It’s true that officers must evaluate the totality of the circumstances to determine probable cause … But that obligation doesn’t mean officers “must investigate a defendant’s legal defenses prior to making an arrest.”
Stafford v. Sugarcreek Township
No. 25 – 3925 (6th Cir., 2026)
Sixth Circuit Appellate Court
June 29, 2026
Why is this case important?
Stafford v. Sugarcreek Township reinforces one of the most important principles governing warrantless arrests: probable cause is a practical, common-sense standard—not an absolute – proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt conclusive standard. The Sixth Circuit held that officers are not required to conclusively determine whether a suspect’s claim of self-defense or other legal defense will ultimately succeed before making an arrest. Rather, officers must evaluate the totality of the circumstances of the incident, consider both incriminating and exculpatory [clearing] evidence, and determine whether there is a probability or substantial chance that a crime has been committed. Once probable cause is established, the Fourth Amendment permits the arrest.
Background
John Stafford lived along the fifth hole of the Sugar Valley Golf Course. His property’s septic system included a leach field, which is an underground network of pipes used to drain treated wastewater. That leach field extended from behind his residence to underneath the fifth hole’s fairway. A previous owner had granted the golf course permanent permission to use the leach field’s surface as part of the course.
Better at Golf than Reading a Sign
But that arrangement resulted in occasional conflict between Mr. Stafford and Sugar Valley. Namely, Mr. Stafford worried that golfers would damage the leach lines when they drove golf carts on the fairway instead of the cart path. He “repeatedly reported” seeing golfers drive carts over his leach field, so Sugar Valley added signs warning that carts must stay on the cart path. Unfortunately, the signs didn’t always deter golfers from straying onto the fairway.
Dog Walk – Racing Golf Carts – Profanity
On one such occasion, a rowdy group of golfers arrived at the fifth hole while Mr. Stafford was walking his dog in his backyard. He could hear the golfers talking loudly from his yard and saw them “rac[ing]” their carts on the fairway.” Chasing an errant ball, one golfer drove his cart out of the golf course into Mr. Stafford’s neighbor’s yard and began driving in circles to retrieve it. Mr. Stafford angrily reminded the group that they weren’t allowed to drive carts on the fairway or into his neighbor’s yard, and they responded with some profanities. He kept walking his dog around the yard; the golfers kept playing the fifth. But as Mr. Stafford turned towards his house and the golfers completed their putts, the altercation reignited.
Dog Threats a Raised Golf Club and a Handgun
The golfers began yelling and cursing at Mr. Stafford from the green. One golfer, Steve Clark, shouted at Mr. Stafford, “I’ll kill you and your dog,” while another added, “[C]rack that dog in the f***ing skull.” Mr. Clark’s companions tried to hold him back, and one cautioned him that Mr. Stafford had a dog and “may have a gun.” Mr. Stafford warned, “[Y]ou’d better listen to them.” But Mr. Clark left the green and walked toward Mr. Stafford anyway, allegedly wielding his golf club raised above his head. Based on the golfers’ belligerent behavior, Mr. Stafford “believed they were going to kill [him].” So when Mr. Clark was about six feet away from him, Mr. Stafford pulled out a handgun and pointed it at Mr. Clark. He told Mr. Clark and the other golfers, “[Y]ou’re not going to f*** anybody up.” Mr. Clark stopped approaching. Amidst the commotion, one of the golfers and a neighbor called 911.
Officers Interviewed Mr. Stafford and the Golfers
Officer Adam Klark and Sergeant Mark White responded to the scene based on a report that a man was pointing a gun at golfers. Officer Klark met Mr. Stafford in the driveway of his home. He briefly discussed the incident with Mr. Stafford but didn’t arrest him at that time. Then, the two officers interviewed the golfers and other witnesses near Mr. Stafford’s home. One of the golfers also showed the officers a video of the aftermath of the altercation. Officers Klark didn’t think any of the golfers were swinging golf clubs near Mr. Stafford.
Chief Directs the Officers to Press Charges
Around that time, Officer White called Sugarcreek Township’s Chief of Police to discuss the incident. During that call, the chief told him, “Go ahead and press charges. We’ve been screwing with him forever,” seemingly referring to Mr. Stafford’s prior run-ins with police due to his political activism. But the chief didn’t order the officers to arrest Mr. Stafford.
Media Awaits Mr. Stafford’s Arrival at the Police Station
Based on their investigation, Officer White and Officer Klark decided to arrest Mr. Stafford for aggravated menacing and transported him to the Sugarcreek Township Police Department in Officer Klark’s cruiser. When they arrived, Officer Klark drove into the sally port, which is a secure entrance where officers typically bring arrestees into the station for processing. But Officer Klark then noticed WHIO-TV anchorman James Brown in the back of the sally-port area looking to film Mr. Stafford’s arrival. So instead, Officer Klark exited the sally port and drove around to the fire department bay on the other side of the building. Officers escorted Mr. Stafford into the police station through the fire department entrance, hoping to “keep him out of the camera view.” However, Mr. Brown was still able to capture some footage of Mr. Stafford’s entrance using his cell phone. WHIO broadcast that footage in a report about Mr. Stafford’s arrest later that evening.
Aggravated Menacing is Dismissed
Civil Lawsuit is Filed and Also Dismissed
After arriving at the station, officers fingerprinted Mr. Stafford, provided him with a copy of his citation, and then released him. The case was referred to a prosecutor in the nearby town of Xenia. Just three days after the incident, that prosecutor filed one aggravated-menacing charge against Mr. Stafford. A couple of weeks later, the case was referred to a special prosecutor, who ultimately dismissed the criminal complaint with prejudice. Mr. Stafford then sued Sugarcreek Township and four of its police officers (Police Defendants) for unreasonable seizure, intrusion into privacy, malicious prosecution, failure to investigate, failure to train, and civil conspiracy. See 42 U.S.C. §1983. He also sued Brown and WHIO-TV (WHIO Defendants) for civil conspiracy, unreasonable seizure, and intrusion into privacy. Finally, he included Sugar Valley Golf Course and its owner in his federal civil conspiracy claim. Mr. Stafford also brought a variety of state-law claims against all three groups of defendants. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all Mr. Stafford’s federal claims and dismissed the state law claims without prejudice. Mr. Stafford timely appealed.
Mr. Stafford Appeals
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). At this stage, we view all evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Stafford, the nonmoving party.
There was probable cause to arrest Mr. Stafford for aggravated menacing.
There was probable cause to arrest Mr. Stafford for aggravated menacing, which defeats his claims of unreasonable seizure and malicious prosecution. And our precedent doesn’t support Mr. Stafford’s federal claim for intrusion into privacy. Because Mr. Stafford can’t show an underlying constitutional violation, his Monell and civil-conspiracy claims also fail. With no surviving federal claims, the district court properly dismissed his state-law claims without prejudice.
Was Mr. Stafford Unreasonably Seized?
First, Mr. Stafford alleges that the Police and WHIO Defendants unreasonably seized him by arresting him without a warrant.1 See U.S. Const. amend. IV. If the officers had probable cause to believe Mr. Stafford committed aggravated menacing before arresting him, that claim fails. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152, 125 S. Ct. 588, 160 L. Ed. 2d 537 (2004). Because there was probable cause for Mr. Stafford’s arrest, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to defendants on that claim.
Established Case Law – Probable Cause
Probable cause to arrest a suspect is a “low bar.” Frenchko v. Monroe, 160 F.4th 784, 796 (6th Cir. 2025). We assess probable cause by asking whether the events leading to the arrest would cause an objectively reasonable officer to identify a “probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56-57, 138 S. Ct. 577, 199 L. Ed. 2d 453 (2018). That determination typically depends on the elements of the underlying state-law charges. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979).
Established Case Law – Aggravated Menacing
Here, Mr. Stafford was arrested under Ohio’s aggravated-menacing statute, which prohibits “knowingly caus[ing] another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person” or his family. O.R.C. §2903.21(A). Even “briefly” brandishing a gun or aiming it at someone can provide probable cause for an aggravated-menacing arrest. Crable v. City of Cleveland, No. 24-3316, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 32374, 2024 WL 5656461, at *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2024). Because those elements were present here, the officers had probable cause at the time of the arrest to believe Mr. Stafford had committed the crime of aggravated menacing.
Get Off My Lawn with the Threat of a Firearm
The officers decided to arrest Mr. Stafford based on witness statements indicating he had placed the golfers in fear of serious physical harm and video evidence corroborating their account. When the officers arrived at the golf course, two uninvolved bystanders told them that Mr. Stafford had “pulled a gun” and pointed it at the group of golfers, with lots of “swearing and threatening back and forth.” What’s more, Mr. Stafford himself informed the officers that he had brandished his gun at the golfers and told them to get off his property. Finally, after speaking with Mr. Stafford, the officers took written statements from the golfers involved in the altercation. All four golfers reported that Mr. Stafford pulled a gun on the group. Plus, three of the golfers reported that Mr. Stafford threatened to kill them all and that they feared for their lives.
The Incident Likely Happened
The golfers also took videos of the incident and showed one to the officers at the scene. The video didn’t show Mr. Stafford pulling the gun (because it started after the incident). But the officers believed that it undermined Mr. Stafford’s story and self-defense claim. And they thought the video showed the golfers standing on the fairway, so they determined the incident likely happened in that location.
[T]he officers had enough evidence to meet the low bar for probable cause.
We’ve previously found probable cause for an arrest under Ohio’s aggravated-menacing statute when four witnesses reported that a suspect pointed a gun at them and the suspect stated he wanted to scare them off. Manuel v. City of Columbus, 86 F. App’x 852, 854-55 (6th Cir. 2004). After similar reports here, the officers believed they “had enough based upon the law to meet the elements of the law.” In fact, they had even more cause here. Unlike Mr. Manuel, Mr. Stafford admitted that he pointed his gun at the golfers. Manuel, 86 F. App’x at 855. Thus, under our precedent, the officers had enough evidence to meet the low bar for probable cause.
It’s true that officers must evaluate the totality of the circumstances to determine probable cause … But that obligation doesn’t mean officers “must investigate a defendant’s legal defenses prior to making an arrest.”
In response, Mr. Stafford argues that the officers ignored exculpatory evidence that his actions were lawful self-defense under Ohio’s “Stand Your Ground” law. See O.R.C. §2901.09. It’s true that officers must evaluate the totality of the circumstances to determine probable cause, including “both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.” Ouza v. City of Dearborn Heights, 969 F.3d 265, 282 (6th Cir. 2020). But that obligation doesn’t mean officers “must investigate a defendant’s legal defenses prior to making an arrest.” Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 874 (6th Cir. 2002). Instead, “[E]ven if the circumstances suggest that a suspect may have an affirmative defense,” an officer may still make an arrest (supported by probable cause) unless a reasonable officer would “conclusively know” the defense applies. Based on what the officers knew when they arrested him, Mr. Stafford’s case for self-defense was far from clear-cut.
Officers Received Contradictory Stories
For starters, Ohio’s Stand Your Ground law covers only the use of defensive force. O.R.C. §2901.09(B). And the officers didn’t “conclusively know” whether Mr. Stafford was acting defensively when they arrested him. Fridley, 291 F.3d at 873. Mr. Stafford alleged that Mr. Clark approached him wielding “a golf club raised in his hand over his head threatening to strike” him. But the officers didn’t have to believe Mr. Stafford’s story. Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1988). In fact, one of the first witnesses the officers encountered had described Mr. Clark as “empty handed” at the time of the incident. And one of the golfers said Mr. Stafford “tried to start a fight” with his group. Faced with contradictory stories, the officers couldn’t conclusively know whether the Stand Your Ground law protected Mr. Stafford’s conduct.
Walking the Dog or Playing Golf?
The location of the incident adds another layer of uncertainty. Ohio’s Stand Your Ground law applies to the use of force by someone in a place where he has a legal right to be. O.R.C. §2901.09(B). Of course, if the altercation occurred on Mr. Stafford’s property, his presence would clearly be lawful. But that wasn’t obvious to officers at the time. They had just seen a video of the incident that showed Mr. Stafford and the golfers arguing on the fairway. And Mr. Stafford was walking his dog—suggesting that he wasn’t there to golf. So the officers couldn’t have “conclusively” known that Mr. Stafford had any legal right to be there. All told, Mr. Stafford’s self-defense argument wasn’t so obvious that it defeated probable cause.
Probable cause doesn’t require officers to be certain that every element of an offense is present at the moment of arrest.
Mr. Stafford emphasizes that Ohio’s amended Stand Your Ground provision is no longer an affirmative defense, but rather something the government must disprove at trial. That doesn’t change our conclusion. The burden for a conviction is different from the burden for an arrest. Probable cause doesn’t require officers to be certain that every element of an offense is present at the moment of arrest. United States v. Baker, 976 F.3d 636, 648-49 (6th Cir. 2020). After all, requiring such certainty would hamstring law enforcement’s ability to make warrantless arrests of dangerous suspects anytime they asserted self-defense. That’s why a suspect’s “purported legal excuse for his actions” should generally “be assessed by prosecutors and judges, not policemen.” Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 571 n.21 (6th Cir. 1999). So even if convicting Mr. Stafford would require prosecutors to prove he wasn’t acting in self-defense, officers didn’t need to know whether they could prove that in order to arrest him.
Mr. Stafford First Failure
In short, Mr. Stafford’s unreasonable-seizure claim fails because the officers had probable cause to arrest him.
Mr. Stafford Second Failure
Next, Mr. Stafford alleges the Police Defendants maliciously prosecuted him. A malicious-prosecution claim requires a plaintiff to show that “(1) the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute; (2) the government lacked probable cause; (3) the proceeding caused the plaintiff to suffer a deprivation of liberty; and (4) the prosecution ended in the plaintiff’s favor.” Lester v. Roberts, 986 F.3d 599, 606 (6th Cir. 2021). Mr. Stafford fails at the first hurdle.
Mr. Stafford Third Failure
The Police Defendants didn’t influence the Xenia prosecutor’s independent decision to charge Mr. Stafford with aggravated menacing. That’s because “[A] prosecutor’s independent charging decision typically breaks the causal chain for malicious-prosecution purposes” unless an officer makes false statements or engages in other “misconduct” that would foreseeably result in charges. Novak v. City of Parma, 33 F.4th 296, 307 (6th Cir. 2022). While Mr. Stafford may disagree with the officers’ account of the incident, he can’t identify any evidence that any of the officers lied or misrepresented facts in the underlying documents. And the officers didn’t do anything else to influence the decision to prosecute Mr. Stafford. In fact, Officer White never even talked to the prosecutor who filed charges. Officer Klark simply compiled the citation and materials from the case and sent it to a supervisor, who transmitted it to the court and prosecutor. The charges that were eventually “sent up” were “out of [Klark’s] control.” So the Xenia prosecutor’s independent charging decision broke the causal chain from the officers to Mr. Stafford’s prosecution. Because the defendants didn’t participate in or improperly influence the charging decision, Mr. Stafford’s malicious-prosecution claim also fails.
Mr. Stafford Fourth Failure
Mr. Stafford next claims that the Police and WHIO Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by intruding into his privacy with a “staged perp walk.” He relies on a single out-of-circuit case holding that a perp walk staged for media engagement that “lacked any legitimate law enforcement purpose” violated the Fourth Amendment. Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2000). Lauro is neither binding nor applicable. This court has never recognized a claim based on the intangible privacy interests recognized in Lauro. And by its own terms, Lauro didn’t address cases “where a suspect is photographed in the normal course of” police transport. Id. at 213. But that’s exactly what happened here. In fact, the officer transporting Mr. Stafford testified that when he saw a WHIO reporter in the sally port, he walked Mr. Stafford through an alternative entrance to “keep him out of the spotlight.” So any claim related to the perp walk fails, too.
Mr. Stafford’s Fifth Failure
Because Mr. Stafford hasn’t established a constitutional violation, the rest of his federal claims also fail. And with no surviving federal claims, the district court properly dismissed his state-law claims.
Mr. Stafford’s Sixth Failure
First, Mr. Stafford argues that the Police and WHIO Defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights through the arrest and perp walk. A civil-conspiracy claim under §1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation. Susselman v. Washtenaw Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 109 F.4th 864, 872 (6th Cir. 2024); see also PB&J Towing Serv. I & II, LLC v. Hines, No. 20-6170, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 3779, 2022 WL 390599, at *5 (6th Cir. Feb. 9, 2022). But there was no constitutional violation here, so Mr. Stafford’s civil-conspiracy claim fails.
Mr. Stafford’s Seventh Failure
Mr. Stafford also seeks to hold Sugarcreek Township and its police chief liable for failing to investigate his defenses and failing to train officers on Ohio’s Stand Your Ground law. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). But a city can’t be liable under Monell without an underlying constitutional violation. Codrington v. Dolak, 142 F.4th 884, 896 (6th Cir. 2025). Because Mr. Stafford’s underlying constitutional claims fail on the merits, so do his Monell claims.
Mr. Stafford’s Eighth Failure
Finally, Mr. Stafford asks us to revive his state-law claims, which the district court dismissed without prejudice. Once the district court had dismissed Mr. Stafford’s federal claims, it could properly decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). And Mr. Stafford makes no effort to argue that the district court abused its discretion in doing just that. See Hester v. Chester County, 162 F.4th 780, 790 (6th Cir. 2025). Because state courts should address those claims in the first instance, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Stafford’s state-law claims without prejudice.
Information for this article was obtained from Stafford v. Sugarcreek Township, No. 25 – 3925 (6th Cir., 2026).
Stafford v. Sugarcreek Township, No. 25 – 3925 (6th Cir., 2026) was issued on June 29, 2026 by the Sixth Circuit Appellate Court and is binding in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee.
Lessons Learned
What is Probable Cause? Probable cause has many definitions issued by many different courts. In this case the Sixth Circuit Appellate Court applied “[P]robability or substantial chance of criminal activity.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018). In this case the officers established probable cause that Mr. Stafford committed the act of Aggravated Menacing. Because the prosecutor dropped the criminal charge did not undermine that the officers had established probable cause.
Must Law Enforcement Exhaust All Affirmative Defenses Prior to Criminally Charging a Suspect? No. Law enforcement must establish probable cause to arrest based on the totality of the circumstances. Here the court evaluated whether or not the officers were aware of and responsible for investigating each of the defenses of and by Mr. Stafford. “But that obligation doesn’t mean officers “must investigate a defendant’s legal defenses prior to making an arrest.” Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 874 (6th Cir. 2002).
What is Ohio’s Self Defense Law? In order for a person to claim self-defense his behaviors must comport with a three-part test established by the Supreme Court of Ohio on May 2, 1979: (1) Defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray, (2) Defendant had reasonable grounds to believe and an honest belief even if mistaken that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that he did not use more force than necessary to defend against the attack, and (3) Defendant must not have violated any duty to retreat or avoid the danger. State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 79 (1979). The third element was modified on April 6, 2021 by the state legislature when it updated O.R.C. §2901.09 (B) the Self-Defense statute [often called Stand Your Ground law] that states in pertinent part “[A] person has no duty to retreat before using force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person’s residence if that person is in a place in which the person lawfully has a right to be.”. In this case Mr. Stafford was determined to be an instigator in the encounter with the golfers, so he cannot claim self-defense. As the court explained “Mr. Stafford alleged that Mr. Clark approached him wielding “a golf club raised in his hand over his head threatening to strike” him. But the officers didn’t have to believe Mr. Stafford’s story. Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1988). In fact, one of the first witnesses the officers encountered had described Mr. Clark as “empty handed” at the time of the incident. And one of the golfers said Mr. Stafford “tried to start a fight” with his group. Faced with contradictory stories, the officers couldn’t conclusively know whether the Stand Your Ground law protected Mr. Stafford’s conduct.”.
Is Dismissal of the Criminal Case a Pathway against the Officers and Municipality for Successful Civil Litigation? No. Here the court explained “A couple of weeks later, the case was referred to a special prosecutor, who ultimately dismissed the criminal complaint with prejudice.”. However, the court also explained “Because Mr. Stafford can’t show an underlying constitutional violation, his Monell and civil-conspiracy claims also fail. With no surviving federal claims, the district court properly dismissed his state-law claims without prejudice.”. There must be an underlying constitutional violation, commonly a Fourth Amendment violation, for a plaintiff to be success. What is a Monell Claim? A Monell claim is a civil rights claim against a government entity—such as a city, township, county, or police department—under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is named after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). ‘Without Prejudice’ means that Mr. Stafford cannot refile the civil suit.
Does your agency train on Aggravated Menacing?
Don’t fail your training.
Don’t let your training fail you!
Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!