doctrine established by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Does your agency train on how to conduct protective sweeps?
Don’t fail your training – don’t let your training fail you!
Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!