[W]e simply conclude that when an officer permissibly engages in a traffic stop based on a reasonable suspicion that a car is not being operated by a validly licensed driver, the officer may ask the driver of the car if he has a valid license.
State v. Dunlap/Lewis
Supreme Court of Ohio
October 9, 2024
Traffic Stop
Chester Township Police Officer Andrew Centrackio testified that for the entirety of his shift on Monday March 15, 2021, he was in a parking lot running random registration checks on passing vehicles. He entered the tag of a Kia Forte bearing Ohio K450762 into the Law Enforcement Automated Data System (LEADS), which showed the registered owner, Ms. Jessica Dunlap, was a suspended driver. At that time, he had not yet observed the driver but had reviewed Ms. Dunlap’s identifying information in LEADS, including her height, weight, and gender. Officer Centrackio performed a traffic stop of the vehicle near the intersection of Mayfield Road and County Line Road.
Driver did not Match the Owner who was Suspended
Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Centrackio observed that the driver did not match Ms. Dunlap’s description, whom he knew to be a white female, and was instead an African American male, later identified as Mr. Je’Brel Lewis. A female, later identified as Ms. Dunlap, was in the passenger seat. Officer Officer Centrackio informed Mr. Lewis that the reason for the stop was the invalid license of the registered owner.
Neither the Driver or the Passenger had a Valid License
Officer Centrackio asked Mr. Lewis if he had a valid license. Mr. Lewis responded that he believed his license was valid, pointed to the passenger, and stated he believed she had a valid license. Officer Centrackio then asked for Mr. Lewis’ license and was provided a state identification card. The dash cam video recording shows that upon taking the identification, Officer Centrackio indicated “if you’re valid, you guys are good to go.”Officer Centrackio testified that he requested identification to document the driver in his report and to confirm that Mr. Lewis was legally able to drive the vehicle. Officer Centrackio entered Mr. Lewis’ information into LEADS and determined he had a suspended driving status and outstanding warrants.
Tow Truck and a Firearm
Since there was no valid driver, Officer Centrackio contacted a tow truck for the vehicle. As the warrants indicated the potential that Mr. Lewis was armed, Officer Centrackio asked him whether there was a weapon in the vehicle. Mr. Lewis confirmed that there was and, when asked of its location, he pointed to the front passenger side door compartment, said it was unloaded, and granted permission to enter the vehicle. A firearm was recovered as well as a loaded magazine. Ms. Dunlap had access to both the unloaded firearm in the passenger door pocket. A loaded magazine was found in back seat foot well behind the driver along with three spent shell casings. Ms. Dunlap had access to both the firearm and magazine and was charged with O.R.C. 2923.16 Improper Handling of a Firearm in a Motor Vehicle. Officer Centrackio and his backup Officer Insana also discovered marijuana and paraphernalia in the Kia and on Ms. Dunlap’s person.
Note: This arrest occurred prior to the new Permitless Carry became effective on June 13, 2022.
This photo of the evidence was obtained from a public records from the Chester Township Police Department.
Motion to Suppress was Denied
On August 11, 2021, the trial court issued an Order denying Mr. Lewis’ Motion to Suppress. It determined that “the officer was confronted with a new potential for criminal activity even after discovering Ms. Dunlap was not driving this vehicle” and had grounds to question “if the registered owner of the vehicle was not driving it, then who was?” It found that detention of Mr. Lewis to determine his identity after a legitimate traffic stop was constitutional.
The trial court denied the motions to suppress. Both defendants pled no contest and appealed to the Eleventh District. On appeal, they argued that although the initial stop was justified, the officer violated the Fourth Amendment by continuing the stop after he realized that Mr. Lewis was not driving the car.
Eleventh District Appellate Court Overturned the Trial Court
The Eleventh District reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress in both cases. State v. Dunlap, 2022-Ohio-3007 (11th Dist.); State v. Mr. Lewis, 2022-Ohio-3006 (11th Dist.). It held that once Officer Centrackio realized that Ms. Dunlap was not the driver, he no longer had reasonable suspicion for the stop. Ms. Dunlap at ¶ 19; Mr. Lewis at ¶ 19. Therefore, the court reasoned, it was impermissible for the officer to continue the stop to ask Mr. Lewis for identification. See id. Because “the extension of the stop was improper once Officer Centrackio recognized Ms. Dunlap was not the driver,” the court of appeals held that the firearm that was discovered as a result of the continued detention must be suppressed. Mr. Lewis at ¶ 29; see also Ms. Dunlap at ¶ 29.
Supreme Court of Ohio Overturned the Eleventh District
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Ohio Constitution also prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Ohio Const., art. I, §14. But in this court and in the proceedings below, Mr. Lewis and Ms. Dunlap have framed their argument under the Fourth Amendment and have failed to assert that the Ohio Constitution provides any greater protections. Thus, we are constrained to consider only whether Mr. Lewis’s and Ms. Dunlap’s rights under the Fourth Amendment were violated.
The officer had reasonable suspicion to make the stop
The United States Supreme Court has held that the reasonableness of a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment should be evaluated in a manner more akin to the brief detention of a permissible Terry stop than to a formal arrest. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). As is true of a Terry stop, an officer initiating a traffic stop must have reasonable suspicion—or, in other words, a “‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity,’ ” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380 (2020), quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981).
Officer Centrackio had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. The United States Supreme Court has recently made clear that an officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment “by initiating an investigative traffic stop after running a vehicle’s license plate and learning that the registered owner has a revoked driver’s license,” id. at 378. Such a stop is reasonable as long as “the officer lacks information negating an inference that the owner is the driver of the vehicle.” Thus, Officer Centrackio was entitled to make the traffic stop based on the information acquired from LEADS indicating that the owner of the vehicle did not have a valid driver’s license.
Officer Centrackio did not violate the Fourth Amendment by asking Mr. Lewis if he had a valid driver’s license
Everyone agrees that the stop was legal. Nor is there any dispute that after Mr. Lewis produced a state-issued identification card rather than a driver’s license, Officer Centrackio had cause to detain him on suspicion of operating a vehicle without a license. So the question before us is whether the officer committed a constitutionally impermissible seizure by asking Mr. Lewis if he had a valid driver’s license. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez v. United States makes clear that he did not. 575 U.S. 348 (2015).
Established Case Law – Extension of a Traffic Stop
In Rodriguez, an officer detained a driver after completing a traffic stop in order to conduct a canine search of his vehicle. Id. at 348. The court held that absent reasonable suspicion, police may not extend an otherwise completed traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff. Id. at 355. Importantly, though, the court held that “the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, . . . and attend to related safety concerns.”, quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). The court explained that “[B]eyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.’ ” Id. at 355, quoting Caballes at 408. “Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. Actions outside the mission would cause the stop to become unlawful if they “‘measurably extend the duration of the stop,’ ” id., quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009).
The court explained that ordinary inquiries—such as checking a driver’s license—are within a stop’s mission because they serve the same objective as the initial stop: to enforce the traffic code and to “ensur[e] that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.” Id. at 355. In addition to furthering the interests of traffic enforcement, these ordinary inquiries also protect officers. Id. at 356. Because “[T]raffic stops are ‘especially fraught with danger to police officers,’ . . . an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission safely.” Id., quoting Johnson at 330.
Completing the Mission of a Traffic Stop Includes Assuring the Driver is Licensed
Thus, completing the mission of the traffic stop in this case allowed Officer Centrackio to make the “ordinary inquiries” of such a stop, including “checking the driver’s license.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356, 355. Officer Centrackio stopped the car because he had a reasonable suspicion that the driver did not have a valid license. His question – “Are you valid?” – was also consistent with the stop’s mission of ensuring that the vehicle was being operated by a properly licensed driver. See id.; see also Glover, 589 U.S. at 381 (“empirical studies demonstrate what common experience readily reveals: Drivers with revoked licenses frequently continue to drive and therefore to pose safety risks to other motorists and pedestrians”).
Dissent Fictionalizes a ‘Factual’ Argument
In arguing to the contrary, the dissent swings at a straw man, claiming that “[U]nder the lead opinion’s reasoning, every officer has the authority to require a driver to produce a license—in any context—simply because any driver on the road could potentially have a suspended license,” dissenting opinion at ¶ 61. But of course, that is nothing close to what we have said. Rather, we simply conclude that when an officer permissibly engages in a traffic stop based on a reasonable suspicion that a car is not being operated by a validly licensed driver, the officer may ask the driver of the car if he has a valid license.
Rodriguez’s ‘Ordinary Inquiries’
There is nothing novel about this conclusion. It follows precisely what the United States Supreme Court pronounced in Rodriguez—that once an officer has initiated a lawful stop, the officer may make ordinary inquiries incident to the stop, including checking the driver’s license status. Rodriguez at 355. And numerous lower courts have read Rodriguez the same way we do.
State v. Chatton Focused on the Purpose of the Stop
The dissent also relies on Chatton, reasoning that Rodriguez does not control because of dissimilar facts. But Chatton also involved different facts—facts that are legally distinguishable from those at bar.
In Chatton, an officer initiated a traffic stop after observing a vehicle without a front or back license plate. Id. at 59. As the officer walked toward the car, he saw a temporary tag on the rear of the vehicle. Id. Nevertheless, the officer continued walking to the driver-side window and completed the stop. Id. We concluded that once the officer saw the temporary tag, he had no further authority to detain the driver. Id. at 61.
This case is factually distinguishable from Chatton in that Chatton involved a car’s registration status while this case involves a driver’s license status. As the state explains, once the officer saw the temporary tag, the entire mission of the stop—confirming that the car was registered—was completed.
Ordinary Inquiry
In contrast, the mission of the stop in this case was to ensure that a licensed driver was behind the wheel. Unlike in Chatton, information was not presented prior to the officer’s approach that dispelled the suspicion and resolved the mission of the stop. Here, Officer Centrackio’s mission was not completed until he ascertained whether the driver of the vehicle had a valid license. Whether Ms. Dunlap or any other driver was operating the vehicle, completing the mission of the stop included the “‘ordinary inquir[y] incident’ ” to the stop of checking the driver’s license. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355, quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408.
Rodriquez Supersedes Chatton
Both in Time and Authority
Though the facts here are different than those in Chatton, our disposition of this case does not depend solely on that distinction. When it comes to the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, we are bound to defer to the United States Supreme Court. And that court has made it clear that once a police officer has lawfully initiated a traffic stop, the mission of the stop includes asking the driver for a driver’s license. To the extent that Chatton could be read to suggest otherwise, it has been superseded by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez.
Conclusion
We reverse the judgments of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgments of the trial court.
Information for this article was obtained from State v. Dunlap/Lewis, 2024 – Ohio – 4821 and a public records request that included photos and the arrest report of Ms. Dunlap and Mr. Lewis. I also want to thank Bowling Green Police Officer Robert Romstadt who provided me the case for analysis.
State v. Dunlap/Lewis, 2024 – Ohio – 4821 was issued by the Supreme Court of Ohio and is binding throughout Ohio.
Lessons Learned
- Sex or Gender? The court opined “LEADS also provided some of Dunlap’s identifying traits, including her gender, height, age, and weight.”. Officer Andrew Centrackio did not write this sentence verbatim, rather this was the courts description. But, law enforcement should not use the word gender. Given that the term gender continues to grow in numbers and application, officers should only use the word sex when describing a suspect.
https://www.medicinenet.com/what_are_the_72_other_genders/article.htm
- Extension of a Traffic Stop – On April 21, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court issued Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015). In this case on March 27, 2012 a Valley Police Officer stopped Mr. Rodriguez for crossing the center line on Nebraska State Route 275 at 12:06 a.m. and issued him a written warning ticket at 12:27 a.m. At 12:30 a.m. Mr. Rodriguez denied consent to search the vehicle, yet the officer waited for a canine officer to arrive. At 12:33 a.m. the canine alerted on the vehicle and methamphetamine was discovered nestled inside the vehicle. Rodriguez was charged, convicted and appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court that held the extension of the traffic stop to await for a canine was unreasonable “Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may ‘last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose’. Authority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the traffic stop are – or reasonably should have been completed … An officer, in other words, may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But … he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.” The key to Rodriguez is that there is a ‘Rodriguez Moment’ on EVERY traffic stop when the violator must be released by law enforcement.
- Mission of the Traffic Stop – In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio determined that Officer Centrackio mission of the traffic stop was to investigate whether Ms. Dunlap was driving. Officer Centrackio knew that Ms. Dunlap had a suspended drivers license and when he observed Mr. Lewis was driving, who clearly was not Ms. Dunlap as he was a black male and Ms. Dunlap was a white female, Officer Centrackio continued the traffic stop to assure Mr. Lewis was a valid driver. Lewis was not a valid driver, so following his conviction he appealed. Here the Supreme Court of Ohio held “[W]e simply conclude that when an officer permissibly engages in a traffic stop based on a reasonable suspicion that a car is not being operated by a validly licensed driver, the officer may ask the driver of the car if he has a valid license.” Officers must be prepared to articulate what is part of the mission of a traffic stop. The mission includes but is not limited to: 1) Two vehicle approaches; 2) Request for license, registration and insurance documents; 3) Checking the status of the drivers license, license plate to assure the plate(s) belong on that vehicle; 4) Warrant check; 5) Completion of the ticket or warning; and 6) Issuing the ticket or warning. There may be more depending on local rules or department policies but this list includes most of what is part of a ‘mission’ of a traffic stop.
- Purpose of the Traffic Stop – Dunlap/Lewis is distinguishable from State v. Chatton 11 Ohio St.3d 59 (1984) and State v. Fips 2023 – Ohio – 2295. In those cases law enforcement discovered on first approach that the purpose of the traffic stop was a mistake. In Chatton the officer discovered the vehicle had a temporary tag that he could not see when he stopped the vehicle. At the time in Ohio the temporary tag did not have to be visible, now it does have to be visible O.R.C. §4503.21. See: Can a Law Enforcement Officer Continue a Traffic Stop if He Discovers the Reason for the Stop was Incorrect? In Fips, the officer discovered the vehicle had two operable headlights when the officer believed it only had one operable headlight. See: Can Law Enforcement Extend a Traffic Stop for Inoperable Headlight … If the Officer Discovers During the Traffic Stop that the Headlight IS Operable?.
- What if Owner of the Vehicle has an Active Warrant? Can law enforcement stop a vehicle if the owner of the vehicle has an active and verified warrant? Yes! On September 17, 2018 the Sixth Circuit Appellate Court held “Once an officer discovers that a car’s owner has an outstanding arrest warrant, he needs only reasonable suspicion that the owner is in the vehicle.” U. S. v. Pyles, 904 F.3d 422 (2018). See Angie was on the Warrant List but was She in her Car?
- Pre-Sent Arms! Chester Township Police Officer Andrew Centrackio should be highly commended for his self-initiated activity and legal prowess. Well done!
Does your agency train on Traffic Stops?
Don’t fail your training.
Don’t let your training fail you!
Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!