As we have explained, a court cannot thus “narrow” the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, to focus on only a single moment. It must look too, in this and all excessive-force cases, at any relevant events coming before.
Barnes v. Felix
U.S. Supreme Court
May 15, 2025
Background
On March 27, 2001 the Fifth Circuit issued Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481 (5th Cir., 2001) that established a unique holding on evaluating a law enforcement officers use of force. Titled the Moment of Threat Doctrine, the court held “The excessive force inquiry is confined to whether the Trooper was in danger at the moment of threat that resulted in Trooper’s shooting Bazan.”. Id at 493. In other words, the Fifth Circuit evaluated force at the moment the use of force was exacted and not based on the totality of circumstances that was established on March 27, 1985 in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) “In each of these cases, the question was whether the totality of the circumstances justified a particular sort of search or seizure.”. The Totality of Circumstances application for use of force analyses was reaffirmed four years later on May 15, 1989 in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
Note: The U.S. Supreme Court attributes the establishment of the Moment of Threat Doctrine to Harris v. Serpas, 745 F. 3d 767 (5th Cir., 2014) though this case reaffirmed Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481 (5thCir., 2001) issued thirteen years earlier.
Outstanding Toll Violations
On the afternoon of Thursday April 28, 2016, Harris County, Texas Dep. Roberto Felix, Jr., a law enforcement officer patrolling a highway outside Houston, received a radio alert about an automobile on the road with outstanding toll violations. Dep. Felix soon spotted the car, a Toyota Corolla, and turned on his emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop. The driver, Mr. Ashtian Barnes, pulled over to the highway’s shoulder.
First and Only Approach – Smell of Marijuana – REPEATED Failure to Follow Lawful Orders
Parking his own car just behind, Dep. Felix walked to the Corolla’s driver-side door and asked Mr. Barnes for his license and proof of insurance. Mr. Barnes replied that he did not have his license with him, and that the car was a rental in his girlfriend’s name. As he spoke, Mr. Barnes rummaged through some papers inside the car, causing Dep. Felix to tell him several times to stop “digging around.” Dep. Felix also commented that he smelled marijuana, and asked if there was anything in the car he should know about. Mr. Barnes responded that he might have some identification in the trunk. So Dep. Felix told him to open the trunk from his seat. Mr. Barnes did so, while also turning off the ignition. All that happened (as a dash- cam recording of the incident shows) in less than two minutes.
Dep. Felix Stepped onto the Running Board and Mr. Barnes Began to Flee and Dep. Felix Shot and Killed Mr. Barnes
Then things began moving even faster. With his right hand resting on his holster, Dep. Felix told Mr. Barnes to get out of the car. Mr. Barnes opened the door but did not exit; instead, he turned the ignition back on. Dep. Felix unholstered his gun and, as the car began to move forward, jumped onto its door- sill. He twice shouted, “Don’t fucking move.” And with no visibility into the car (because his head was above the roof), he fired two quick shots inside. Mr. Barnes was hit, but managed to stop the car. Dep. Felix then radioed for back-up. By the time it arrived, Mr. Barnes was dead. All told, about five seconds elapsed between when the car started moving and when it stopped. And within that period, two seconds passed between the moment Dep. Felix stepped on the doorsill and the moment he fired his first shot.
Screenshot from Dep. Felix’s cruiser camera.
Link to video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9gbM_22fUbY
Note: On Tuesday August 16, 2016 a Grand Jury declined to indict Dep. Felix in the shooting of Mr. Barnes.
Civil Lawsuit for Excessive Force
Mr. Barnes’s mother, Ms. Janice Barnes, sued Dep. Felix on her son’s behalf. The suit, brought under 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleged that Dep. Felix had violated Ashtian Mr. Barnes’s Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force against him.
Moment of Threat Doctrine
The District Court granted summary judgment to Dep. Felix. The court explained that to prevail on her claim, Mrs. Mr. Barnes needed to show that Dep. Felix’s use of force was “objectively unreasonable.” 532 F. Supp. 3d 463, 468 (SD Tex. 2021). In the usual excessive-force case, the court noted, the inquiry into reasonableness would involve considering a variety of circumstances. See id., at 468–469. But when an officer has used deadly force, the court continued, “the Fifth Circuit has developed a much narrower approach.” Id., at 469. Then, a court could ask only about the situation existing “at the moment of the threat” that sparked the fatal shooting. Ibid. (quoting Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F. 3d 985, 991 (CA5 2011); emphasis in original). The District Court identified that moment as “the two seconds before Dep. Felix fired his first shot,” when he was standing on the doorsill of a moving vehicle. 532 F. Supp. 3d., at 471. At that moment, the court found, an officer could reasonably think himself “at risk of serious harm.” Id., at 472. And under the Fifth Circuit’s rule, that fact alone concluded the analysis. The court explained that it could not consider “what had transpired up until” those last two seconds, including Dep. Felix’s decision to jump onto the sill. Id., at 471. Although a “more robust examination” might have aided in assessing the reasonableness of the shooting, the court was “duty bound” by “Circuit precedent” to “limit[ its] focus” to the “exact moment Dep. Felix was hanging onto Mr. Barnes’s” moving car. Id., at 472.
Circuit Court Upholds the Moment of Threat Doctrine
The Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining that it too was “[B]ound” by “this Circuit’s moment of threat doctrine.”91 F. 4th 393, 394, 397 (2024). Under that rule, the panel agreed, the “inquiry is confined to whether the officer” was “in danger at the moment of the threat that resulted in [his] use of deadly force.” Id., at 397. Any prior events “leading up to the shooting,” including actions the officer took, were simply “not relevant.” Ibid. (quoting Harris v. Serpas, 745 F. 3d 767, 772 (CA5 2014)). And here, as the District Court found, the “precise moment of the threat” was the “two seconds” when Dep. Felix was clinging to a moving car. 91 F. 4th, at 397–398. Because Dep. Felix could then have reasonably believed his life in danger, the panel concluded, his decision to shoot “did not violate Mr. Barnes’s constitutional rights.” Id., at 398.
Precise Millisecond or Totality of the Circumstances?
In a concurring opinion, Judge Higginbotham (who also authored the panel opinion) expressed “concern” with the Fifth Circuit’s moment-of-threat doctrine. Ibid. He thought that rule inconsistent with this Court’s directive to assess the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force, including deadly force, by “look[ing] to the totality of circum- stances.” Id., at 399. Under the totality approach, Judge Higginbotham wrote, a court could consider not just the “precise millisecond” when an officer deploys force, but eve- rything that “ha[d] transpired up until” that time. Ibid. And with that wider focus, Judge Higginbotham would have found that Dep. Felix’s shooting of Mr. Barnes was unreasonable. See id., at 401.
We granted certiorari to address whether, in resolving Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims, courts may ap- ply the moment-of-threat rule just described. See 603 U. S. ___ (2024). We hold they may not because that rule constricts the proper inquiry into the “totality of the circumstances.”
Established Case Law – Excessive Use of Force
A claim that a law enforcement officer used excessive force during a stop or arrest is “analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’” as measured in objective terms. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403 (2006). So the question in a case like this one, as this Court has often held, is whether the force deployed was justified from “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” taking due account of both the individual interests and the governmental interests at stake. Graham, 490 U. S., at 396; County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U. S. 420, 428 (2017).
And the stopped person’s conduct is always relevant because it indicates the nature and level of the threat he poses, either to the officer or to others.
That inquiry into the reasonableness of police force requires analyzing the “totality of the circumstances.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). There is no “easy-to-apply legal test” or “on/off switch” in this context. Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372, 382–383 (2007). Rather, the Fourth Amendment requires, as we once put it, that a court “slosh [its] way through” a “factbound morass.” Id., at 383. Or said more prosaically, deciding whether a use of force was objectively reasonable demands “careful attention to the facts and circumstances” relating to the incident, as then known to the officer. Graham, 490 U. S., at 396. For example, the “severity of the crime” prompting the stop can carry weight in the analysis. See ibid.; Garner, 471 U. S., at 11. So too can actions the officer took during the stop, such as giving warnings or otherwise trying to control the encounter. See id., at 12; Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U. S. 389, 397 (2015). And the stopped person’s conduct is always relevant because it indicates the nature and level of the threat he poses, either to the officer or to others. See ibid.; Graham, 490 U. S., at 396.
Fourth Amendment has No Time Limit
those later, “in-the-moment” facts “cannot be hermetically sealed off from the context in which they arose.”
Most notable here, the “totality of the circumstances” inquiry into a use of force has no time limit. Of course, the situation at the precise time of the shooting will often be what matters most; it is, after all, the officer’s choice in that moment that is under review. But earlier facts and circumstances may bear on how a reasonable officer would have understood and responded to later ones. Or as the Federal Government puts the point, those later, “in-the-moment” facts “cannot be hermetically sealed off from the context in which they arose.” Brief for United States as Amicus Cu- riae 14. Taking account of that context may benefit either party in an excessive-force case. Prior events may show, for example, why a reasonable officer would have perceived otherwise ambiguous conduct of a suspect as threatening. Or instead they may show why such an officer would have perceived the same conduct as innocuous. The history of the interaction, as well as other past circumstances known to the officer, thus may inform the reasonableness of the use of force.
Established Case Law – Objectively Reasonable Use of Force
The Court’s decision in Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U. S. 765 (2014), well illustrates the point. The excessive-force claim there concerned the fatal shooting of a driver at the end of a “dangerous car chase” lasting more than five minutes. Id., at 768. The driver had sped away from a traffic stop on a well-used road, and tried to outrun as many as six police cruisers at speeds sometimes exceeding 100 miles per hour. Eventually, the fleeing car ran into one of the cruisers and came “to a near standstill.” Id., at 776. The driver, though, still tried to escape, pumping the gas in a way that sent his wheels “spinning” and then putting the car into reverse. Ibid.At that point, one of the officers fired several shots into the car. In a suit brought against the officer, the driver’s daughter contended that those shots were taken when the chase was “already over.” Id., at 777. But this Court rejected that claim based on everything that had happened during the incident—the driver’s “outrageously reckless” behavior over the prior “five minutes,” as well as his last-second efforts to again take flight. Id., at 776. Given all of those events, the Court explained, a reasonable officer would have concluded that the driver was “intent on resuming” his getaway and, if allowed to do so, would “again pose a deadly threat for others.” Id., at 777. In short, the shooting was justified “at the moment” it occurred partly because of what had transpired in the preceding period. Ibid.
A court deciding a use-of-force case cannot review the totality of the circumstances if it has put on chronological blinders.
The moment-of-threat rule applied in the courts below prevents that sort of attention to context, and thus conflicts with this Court’s instruction to analyze the totality of the circumstances. Recall that the District Court and Fifth Cir- cuit limited their view to the two seconds before the shoot- ing, after Dep. Felix had stepped onto the doorsill of Mr. Barnes’s car. See supra, at 3–4. Those courts believed that, under Fifth Circuit precedent, they could not take into account any- thing preceding that final moment. See 532 F. Supp. 3d, at 471 (excluding analysis of “what had transpired up until the shooting itself”); 91 F. 4th, at 397 (agreeing that “ac- tions leading up to the shooting are not relevant”). So, for example, they could not consider the reasons for the stop or the earlier conduct of, and interactions between, the suspect and officer. And because of that limit, they could not address whether the final two seconds of the encounter would look different if set within a longer timeframe. It is as though the Court in Plumhoff could consider only the instant when the chased car was at a “near standstill,” and not the earlier time when it zigzagged down a busy roadway at speed. 572 U. S., at 776. To be sure, historical facts will not often matter as much as they did there to the reasonableness analysis. See supra, at 6. And some of those facts may not be relevant at all. But no rule that precludes consideration of prior events in assessing a police shooting is reconcilable with the fact-dependent and context-sensitive approach we have prescribed. A court deciding a use-of-force case cannot review the totality of the circumstances if it has put on chronological blinders.
[P]rior events are not “off limits” in the reasonableness inquiry, for they may “inform the perspective of the reasonable officer.”
That point is so evident that not even Dep. Felix quarrels with it; his defense of the decisions below instead relies on taking a different view of their meaning and of the question they raise. First, the agreement with what we have said: Yes, Dep. Felix acknowledges, prior events are not “off limits” in the reasonableness inquiry, for they may “inform the perspective of the reasonable officer.” Just so. But now the divergence: According to Dep. Felix, the courts below acted consistently with that all- times-considered principle. The Fifth Circuit’s moment-of- threat doctrine, Dep. Felix argues, in fact allows courts to assess many pre-shooting facts and circumstances—and courts applying it often do so. See id., at 20 (citing other Fifth Circuit decisions). All that the doctrine bars is a single kind of inquiry—into whether an officer’s earlier error itself “created the need for deadly force.” Id., at 21. And on that issue, Dep. Felix submits, the Fifth Circuit is right: “[A]n officer doesn’t lose his right to defend himself just because” he previously “made a mistake.” Ibid.
The Fifth Circuit’s Two Second Snippet
But whatever might be said of Fifth Circuit law generally, the decisions below applied a rule about timing. As shown above, both lower courts took pains to explain that, in evaluating the shooting’s reasonableness, they could look only to a two-second snippet of the encounter. And because that was the reasoning in the case before us, that is the reasoning we must address. It could make no difference to our decision here if the Fifth Circuit in other cases eschewed a strict time limit, as Dep. Felix claims. And anyway, we are not sure Dep. Felix correctly describes the overall state of Fifth Circuit law. Consider Harris v. Serpas—a Fifth Circuit decision relied on below. See 91 F. 4th, at 397. The court there noted the plaintiffs’ recital of several historical facts—actions of both the suspect and the officer in the period prior to the shooting. See 745 F. 3d, at 772. And the court recognized that this Court’s decisions directed an inquiry into the “the ‘totality of the circumstances.’” Ibid.(quoting Graham,490U.S.,at396).
Totality-of-the-Circumstances Analysis Cannot be Narrowed
But then came the following: “This [Circuit], however, has narrowed that test” in deadly force cases, holding that the inquiry there is “confined to whether the [officer] was in dan- ger at the moment of the threat that resulted in the [officer’s] shooting.” Ibid. (alterations in original). The problem with the statement is apparent. As we have explained, a court cannot thus “narrow” the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, to focus on only a single moment. It must look too, in this and all excessive-force cases, at any relevant events coming before.
U.S. Supreme Court Does Not Address an “Officer-Created Danger” Test
We do not address here the different question Dep. Felix raises about use-of-force cases: whether or how an officer’s own “creation of a dangerous situation” factors into the reasonableness analysis. Brief for Respondent 22; see supra, at 8. As in another of our recent Fourth Amendment cases, that issue is not properly before us. See Mendez, 581 U. S., at 429, n. The courts below never confronted the issue, precisely because their inquiry was so time-bound. In looking at only the two seconds before the shot, they excluded from view any actions of the officer that allegedly created the danger necessitating deadly force. So, to use the obvious example, the courts below did not address the relevance, if any, of Dep. Felix stepping onto the doorsill of Mr. Barnes’s car. And because they never considered that issue, it was not the basis of the petition for certiorari. The question presented to us was one of timing alone: whether to look only at the encounter’s final two seconds, or also to consider earlier events serving to put those seconds in context.
Case is Returned to the Lower Courts to Determine if the Shooting was Objectively Reasonable
With that matter resolved, we return everything else to the courts below. It is for them now to consider the reasonableness of the shooting, using the lengthier timeframe we have prescribed.
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Information for this article was obtained from Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73 (2025)
Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73 (2025) was issued by the U.S. Supreme Court on May 15, 2015 and is binding throughout the United States.
Lessons Learned:
- The End of the Moment of Threat Doctrine – The Fifth Circuit went on a legal field trip beginning on March 27, 2001 when it issued Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481 (5th, 2001) and established the Moment of Threat Doctrine. On Thursday May 15, 2025 the U.S. Supreme Court ended that legal field trip when it issued Barnes v. Felix, No. 23 – 1239 (2025). The U.S. Supreme Court directed the lower courts to return to both Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) and Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) when evaluating a law enforcement officer’s use of force, based on the Totality of the Circumstances Doctrine. Specifically: 1) Severity of the crime. 2) Threat posed by the suspect. 3) Suspect’s attempt to flee or resist. Based on the totality of the circumstances. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). As this court in Barnes v. Felix, No. 23 – 1239 (2025) opined “A court deciding a use-of-force case cannot review the totality of the circumstances if it has put on chronological blinders.”. In short, context matters – not just the final seconds preceding the use of force.
- What the U.S. Supreme Court Did Not Do – In Barnes v. Felix, Mr. Barnes’ family—along with several organizations filing amicus briefs—urged the U.S. Supreme Court to adopt an Officer-Created Danger Their argument centered on the idea that Deputy Felix created the danger by stepping onto the running board of Mr. Barnes’ vehicle before the shooting occurred. However, this logic ignores a key fact: Mr. Barnes was the one who created the actual danger by turning the ignition and attempting to flee while an officer was positioned on the vehicle. Even if such a doctrine were considered, it would raise serious practical issues for law enforcement. For example, if two officers respond to a domestic violence call, did they “create the danger” simply by bringing firearms to the scene? If the answer is no—and it clearly is—then where would such a test begin, and where would it end? The Court declined to create such a rule, recognizing the risk of second-guessing officers’ lawful decisions made in dynamic, unpredictable environments.
- Concurring Opinion – Though this case was a unanimous decision 9-0, four justices wrote a concurring opinion. In that opinion the justices spend considerable ink on the dangerousness of traffic stops by highlighting mass murder Tim McVeigh the Oklahoma City bomber who was stopped for failing to display a license plate. The court also reviewed serial killer Ted Bundy who was stopped for being in a stolen vehicle. The court concluded this part of their analysis “The possibilities are many. But the key point is a commonsense one: A driver who speeds away from a traffic stop can pose significant dangers to both the officer and the surrounding community.”.
- Peace Officers Memorial Day – On October 1, 1962 President John F. Kennedy, signed Public Law 87-726 that established May 15th as Peace Officers Memorial Day. Twenty-seven years later the U.S. Supreme Court issued Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) in a 9-0 decision. Then on May 15, 2025 the court issued Barnes v. Felix, 23 – 1239 (2025). I do not believe that the U.S. Supreme Court randomly selected this day to issue to critically important law enforcement use of force cases. I believe the court implies that our country understands that when a law enforcement officer uses force it is not good, or bad, it is simply part of the profession. When force is evaluated, it will not be examined in the few seconds prior to the force being used but rather by a totality of the circumstances. Law enforcement is THE hardest job in America and is entrusted to use force against citizens and non-citizens to assure the rule of law. In nearly every use of force it is the suspect who chooses that the officer use force, not the officer. That truth was evident on April 28, 2016, when Deputy Felix shot Mr. Barnes, it wasn’t the deputy who made that decision—it was Mr. Barnes who created the danger, because he repeatedly failed to comply with the lawful order to stop.
Does your agency train on Use of Force?
Don’t fail your training.
Don’t let your training fail you!
Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!