[A]n officer may ask unrelated questions to his heart’s content, provided he does so during the supposedly dead time while he or another officer is completing a task related to the traffic violation.
U.S. v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484 (2010).
U.S. v. King II
Sixth Circuit Appellate Court
July 31, 2025
DEA Task Force and Parole Officer Tips
The traffic stop that is the subject of Mr. James King’s motion to suppress occurred on Saturday September 17, 2022. Prior to that date, Mr. King was the subject of a drug traffic. Mr. King investigation conducted by Cole Hodge, a Michigan State Police (“MSP”) trooper assigned to a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) task force. In May 2022, Tr. Hodge received tips from a “potential informant” facing criminal charges that Mr. King was traffic. Mr. King large amounts of methamphetamine from downstate Michigan to locales in the Upper Peninsula. Tr. Hodge followed up on these initial tips by contacting Mr. King’s parole officer, who provided Tr. Hodge with Mr. King’s contact information and the make and model of a pickup truck that Mr. King purchased. The parole officer also provided information about Mr. King’s movements that corresponded to the tips Tr. Hodge received – Mr. King frequently traveled downstate to visit his children, and he seasonally worked on Mackinac Island, where he was suspected of distributing methamphetamine.
Cell Phone Search Warrant – Traffic Stop and Canine Alert – Methamphetamine Residue
Tr. Hodge continued to investigate Mr. King in June and July of 2022, and eventually obtained a search warrant for Mr. King’s historical and active cell phone location data. From surveilling Mr. King’s phone data, Tr. Hodge was able to track Mr. King’s location, and discerned that he was returning to the Upper Peninsula from a trip downstate on July 29, 2022. MSP troopers surveilled Mr. King as he reentered the Upper Peninsula, and observed Mr. King’s attempt to evade surveillance and veer into a separate roadway. The troopers relocated Mr. King and stopped him based on an alleged lane violation. During the stop, a drug-sniffing dog alerted to Mr. King’s vehicle. Troopers found only methamphetamine residue, which was attributed to Mr. King’s passenger and eventual fiancée Marissa Rosebush.
A warrant was subsequently issued for Ms. Rosebush’s arrest. No methamphetamine was found on Mr. King’s person or attributed to Mr. King.
Downstate Narcotics Run
After the July 2022 stop, Tr. Hodge continued to surveil Mr. King and monitored his license plate. On September 15, 2022, two days prior to the relevant stop in this appeal, Tr. Hodge learned that Mr. King had traveled downstate. On September 17, 2022, he learned that Mr. King was returning to the Upper Peninsula. Suspecting that Mr. King was on a narcotics run, Tr. Hodge instructed uniformed MSP troopers to attempt a traffic stop. He informed troopers that (1) Mr. King was currently on parole; (2) Mr. King was bringing methamphetamine from downstate to the Upper Peninsula; (3) Mr. King was stopped on July 29, 2022, and had attempted to evade troopers’ initial attempts at a stop; (4) it was possible that Rosebush was also in the vehicle; and (5) Rosebush had a felony warrant for possession of methamphetamine. Tr. Hodge also relayed that Mr. King’s vehicle was pulling an empty utility trailer.
Traffic Violations – Traffic Stop – Knives – Mood Swings
Troopers surveilled Mr. King as he returned to the Upper Peninsula. MSP Trooper Colin Immel clocked Mr. King’s speed on a radar device and observed that Mr. King was traveling at 71 miles-per-hour, six miles over the posted speed limit of 65 miles-per-hour. As Tr. Immel pursued Mr. King for speeding, he observed additional traffic infractions – Mr. King’s trailer had no working brake lights, and one brake light on Mr. King’s vehicle was out. Tr. Immel pulled Mr. King over for the traffic infractions and made contact with Mr. King on the driver’s side of the vehicle. While Mr. King was still in his vehicle, Tr. Immel obtained Mr. King’s license and registration, and asked Mr. King to remove two knives he had on his person. Mr. King initially tried to hand Tr. Immel his driver’s license through the driver’s side window, only rolling the window partially down. This odd interaction piqued Tr. Immel’s suspicion that Mr. King was under the influence of drugs. As Tr. Immel continued to interact with Mr. King, he observed additional possible symptoms of intoxication, including that Mr. King was nervous, sweating, experiencing mood swings, and was “very challenging.”
Ms. Rosebush Under the Influence?
Upon contact with Mr. King, Tr. Immel identified Ms. Rosebush sitting in the front passenger seat of Mr. King’s vehicle. Tr. Immel’s partner, Trooper Ethan Metras, obtained Rosebush’s identification and verified her information. Tr. Metras believed that Ms. Rosebush was under the influence of drugs, or that she was extremely nervous – she was trembling, sweating but also complaining of being cold, and appeared sensitive to sunlight.
Have a Seat
After Tr. Immel received Mr. King’s license and registration, he asked Mr. King to join him in the front seat of his patrol car, a request Tr. Immel “routinely” makes during traffic stops. Mr. King agreed to sit in the vehicle. Tr. Immel informed him that he was free to leave at any time. As Mr. King sat in the patrol car, Tr. Immel verified Mr. King’s identity, registration, and insurance, and checked his driver’s license against law enforcement databases for outstanding warrants or involvement in additional drug investigations. None of these routine checks gave Tr. Immel additional reason to detain Mr. King.
A Child Visit and a Failed Purchase of an Unknown Lawn Mower
As Tr. Immel ran these checks, he questioned Mr. King about his travels. Mr. King stated that he was traveling from Mount Pleasant, in downstate Michigan, to Manistique in the Upper Peninsula. Mr. King said he visited one of his children and looked at a lawn mower for sale that he ultimately declined to buy. Tr. Immel believed Mr. King’s responses to be suspicious because Mr. King did not know the type of lawn mower he was attempting to buy—he knew only that it was a rider lawn mower—and Mr. King said that he declined to buy the lawn mower after the seller changed the agreed-upon price. Tr. Immel later testified that, in his experience, “when you are going to go and purchase something, especially several hours away, you are going to know a price” for the item.
Canine Trooper Arrives Four Minutes Into the Stop
While Tr. Immel was asking Mr. King about his travel plans, another MSP vehicle arrived on the scene, approximately three minutes and fifty-seven seconds into the stop. It was a marked K-9 vehicle driven by MSP Trooper Kyle Lott, and contained his drug-sniffing dog, Rudy. Rudy is trained and certified in the detection of methamphetamine, crack cocaine, powder cocaine, and heroin. Tr. Lott and Rudy had previously responded to Mr. King’s vehicle during the July 29, 2022 stop, when Rudy indicated positive for the presence of drugs and Rosebush was found with methamphetamine residue.
Canine Rudy
Mr. King observed the K-9 vehicle as it approached, and said “You got another guy coming too? Some dogs next? You guys go ahead. I don’t have shit.” Tr. Immel interpreted Mr. King’s statements as permission to do a free-air sniff around his vehicle. When Tr. Lott got out of his vehicle, Tr. Immel gave him a nonverbal signal to conduct the free-air sniff. Tr. Lott then went back to his vehicle, released Rudy, and allowed the dog to relieve himself before proceeding with the free-air sniff.
Marijuana – No
Cocaine – No
Heroin – No
Methamphetamine – Silence
After Mr. King’s interjection, Tr. Immel continued to conduct routine database checks in his patrol vehicle, and additionally questioned Mr. King about his possession of illegal substances. Mr. King generally denied possessing illegal substances, and denied possessing marijuana, cocaine, and heroin. But when Tr. Immel twice asked Mr. King if he had methamphetamine in his vehicle, Mr. King gave no verbal response. Tr. Immel observed Mr. King’s “chest . . . rise and fall heavier than normal” when he was asked about methamphetamine.
Traffic Investigation Concurrent to Rudy’s Work
After this questioning, at around six minutes and eighteen seconds into the stop, Tr. Immel asked Mr. King to exit the patrol car. At this time, Tr. Immel had verified Mr. King’s basic information and completed his database searches, but still had to complete other tasks Tr. Immel qualified as routine and incident to the traffic stop: running Mr. King’s trailer registration plate and performing a field sobriety test. Tr. Immel also had yet to issue Mr. King a citation for traffic violations, and ultimately declined to do so.
Arrest Warrant for Ms. Rosebush
Seven minutes and five seconds into the stop, Tr. Metras confirmed there was an active warrant for Ms. Rosebush’s arrest on drug-related charges. After confirming the warrant, Tr. Metras arrested Ms. Rosebush and checked her waistband for contraband, but found nothing. Tr. Metras radioed for a female trooper to do a more thorough search of Rosebush’s person incident to the arrest.
Seven minutes and thirteen seconds into the stop, Tr. Immel obtained Mr. King’s consent to search his person, and subsequently conducted the search. Tr. Immel found no weapons, drugs, or drug paraphernalia on Mr. King’s person. He found $1,500 in cash in Mr. King’s wallet, which Mr. King stated was for the purchase of the lawn mower.
Rudy’s Alert Eight Minutes from Initial Stop
During the consent search, Tr. Lott notified Tr. Immel that Rudy positively indicated for the odor of narcotics on Mr. King’s vehicle. Tr. Lott began the free air sniff at around seven minutes into the stop. He observed Rudy head-snapping, bracketing, excessively wagging his tail, breathing deeply, and ultimately giving a “finalized response for the odor of narcotics” by sitting by the driver’s side of Mr. King’s vehicle near the doors. The positive alert occurred between eight minutes and eight minutes and fifteen seconds into the stop.
Over Ten Grams of Methamphetamine
After completing the consent search of Mr. King’s person, Tr. Immel and Tr. Metras searched Mr. King’s vehicle pursuant to Rudy’s positive alert. Tr. Immel recovered 10.5 grams of a substance he suspected to be methamphetamine from a locked bag on the passenger side of the vehicle. Tr. Metras recovered two used hypodermic needles from the headliner above the driver’s seat, within reach of the driver. Tr. Metras observed that the needles were used, and had a residual substance on them. Tr. Lott field-tested the residue on the needles, and the residue field-tested as positive for methamphetamine.
As a result of the evidence obtained during the search of the vehicle, Mr. King was arrested for possession of methamphetamine, maintaining a drug vehicle, and parole violation.
An Additional 1.3 Kilo’s at Mom’s House
Officers recovered an additional 1.3 kilograms of methamphetamine at Mr. King’s mother’s home, in black bags Mr. King referenced in a monitored jail phone call.
Indictment and Motion to Suppress is Denied
Mr. King was subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury on two charges: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 5 or more grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(viii), (b)(1)(C), and 846 (Count 1); and (2) possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(viii), (b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. He filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the September 17, 2022, traffic stop, arguing that his detention during the stop was unreasonably prolonged, and therefore that the searches of his person and vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights. After a hearing on August 22, 2023, the district court denied the motion in an oral ruling. The court concluded that before the drug dog alerted to the presence of narcotics, none of the troopers’ actions exceeded the scope of the traffic stop. It was reasonable for the officers to take eight or nine minutes to work through a traffic stop and a parolee search. But even if the traffic stop was extended beyond its initial mission during this time, the troopers had sufficient reasonable suspicion to support the extension. And once the dog alerted, the officers were free to search every nook and cranny of Mr. King’s vehicle.
Eleven and a Half Years in Prison
After his motion was denied, Mr. King pleaded guilty to Count 2 of the superseding indictment against him, possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§841(a)(1), b(1)(B). In his plea agreement, Mr. King reserved the right to seek review of the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The district court accepted Mr. King’s plea and sentenced Mr. King to 140 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release.
Appeal – Traffic Stop was Unreasonably Prolonged
Mr. King argues only that his detention was unreasonably prolonged beyond the time necessary to handle the alleged traffic violations for which he was stopped. But he does not dispute that the drug dog’s positive alert gave the troopers probable cause to search his vehicle. And he does not dispute the dog’s reliability. Thus, it is clear that the certified drug dog’s alert provided probable cause for the search of Mr. King’s vehicle. See Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 246–47 (2013) (dictating that, absent conflicting evidence of unreliability, “a court can presume” that a certified drug dog’s positive alert “provides probable cause to search”). He instead contends that prior to the dog’s alert, officers unreasonably extended the time “reasonably required to complete the process of issuing a ticket for a traffic violation” in order to facilitate the dog sniff. Therefore, we examine the stop for the approximately eight minutes prior to the dog’s positive alert. We conclude that the stop was not unreasonably prolonged, and that Mr. King’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.
Established Case Law – Prolonging a Traffic Stop
As an initial matter, Mr. King does not contest that he was stopped for a lawful reason—driving over the speed limit and with the brake lights out on his vehicle and trailer.1 But though Mr. King’s initial seizure was “concededly lawful,” “[A] seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). The scope of an ordinary traffic stop is limited “to address[ing] the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend[ing] to related safety concerns.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015) The scope of the stop therefore includes “determining whether to issue a traffic ticket,” and “ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop,” such as “checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. at 355 “[T]he Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain unrelated investigations” during a traffic stop, but “only so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Id. at 354–55 Thus, “[A]n officer . . . may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. . . . But . . . he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.” Id. at 355. “Authority for the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Id. at 354.
Established Case Law – Pretextual Traffic Stops
Footnote #1 Nevertheless, Mr. King attempts to argue that because troopers had an ulterior motive for the stop—investigation of drug trafficking – they needed reasonable suspicion that he was trafficking drugs to affect the traffic stop on September 17, 2022. Undoubtedly, the stop was pretextual. “It is well established, however, that police officers may stop a vehicle that commits a traffic violation and look for evidence of a crime, even if the traffic stop is merely a pretext and they do not have an independent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Hernandez v. Boles, 949 F.3d 251, 258 (6th Cir. 2020). Where Mr. King was legally stopped for a traffic violation, troopers did not need further justification for the initial stop, regardless of their motives.
Are Routine License Checks Objectively Reasonable?
Mr. King argues that several intrusions exceeded the mission of the initial seizure—the lawful traffic stop—and unreasonably prolonged his detention, violating the Fourth Amendment and ending authority for his seizure. We proceed chronologically with the first relevant alleged intrusion. Shortly after he was pulled over, Mr. King agreed, upon Tr. Immel’s request, to sit in the front seat of Tr. Immel’s patrol car while Tr. Immel ran routine checks on his license and registration. Situating Mr. King in the patrol car added about 40 seconds to the stop. Mr. King argues that this request was not “normal” for a traffic stop, and unreasonably prolonged the duration of the stop. We disagree. We have previously ruled that officers may permissibly detain defendants in their patrol cars during traffic stops without reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 269–270 (6th Cir. 1999) (ruling that a traffic stop that included an officer’s heeded request that a driver sit in the officer’s patrol car was not unreasonably prolonged). Such detentions do not exceed the scope of a traffic stop if the officer’s actions were reasonably tailored to the mission of the stop and were not otherwise unreasonable. See id.
Established Case Law – Mimms
Under the circumstances of this case, Tr. Immel’s request that Mr. King sit in his patrol car was reasonable and did not prolong the traffic stop. “Reasonableness . . . depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977). In establishing that an officer’s order that a driver exit his vehicle during a lawful traffic stop affects only a de minimis intrusion on the driver’s liberty, the Supreme Court has recognized that considerations of officer safety fall within the public interest and affect our assessment of reasonableness. Id. at 110. Specifically, officers may face a higher risk of assault from “approach[ing] a person seated in an automobile.” Id. If officers stand on the side of the road while interacting with drivers, they also face “[t]he hazard of accidental injury from passing traffic.” Id. at 111.
In light of these concerns, Tr. Immel’s request that Mr. King sit in his patrol car was reasonable. Tr. Immel’s request was motivated by the same officer safety concerns that guided the Court in Mimms—Tr. Immel testified that speaking to Mr. King in his patrol car negated the necessity of him repeatedly exiting his vehicle, into traffic, to obtain additional information from Mr. King. And the request did not exceed the scope of the traffic stop. Tr. Immel testified that he put Mr. King in his patrol car, in part, to more efficiently facilitate his questioning related to the stop. While Mr. King was in the patrol car, Tr. Immel proceeded with tasks related to the stop, conducting routine checks of Mr. King’s information. Thus, Mr. King’s placement in the patrol car was within the bounds of the initial stop, and did not prolong it. Cf. United States v. Bradshaw, 102 F.3d 204, 212 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that an officer lawfully detained a defendant in his patrol car after the initial stop while the officer performed radio checks and issuance of the citation). We further find it relevant that when Tr. Immel asked Mr. King to sit in his patrol vehicle, he had Mr. King sit in the front seat, and made it clear that Mr. King was free to leave. Mr. King was therefore not under arrest, such that reasonable suspicion or probable cause was required to justify his placement in the patrol car. Cf. id. at 212 & n.18 (stating that reasonable suspicion is not required for the initial detention, without arrest, of a motorist in an officer’s squad car).
Mr. King’s second and primary argument is that Tr. Immel’s questioning about his travel plans and drug possession constituted “on-scene investigation into other crimes” that deviated from the mission of the traffic stop, unduly prolonged it, and rendered Mr. King’s detention unlawful.
Consent Granted But Not Required
Tr. Immel began questioning Mr. King about his travel approximately two minutes and thirty seconds into the stop, continuing until about four minutes into the stop. At that point, Mr. King observed the K-9 vehicle, and interjected “You got another guy coming too? Some dogs next? You guys go ahead. I don’t have shit.” Tr. Immel interpreted this as consent to conduct a free-air sniff around Mr. King’s vehicle, and Mr. King does not dispute that he consented to the sniff. After this interjection, Tr. Immel questioned Mr. King about his possession of drugs for about a minute and a half, from approximately four to five and a half minutes into the stop. Mr. King remained in Tr. Immel’s patrol car, answering additional questions about his travel plans, until approximately six minutes and eighteen seconds into the stop.
We conclude that this portion of the stop was justified and not unduly prolonged.
We conclude that this portion of the stop was justified and not unduly prolonged. Tr. Immel’s initial questioning related to Mr. King’s movements and travel plans. This questioning was permissible as part of the mission of the traffic stop. “Asking a few questions” is a “routine traffic-violation task,” United States v. Jordan, 100 F.4th 714, 718 (6th Cir. 2024), if these questions are “‘context-framing’ questions about [a defendant’s] travel history and plans,” as they were in this case. United States v. Williams, 68 F.4th 304, 307 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Lott, 954 F.3d 919, 924 (6th Cir. 2020)).
The Unrelated Questions Occurred During Dead Time
To the contrary, Tr. Immel’s questioning about Mr. King’s drug possession was, by Tr. Immel’s own admission, unrelated to the traffic stop. But Tr. Immel’s questioning did not unreasonably prolong the stop. While Tr. Immel asked about Mr. King’s travel plans, he was in the process of verifying Mr. King’s information, and he continued to do so while asking Mr. King if had various illicit substances in his vehicle. Tr. Immel’s body camera footage shows him using the computer in his patrol car for the entire time that Mr. King was present in the front seat. Tr. Immel testified that he was using the computer to conduct routine checks verifying Mr. King’s driver’s license, insurance, and vehicle registration information, and he searched police information networks and databases for Mr. King’s name to check for warrants or additional drug investigations. These checks constituted “ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355 Because Tr. Immel questioned Mr. King while conducting these ordinary inquiries, the questioning did not unreasonably prolong the traffic stop. “[A]n officer may ask unrelated questions to his heart’s content, provided he does so during the supposedly dead time while he or another officer is completing a task related to the traffic violation.” United States v. Howard, 815 F. App’x 69, 75 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 492 (6th Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357). All of Tr. Immel’s questioning of Mr. King in the patrol car—whether related or unrelated to the mission of the traffic stop—appears to have taken place during this “dead time.”
Checking whether passengers have valid identification and any outstanding warrants is a task incident to the mission of a traffic stop.
Mr. King exited the patrol vehicle approximately six minutes and eighteen seconds into the stop, and he consented to a search of his person less than a minute later, approximately seven minutes and thirteen seconds into the stop. During this minute, troopers were still performing tasks within the mission of the traffic stop. While Mr. King was in Tr. Immel’s vehicle, Tr. Metras was working to verify the active warrant against Mr. King’s passenger and fiancée, Ms. Rosebush. Checking whether passengers have valid identification and any outstanding warrants is a task incident to the mission of a traffic stop. See Hernandez v. Boles, 949 F.3d 251, 256 (6th Cir. 2020) (“We have held that checking passengers for warrants and brief questioning are permissible as part of a traffic stop.”); United States v. Smith, 601 F.3d 530, 542 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t [was not] inappropriate for [an officer] to check both whether [the driver and passenger] had valid identification and whether they had any outstanding warrants.”). Per the troopers’ testimony, final confirmation of Rosebush’s warrant did not come in until seven minutes and five seconds into the stop. So, for these seven minutes, the stop was not unreasonably prolonged.
[W]e conclude that Tr. Immel had reasonable suspicion that Mr. King possessed or was trafficking drugs at the time of the search, sufficient to justify extending the stop.
Mr. King additionally suggests that his detention was unreasonably prolonged when Tr. Immel searched his person. Mr. King does not dispute that he gave consent for the search, and that his consent was valid. We assume, without deciding, that Tr. Immel needed reasonable suspicion to ask Mr. King for consent to search his person and to affect the resulting search. Proceeding with this assumption, we conclude that Tr. Immel had reasonable suspicion that Mr. King possessed or was trafficking drugs at the time of the search, sufficient to justify extending the stop.
Tr. Immel testified that at the time of the consent search, he had not completed tasks related to the traffic stop, like running Mr. King’s trailer license plate through law enforcement databases. Nevertheless, Tr. Immel elected to first obtain consent to perform the search, and the search was not related to the mission of the stop. Instead, it was part of Tr. Immel’s unrelated investigation of Mr. King for drug possession and drug trafficking. Thus, assuming that Tr. Immel’s obtaining of consent to search, and the search itself, constituted an extension of the authorized seizure affected by the initial traffic stop, we must assess whether Tr. Immel developed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify extending the seizure. See Lott, 954 F.3d at 923 (“A seizure can be extended if something happened during the stop to cause the officer to have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”
Established Case Law – Reasonable Suspicion
“In deciding whether an officer conducting a traffic stop has developed a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, we consider the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651, 664 (6th Cir. 2012). “The officer must point to ‘specific and articulable facts’” that amount to “more than an ill-defined hunch” that criminal activity is afoot. Id. (quoting United States v. Richardson, 385 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 2004)).
Four Factors in Determining Reasonable Suspicion
In testimony, Tr. Immel identified four factors that contributed to his suspicion that Mr. King was engaged in criminal activity, specifically that he possessed and was trafficMr. King methamphetamine: (1) Tr. Immel was acting on information, relayed by Detective Tr. Hodge, that “there were suspicions of methamphetamine being found or being in the car,” Supp. (2) Tr. Immel believed Mr. King to be under the influence of drugs; (3) Mr. King denied possessing several illicit substances when questioned, but was unresponsive when Tr. Immel asked if he possessed methamphetamine; (4) Mr. King said he traveled downstate in part to purchase a lawnmower, but gave dubious answers as to the specifics of his proposed purchase. Some of these factors, considered alone, are weak indicators of criminal activity. But considered together, the totality of the circumstances supports the existence of reasonable suspicion. We discuss each factor in turn.
Mr. King’s Dubious Travel
First, Tr. Immel received information from Tr. Hodge that Mr. King was on a suspected narcotics run, and Tr. Hodge informed uniformed troopers, when instructing them to attempt the traffic stop, that Mr. King was bringing methamphetamine from downstate to the Upper Peninsula. Taken alone, Tr. Hodge’s relayed information does not provide reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. United States v. Noble, 762 F.3d 509, 522–25 (6th Cir. 2014) (declining to find reasonable suspicion that a driver was armed and dangerous, as needed to support a frisk, when, among other weak indicators of danger, a detective had relayed that a “DEA Task Force suspected that the [driver’s] vehicle was connected to methamphetamine trafficking”). But it did contribute, albeit minimally, to the quantum of reasonable suspicion. We have stated that when “criminal history reports . . . [are] specific and related to the same suspicions that the officer was developing,” such reports can “cast a suspicious light on . . . otherwise weaker indicators” of criminal activity, “particularly when combined with . . . dubious travel plans.” Stepp, 680 F.3d at 667. An example of specific information on a defendant’s criminal history includes that he was “previously . . . investigated by the DEA for trafficking cocaine.” Id. In this case, Tr. Hodge specifically relayed to Tr. Immel that he suspected Mr. King was a methamphetamine trafficker. Where Tr. Immel developed his own articulable suspicions that Mr. King was trafficMr. King drugs, this information about Mr. King’s history helps justify Tr. Immel’s prolonging of the traffic stop for the consent search. However, we assign little weight to this factor, in part because Tr. Immel was additionally aware that Mr. King had been previously stopped, and the stop did not yield methamphetamine attributed to Mr. King.
Mr. Kings Nerves
Second, Tr. Immel testified that he believed Mr. King to be under the influence of drugs. Tr. Immel thought that Mr. King was under the influence because “he was nervous. His chest started to rise and fall. He was sweating, . . . he had mood swings and [he] was very challenging.” Additionally, Tr. Immel believed that it was symptomatic of drug use that Mr. King, upon initial contact, attempted to hand over his driver’s license without rolling down his window, displaying odd or evasive behavior. We have said that nervousness, by itself, is “a relevant but unreliable indicator” of criminal activity, “especially in the context of a traffic stop.” United States v. Calvetti, 836 F.3d 654, 666 (6th Cir. 2016) But Tr. Immel articulated symptoms other than nervousness to suggest that Mr. King was on a stimulant, consistent with his developing suspicion that Mr. King possessed methamphetamine in his vehicle. So, “although nervousness alone is insufficient . . . nervousness along with . . . erratic movements and deceptive behavior could reasonably lead an officer to conclude that [Mr. King] was under the influence of a stimulant,” contributing to Tr. Immel’s suspicion that Mr. King “was part of a drug-traffkicking operation.” United States v. Collazo, 818 F.3d 247, 260 (6th Cir. 2016).
Marijuana – No
Cocaine – No
Heroin – No
Methamphetamine – Silence
Third, Mr. King denied possessing several illicit substances, but was unresponsive when Tr. Immel asked if he possessed methamphetamine. Tr. Immel also testified that Mr. King appeared nervous during this line of questioning, and this reaction, along with the lack of response, indicated to him that Mr. King was “possibly lying about having methamphetamine.” We concur with Tr. Immel’s assessment that Mr. King’s nonresponse was tellingly evasive. And we have often said that “evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 753 (6th Cir. 2008). Though we decline to hold that Mr. King’s unresponsiveness alone provided reasonable suspicion, it was significant. Mr. King responded to several questions and affirmatively indicated that he did not possess marijuana, cocaine, or heroin. He specifically declined to respond to Tr. Immel’s question asking if he possessed methamphetamine, the very substance that he was suspected of trafficking. While not an admission to the possession of methamphetamine, in context, Mr. King’s evasiveness supports Tr. Immel’s reasonable suspicion that he possessed the drug.
Established Case Law – Dubious Travel
Fourth, Tr. Immel found Mr. King’s account of his travel plans dubious, and Mr. King’s explanation of his plans lacking. Mr. King told Tr. Immel that he traveled downstate to see his children, and to look at a lawn mower he intended to purchase. Tr. Immel specifically articulated that his suspicion was piqued because Mr. King could not name the model of the lawn mower. He further thought it suspicious that Mr. King returned to the Upper Peninsula without the lawn mower, apparently because the agreed- upon price had changed. In previous cases, we have suggested that similarly dubious explanations contribute strongly to the quantum of reasonable suspicion, where an officer is able to articulate his reason for disbelieving the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 272 (6th Cir. 1999) (district court did not err in finding reasonable suspicion when officer believed “that Defendants provided an implausible explanation for their trip” because they claimed to be relocating a military service person when it was the officer’s experience that “people in the military did not have to move their belongings themselves when relocated”); United States v. Rodriguez, 485 F. App’x 16, 20 (6th Cir. 2012) (officer had reasonable suspicion to prolong a traffic stop in part because he doubted the defendant’s explanation for his travels; the defendant stated he was going to his cousin’s bachelor party, but he did not know the date of the wedding, and the party was allegedly taking place on a Thursday, which the officer believed to be an unusual night for a bachelor party).
Totality of the Circumstances
Assessing the four factors Tr. Immel relied on as a totality, the circumstances demonstrate a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Thus, any expansion of the initial stop to obtain consent to search Mr. King, and to affect the search, was not unreasonable.
Mr. King was Not Like Mr. Rodriguez
Conclusion and Holding
The drug dog began sniffing Mr. King’s vehicle around seven minutes into the stop—as Tr. Immel was obtaining consent to search Mr. King—and alerted during the consent search of Mr. King’s person. As discussed, the consent search was justified by reasonable suspicion, and Mr. King’s detention during the prior seven minutes was justified under the scope of the traffic stop. So, the stop was not unreasonably prolonged to conduct the dog sniff. This case is thus unlike Rodriguez v. United States, on which Mr. King relies. In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to extend an “otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff.” 575 U.S. at 353, 358. In that case, a police officer conducted a sniff of the defendant’s vehicle after “the reason[s] for the [traffic] stop [were] out of the way,” therefore impermissibly prolonging the stop by seven or eight minutes—the time between the completion of the traffic stop and the dog’s positive alert. Id. at 352–53 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Mr. King’s case, we find no such impermissible delay. Mr. King was not detained to facilitate the dog sniff; rather, the dog sniff occurred simultaneous to intrusions justified by the purpose of the traffic stop, and to the search of Mr. King’s person justified by reasonable suspicion. Cf. id. at 357 (“The critical question . . . is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket . . . but whether conducting the sniff prolongs—i.e., adds time to—the stop.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The sniff thus did “not change the character of [the] traffic stop that [was] lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner.” Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408.
Information for this article was obtained from U.S. v. King II, No. 24 – 1089.
U.S. v. King II, No. 24 – 1089 was issued by the Sixth Circuit Appellate Court on July 31, 2025 and is binding in the following states: Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee.
Lessons Learned:
- Officer Safety – The court explained “After Tr. Immel received Mr. King’s license and registration, he asked Mr. King to join him in the front seat of his patrol car, a request Tr. Immel “routinely” makes during traffic stops. Mr. King agreed to sit in the vehicle.”. Officers should not seat a suspect next to the officer in the small confines of the front seat of cruiser. I agree that the an officer can observe body behaviors more accurately while seated next to the suspect, but if the suspect becomes violent the officer will be at a disadvantage while seated within a cruiser.
- Search Incident to Arrest – The court explained “ Metras arrested Ms. Rosebush and checked her waistband for contraband, but found nothing.”. Once a suspect is arrested there are no constitutional or statutory limitations about a different sex officer searching a suspect. There may be department rules that inhibit different sex officers searching a suspect but no constitutional or statutory limitations.
- Pre-Textual Traffic Stop – The court explained “Undoubtedly, the stop was pretextual.”. On June 10, 1996 the U.S. Supreme Court held that pretextual traffic stops are lawful “[The ]officers had probable cause to believe that petititioners had violated the traffic code. That rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996) An officer’s ulterior motive – such as Mr. King being a drug trafficker – had no bearing on the lawfulness of Mr. King’s traffic lane violation. For more on Pre-Textual Traffic stops see Wh(r)en is it lawful to stop a vehicle?.
- Traffic Stop Extension – An Officer’s ‘heart content’ – The court explained “[W]e conclude that Tr. Immel had reasonable suspicion that Mr. King possessed or was trafficking drugs at the time of the search, sufficient to justify extending the stop.”. Once an officer establishes reasonable suspicion of a second crime during a traffic stop, the stop can be extended a reasonable amount of time to investigate the second crime. See United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651, 664 (6th Cir. 2012). However, Tr. Immel’s questions about the lawnmower and methamphetamine occurred during ‘dead time’. Dead time occurs when an officer is diligently working towards issuing a traffic citation or warning and asks unrelated questions. The Sixth Circuit held this was objectively reasonable on April 6, 2010 “[A]n officer may ask unrelated questions to his heart’s content, provided he does so during the supposedly dead time while he or another officer is completing a task related to the traffic violation.” U.S. v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484 (2010).
- Mission of the Traffic Stop – On April 21, 2015 the U.S. Supreme Court held “Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose. Authority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are – or reasonably should have been completed.” Rodriguez v. U.S., 575 U.S. 348 (2015). What are these tasks tied to a traffic infraction? I have identified six standard traffic stop tasks: 1) At least two vehicle approaches. 2) Obtain license, insurance and registration. 3) Computer/MDC/radio check on driver’s license and vehicle registration. 4) Warrant check. 5) Write the ticket or warning. 6) Check the VIN.
- Pre-Sent Arms! Michigan State Troopers Cole Hodge, Colin Immel, Kyle Lott, Canine Rudy and the U.S. Attorney should all be highly commended for their investigation, arrest, conviction and appeal work in the conviction of Mr. King. Well done!
Does your agency train on traffic stops and canine searches?
Don’t fail your training.
Don’t let your training fail you!
Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!