[W]e conclude that the officers didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of Canine Tyra’s brief contact with Mr. Fellmy’s car during her open-air sniff for drugs.
U.S. v. Fellmy
Sixth Circuit Appellate Court
January 23, 2026
Why is this case important?
U.S. v. Fellmy reinforces Sixth Circuit Appellate Court guidance on canine sniffs during traffic stops and draws a clear constitutional line between officer conduct and a canine’s instinctive behavior. The court confirms that a pre-textual traffic stop remains lawful regardless of an officer’s investigative motive, that officers may order a driver out of a vehicle for safety and that a free-air canine sniff is not a Fourth Amendment search. Most significantly, the decision clarifies that brief, incidental canine contact with a vehicle, such as paws on a door or a nose near an open window, does not transform a lawful sniff into an unconstitutional search unless the canine handler directed the canine do so. For law enforcement, prosecutors and courts, this case provides practical, common-sense rules that preserve effective roadside investigations while remaining consistent with established Fourth Amendment case law.
Anonymous Tip – License Plate Light – Traffic Stop
Mercer County Deputy Michael Raisor received a tip that a man named Steven Fellmy was transporting drugs through Mercer County, Kentucky, in a silver Ford Mustang with a black racing stripe. After he saw a car matching that description, Dep. Raisor pulled behind the Mustang and observed that its license plate wasn’t illuminated. He also saw the Mustang make a right turn without signaling. So Dep. Raisor pulled the car over. He first verified that Mr. Fellmy’s license-plate number matched the police department’s records and that his name matched the anonymous tip. Then Dep. Raisor waited for backup to arrive.
Mr. Fellmy was driving a silver Ford Mustang with a black racing stripe, like this vehicle. This is not the exact vehicle but one that was similar.
Windowsill Tap and Canine Alert
After other officers reported to the scene, Dep. Raisor directed Mr. Fellmy to step out of the Mustang. Dep. Raisor then asked Mr. Fellmy if the officers could search his vehicle. Mr. Fellmy said no. So Corporal Isaac Shelton, a K-9 officer, conducted a dog sniff for the presence of drugs. Cpl. Shelton walked a drug dog named Canine Tyra around the vehicle on a leash so she could sniff various parts of the car. When he reached the open driver-side window, Cpl. Shelton tapped the windowsill. In response, Canine Tyra jumped up onto the door of Mr. Fellmy’s car and sniffed for drugs. When she didn’t alert, the officer walked Canine Tyra around to the passenger side and tapped on the windowsill. Canine Tyra once again jumped up onto the car door with her two front paws resting on the windowsill and stuck her nose partially through the open window. This time, she alerted to the presence of drugs.
Methamphetamine – Heroin – Intent to Distribute
Fellmy’s Felonies
Officers then searched Mr. Fellmy’s car and found a bag containing a large crystal of methamphetamine. They also searched Mr. Fellmy’s person and found heroin along with more methamphetamine. So Mr. Fellmy was arrested and charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute.
Motion to Suppress is Denied
Encourage or Facilitate?
Before trial, Mr. Fellmy moved to suppress the drugs. He argued that the officers (1) Unlawfully seized him by ordering him to exit his vehicle and (2) Unlawfully searched him by directing the drug dog to jump onto the car door to sniff inside it. But the district court denied his motion to suppress. It found that police officers have an “unequivocal right” to order a driver out of his car after a traffic stop for safety reasons. So no unlawful seizure occurred. The district court also held that the officers hadn’t unlawfully searched Mr. Fellmy’s car because they didn’t “encourage or facilitate” Canine Tyra to put her head into the vehicle.
Methamphetamine Bag is Admissible
Mr. Fellmy later filed a motion in limine to exclude the bag of methamphetamine from trial. He argued that the drugs were not properly authenticated under Federal Rule of Evidence 901 because police records showed significant differences in drug weight and because the government had not maintained an adequate chain of custody. And Mr. Fellmy asked for an evidentiary hearing to present evidence supporting this claim. The district court again denied Mr. Fellmy’s motion. It observed that a motion to suppress would have been a more appropriate way to raise the argument and that Mr. Fellmy could adequately dispute the evidence’s authenticity via cross-examination. Accordingly, the court admitted the drugs.
Convicted – Twenty-Five Years Prison Sentence
A jury then convicted Mr. Fellmy of trafficking methamphetamine, and the district court sentenced him to 300 months in prison to be followed by ten years of supervised release. Mr. Fellmy timely appealed his conviction. He contends the district court erred by admitting the drugs.
Appeal – Fourth Amendment Violation
Mr. Fellmy first argues that the drugs should be suppressed because the officers found the drugs following both a search and a seizure that violated the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people” to be “secure in their persons . . . and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. To determine whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment, we ask two questions. Did they commit a search or a seizure? And if so, was that search or seizure unreasonable?
Mr. Fellmy Argues he was Unconstitutionally Seized
Start with Mr. Fellmy’s seizure argument. Mr. Fellmy contends that the drug evidence should have been suppressed because the officers unconstitutionally seized him when they ordered him to step out of his vehicle during the traffic stop. And Mr. Fellmy believes that seizure was unreasonable because officers asked him to exit the vehicle only as pretext to perform a dog sniff.
So the officers didn’t unlawfully seize Mr. Fellmy when they asked him to exit his car.
But officers may always order drivers out of their car during a lawful police stop. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977). Why? Because officers must be able to “exercise unquestioned command of the situation” to minimize danger for both the officers and the driver. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (quoting Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997)). The officers’ subjective motivation doesn’t matter. Cf. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). And Mr. Fellmy admits that he had failed to signal at a right turn, and thereby committed a traffic violation. When police see a traffic violation, they can lawfully stop the driver. That means Officer Dep. Raisor had conducted a lawful police stop. So the officers didn’t unlawfully seize Mr. Fellmy when they asked him to exit his car.
Did Canine Tyra Conduct an Unconstitutional Search?
Mr. Fellmy next contends that Canine Tyra’s dog sniff—which led to the discovery of the drugs after she alerted—amounted to an unconstitutional search.
Established Case Law – Searches
The Supreme Court has identified two ways to define a Fourth Amendment search. One test asks whether officials intruded on an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). And more recently, the Supreme Court explained that officials also commit a search by “physically intruding on” constitutionally protected property in “an attempt to find something or to obtain information.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013) (citation omitted); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408 n.5 (2012). Jones made clear that Katz’s “reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test” was “added to, not substituted for” this property-based test, which follows the common-law understanding of trespass. 565 U.S. at 409. Mr. Fellmy contends that the officers’ actions were a search under both Katz and Jones. He’s wrong on both counts.
Established Case Law – Searches
[E]verything inside the car—except drugs—remains private.
The officers didn’t perform a search under Katz. Officers don’t violate a driver’s reasonable expectation of privacy when they walk a trained drug dog around a lawfully stopped car to sniff for drugs. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). That’s because drug dogs alert only when they smell drugs. So everything inside the car—except drugs—remains private. As for the drugs themselves, no one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in such illegal contraband. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005). What’s more, drivers already retain a diminished expectation of privacy in the interior of their cars. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985). Cars can be quickly moved between different jurisdictions. Id. Because that makes it more difficult to get a warrant to search a car, officers have more leeway to investigate cars without violating the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 390.
A Canine Sniff is Not a Search
Under Katz and progeny, Cpl. Shelton conducted a permissible dog sniff. Mr. Fellmy had been lawfully pulled over on a public road after committing a traffic violation. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 819. And Canine Tyra was a trained and certified drug dog. So when Canine Tyra formally “alerted” to the presence of drugs, the officers had not committed a Fourth Amendment search.
We reasoned that when dogs take “instinctive” actions, like jumping into a car, a Fourth Amendment search doesn’t occur unless the officers “encouraged or facilitated” the dog’s action.
Mr. Fellmy disagrees, hanging his hat on United States v. Sharp, 689 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2012). In Sharp, we held that officers didn’t commit a search after their drug dog jumped into a car during a drug sniff. We reasoned that when dogs take “instinctive” actions, like jumping into a car, a Fourth Amendment search doesn’t occur unless the officers “encouraged or facilitated” the dog’s action. Id. at 620. So Mr. Fellmy contends that Cpl. Shelton committed a search because Cpl. Shelton “directed” Canine Tyra to jump up on the driver’s and passenger’s doors and put her head into the cab of the car.
Narcotics Have a Diminished Expectation of Privacy
But this case is a far cry from Sharp. For starters, the dog in Sharp jumped through an open window and explored the interior of the car. 689 F.3d at 617–18. Here, by contrast, Canine Tyra momentarily poked her nose partially inside an open window. For Katz purposes, we doubt that kind of minimal intrusion—through “sui generis” means that could “only reveal[] the possession of contraband”—violated Mr. Fellmy’s already diminished expectation of privacy in the interior of his car. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408–09.
Do Officers Have an Affirmative Duty to Close Car Windows Prior to a Canine Sniff?
In any event, the district court rendered a factual finding that the officers didn’t instruct Canine Tyra to put her nose into the car. While officers signaled for her to jump onto the door by patting the windowsill, they never patted inside the car or provided any other signal for her to explore the car’s interior. Instead, the district court concluded that Canine Tyra “instinctive[ly]” leaned her head towards open car windows to sniff. Nor did the officers open the car windows to facilitate that sniff—Mr. Fellmy had already opened them when he was pulled over, and the officers did “not have an affirmative duty to close the windows in preparation for the dog sniff.” Sharp, 689 F.3d at 619 (distinguishing between the driver opening the point of entry, such as a hatchback or window, and officers themselves opening the point of entry).
Disagreement with the Facts is Not a Sharp Argument
Mr. Fellmy’s objection under Sharp thus boils down to a different reading of the factual record about the officers’ role in facilitating Canine Tyra’s sniffs of the car’s interior. “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, however, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” United States v. Jackson, 154 F.4th 422, 430 (6th Cir. 2025). So Sharp does not support Mr. Fellmy’s Fourth Amendment claim.
Is a Canine Standing on Her Hind Legs the Same as Placing a GPS on a Vehicle?
Mr. Fellmy’s arguments under Jones also fail. As noted, officials commit a search when they “physically occup[y]” or “physically intrud[e]” on private property to find information. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404, 408 n.5; Jardines, 569 U.S. at 5. Mr. Fellmy argues that the officers’ actions were a Jones search because Canine Tyra, by “standing on her hind legs and sticking her nose into the interior of the car,” committed a common-law “trespass against property, i.e. chattel” under Kentucky law. Appellant Br. at 20–21.
Fellmy Fact Check – Canine Tyra’s presence at the scene—and subsequent alleged trespass—was intended to obtain information. That’s because she was trying to sniff the open car windows to check for drugs.
The officials’ actions met part of the Jones test. Mr. Fellmy’s car was constitutionally protected property. The Fourth Amendment protects “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” and Mr. Fellmy’s car falls within that protection because the Supreme Court has told us that cars are “effect[s].” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Jones, 565 U.S. at 404. And Canine Tyra’s presence at the scene—and subsequent alleged trespass—was intended to obtain information. That’s because she was trying to sniff the open car windows to check for drugs.
Canine Physical Contact is Not Unconstitutional
Court Contrasts Canine Paws to a Credit Card
But Canine Tyra’s conduct in performing the free-air sniff around Mr. Fellmy’s vehicle didn’t constitute a search under Jones. That’s because Canine Tyra merely made incidental contact with the car while performing the challenged sniffs. Most of Canine Tyra’s body, including her nose, didn’t touch Mr. Fellmy’s car. Only Canine Tyra’s front paws made fleeting contact with the car’s windowsills—with most of her weight still resting on the ground. Nor, moreover, did the fleeting contact between Canine Tyra’s front paws and Mr. Fellmy’s vehicle—which, again, is the only “physical” contact Mr. Fellmy cites, Jones, 565 U.S. at 405—itself communicate any information. Similar contact, we previously held in the context of briefly “sliding” a credit-card “through a scanner” like the ones available at gas stations and grocery stores, does “not involve” the kind of “physical intrusion” Jones regulates. United States v. Bah, 794 F.3d 617, 623, 630 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation modified). Other circuits have noted the same in post-Jones cases involving police dogs’ touching (and indeed entry) of vehicles. See United States v. Keller, 123 F.4th 264, 268–69 (5th Cir. 2024)
Are Canine Paws Like Chalked Tires?
Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 332–33 (6th Cir. 2019), does not change that conclusion. In that case, this court concluded that city officials committed a trespass—and thus a search—when they chalked the bottom of a car tire to track how long the vehicle had been parked. Id. at 332–33. According to Mr. Fellmy, Canine Tyra made similarly “slight” contact with his car, so that’s enough to constitute a search under Taylor. 922 F.3d at 333.
Note: For more information on Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 332–33 (6th Cir. 2019) See Chalk Another Win for Alison and the Fourth Amendment.
There’s a world of difference between such lasting contact [with a GPS] and the limited and incidental contact of the dog here.
But Canine Tyra’s brief jump looks nothing like the continuous contact in Taylor. There, officers chalked car tires. Id. at 330–31. Those marks then remained on the tires—sometimes for “several hours”—so officers could determine how long the cars had been parked. Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 11 F.4th 483, 486 (6th Cir. 2021); see Taylor, 922 F.3d at 330. In other words, the officers intentionally made a physical alteration of the vehicle that was lasting and integral to the search method at issue. In finding a search, Taylor thus relied on Jones, which stressed that “the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’” Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (emphases added). That continued occupation in Jones was a GPS device attached to the underside of a car for four weeks. Id. at 403. So just as in Taylor, the officers made contact with a car and then left something behind for a significant period: a GPS tracker. Id. There’s a world of difference between such lasting contact and the limited and incidental contact of the dog here. Note too that, unlike in Taylor or Jones, Canine Tyra didn’t leave anything behind after she got off Mr. Fellmy’s car. Taylor, 922 F.3d at 332–33; Jones, 565 U.S. at 403.
The Canine Stepstool Hypothetical
Heeding that difference makes sense because, taken to its logical conclusion, Mr. Fellmy’s argument leads to absurd results. If the incidental contact of Canine Tyra’s paws on Mr. Fellmy’s door was a search, then the Fourth Amendment—and officers’ ability to carry out lawful, open-air sniffs of vehicles—would toggle on and off based on things like the height of the drug dog police use, the size of the car stopped, the particular placement (e.g., glove compartment versus wheel well) of drugs within the car, and whether car doors or windows happen to be left open during the sniff. Canine Tyra is “shorter than the average German Shepherd,” so she rested her paws on Mr. Fellmy’s car door to sniff through his open windows. But a larger drug dog could sniff through the windows without ever touching Mr. Fellmy’s car (though perhaps not for a raised truck or SUV). Cf. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. So, by Mr. Fellmy’s logic, that wouldn’t be a search. Likewise, if officers had placed a stepstool next to Mr. Fellmy’s car for Canine Tyra to stand on, that wouldn’t be a search either according to Mr. Fellmy’s view. The same would seem to follow if the officers had lifted Canine Tyra so her nose was at window level. Or if Mr. Fellmy had left his door ajar upon exiting the vehicle.
The Fourth Amendment Window Knock
Even worse, apply Mr. Fellmy’s reasoning to officers themselves. If an officer rests his arm on a car door while he looks through the window for contraband, Mr. Fellmy’s rule would call that a search. But if the officer simply left his arms at his sides, the very same glance through the window wouldn’t be a search. Or what if the officer knocked on a car window to order a defendant to roll it down? If he then saw contraband, would that be a search because the officer had made contact with the window?
Neither logic nor the Fourth Amendment demands such implausible distinctions.
Neither logic nor the Fourth Amendment demands such implausible distinctions. To the contrary, injecting such arbitrary factors into the calculus risks hampering law enforcement’s ability to efficiently and effectively investigate at traffic-stop scenes, which already are “especially fraught with danger to police officers.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009).
Conclusion and Holding
For the above reasons, we conclude that the officers didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of Canine Tyra’s brief contact with Mr. Fellmy’s car during her open-air sniff for drugs.
Note: There was one additional appeal based on chain of evidence. That appeal was also denied but is not evaluated in this article.
Information for this article was obtained from U.S. v. Fellmy, No. 25 -5381 (6th Cir., 2026).
U.S. v. Fellmy, No. 25 -5381 (6th Cir., 2026) was issued by the Sixth Circuit Appellate Court on January 23, 2026 and is binding in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee.
Lessons Learned
- Deputy Raisor Conducted a Pre-Textual Traffic Stop – On June 10, 1996 the twenty-eighth anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court issuing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, (1968), the same court issued Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996). In Whren, D.C. Metro Police stopped a Nissan Pathfinder for fail to signal. Upon approaching the vehicle an officer observed Mr. Whren with two large bags of crack cocaine in his lap. Whren appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court that held “Here the District Court found that the officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners [Mr. Whren] had violated the traffic code. That rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the evidence thereby discovered admissible.”. This is commonly known as a pre-textual stop because the officers in Whrenwere in an unmarked vehicle in plain clothes and enforced a minor traffic violation. [Note: In Ohio law enforcement must be in a marked vehicle, in uniform to conduct traffic stops.] However, the U.S. Supreme Court opined that law enforcement could enforce traffic laws irrespective of an underlying motivation, so long as the driver violates a traffic regulation. In this case Dep. Raisor stopped Mr. Fellmy for a violation of the Kentucky traffic code because the license plate light was not illuminated and he failed to use his turn signal. However, Dep. Raisor’s motivation was based on an anonymous tip that Mr. Fellmy was a drug trafficker. Based on the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996), Dep. Raisor conducted a lawful traffic stop for the inoperable license plate light and failure to signal.
- Paws on the Vehicle – During the free air sniff, Corporal Isaac Shelton tapped the windowsill of Mr. Fellmy’s vehicle and Canine Tyra placed her paws on the vehicle, extended her head toward the open window and alerted on the presence of narcotics, because there was a presence of narcotics. Mr. Fellmy appealed these actions, focusing on Canine Tyra touching his vehicle with her paws. He applied United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) that now mandates law enforcement obtain a search warrant prior to placing a GPS on a vehicle to obtain tracking information. The court viewed this as a hypothetical wrong with another hypothetical – a credit card; “[W]e previously held in the context of briefly “sliding” a credit-card “through a scanner” like the ones available at gas stations and grocery stores, does “not involve” the kind of “physical intrusion” Jones regulates.”. Mr. Fellmy also argued the Idaho Supreme Court case State v. Dorff, 526 P.3d 988 (2023) where on March 20, 2023 that court held “[A] warrantless Fourth Amendment ‘search’ occurred when [Canine] Nero trespassed against Dorff’s vehicle for the purposes of obtaining information about, or related to, the vehicle.”. Idaho is the ONLY state supreme court to come such a finding. It is one thing to be wrong and it is another to be loud wrong and the Dorff decision is loud wrong.
- Duty to Close the Window – When Mr. Fellmy exited his Mustang HE [Fellmy] left the window open that facilitated Canine Tyra’s alert. The Sixth Circuit Appellate recognized that the deputies had no affirmative duty to close the window prior to the free air sniff based on established case law; “Nor did the officers open the car windows to facilitate that sniff—Mr. Fellmy had already opened them when he was pulled over, and the officers did “not have an affirmative duty to close the windows in preparation for the dog sniff.” United States v. Sharp, 689 F.3d 616, 619 (6th Cir. 2012) (distinguishing between the driver opening the point of entry, such as a hatchback or window, and officers themselves opening the point of entry).”. Consequently, when a suspect leaves the vehicle windows open, law enforcement has no duty to close the windows on the suspect’s behalf.
- Encourage or Facilitate – There are two Sixth Circuit canine cases where the court defers to canine’s instinctive actions. One case focuses on searches and the other case focuses on force – a canine bite. On Friday July 27, 2012 the Sixth Circuit Appellate Court held “We now join our sister circuits in holding that a trained canine’s sniff inside of a car after instinctively jumping into the car is not a search that violates the Fourth Amendment as long as the police did not encourage or facilitate the dog’s jump.”. United States v. Sharp, 689 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2012). Previously, on Monday November 29, 2004 the same Sixth Circuit Appellate Court had to evaluate a dog bite where a mother, trying to protect her adult felonious son tried to walk past a canine handler on a stair case and was bitten in the leg. There the court held “[A] reasonable jury could only conclude [Canine] Kojak’s actions were spontaneous response to Plaintiffs ‘threatening’ movement into the dog’s defense perimeter. The district court properly held Officer Jenkins did not seize the Plaintff ‘through means intentionally applied’, and thus, Plaintiff had no cognizable Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Jenkins.”. Dunigan v. Noble, 390 F.3d 486 (2004). What both the Sharp and Dunigan cases distinguish is a difference between a canine being directed/ordered by the handler and the canine’s instinctive reaction. In this case when Cpl. Shelton tapped the windowsill, he did not direct Canine Tyra to place her nose into the open window and thus Canine Tyra’s instinctive actions was not a Fourth Amendment violation. What canine handlers should take away from Sharp, Dunigan and now Fellmy is that every action the handler gives to the canine will be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment but an instinctive reaction by the canine will not.
- Pre-Sent Arms! Mercer County Deputy Michael Raisor, Corporal Isaac Shelton, Canine Tyra and the federal prosecutors who investigated, arrested, prosecuted and successfully defended the case against Mr. Fellmy should be highly commended. Well done!
Does your agency train on Canine Searches?
Don’t fail your training.
Don’t let your training fail you!
Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!