[T]he officers had articulable reasons to believe that Mr. Eurton might be armed, violent, or imminently suicidal … Because Mr. Eurton cannot show that a reasonable officer in Officer Thomas and Officer Covington’s position would have believed a twelve-minute home entry to assess Mr. Eurton’s wellness violated his constitutional rights, qualified immunity is appropriate.
Mark Eurton and Lauren Whisman v. Parker Officer Thomas, et. al.
Sixth Circuit Appellate Court
April 23, 2026
Why is this case important?
Eurton v. Thomas gives officers practical legal guidance for one of the most dangerous, unpredictable and repetitive calls: a suicidal suspect inside a home. Eurton affirms that when officers can articulate a reasonable belief that someone is in immediate danger, they can act decisively enter, control the situation and ensure safety as an exigent circumstance, consent or a warrant is not required.
Suicide Notification – Lack of Bipolar Meds – Likely has a Gun at Home
On February 11, 2022, Mark Eurton contacted his mother and estranged sister to tell them that he loved them and that “he [was] going to sleep because he ha[d] taken so many things.” Understanding this as a suicide attempt, Mr. Eurton’s family called 911 and asked police to conduct a welfare check. Mr. Eurton’s family also told the dispatcher that Mr. Eurton had just gotten into a fight with his wife Lauren Whisman, who had separated from him a month before; neglected his medication for bipolar disorder; and likely had a gun at home.
[A]n “alert on the residence” because “Mr. Eurton [did] not like police” and was likely to become violent.
Dispatch sent police Officers Parker Thomas and Kimberly Gunsett to Mr. Eurton’s home at 2500 Stoner Road, Oldham County, Kentucky and Officer Tyler Covington also responded to the call. As the officers were on the way, dispatch relayed the information from the 911 call, adding that Mr. Eurton likely had been drinking and “possibly took two bottles of unknown prescription pills.” . Additionally, dispatch warned that there was an “alert on the residence” because “Mr. Eurton [did] not like police” and was likely to become violent.

Mr. Eurton’s family called 911 to alert officers that he was suicidal, had got into a fight with his wife, was off his bi polar medication and was suicidal. The officers would enter his home and both he and his wife would file a lawsuit against the officers. Were the officers actions objectively reasonable?
Mr. Thomas Denies Being Suicidal
When Officer Thomas arrived at Mr. Eurton’s residence, he found Mr. Eurton standing in the doorframe smoking a cigarette. Officer Thomas explained why he was checking on Mr. Eurton, and Mr. Eurton replied he had called his family because it was Valentine’s Day weekend and he wanted to tell them that he loved them. When Officer Thomas asked if Mr. Eurton had any thoughts of hurting himself, Mr. Eurton responded, “Hell no.” Ms. Whisman then came out of the home, speaking to someone on her cell phone and holding up her finger in a “wait” gesture. Ms. Whisman asked Mr. Eurton, “Your sister’s on the phone right now, who did you call?” When Officer Thomas asked Ms. Whisman if she was okay, she started crying and said “no” before turning quickly back to Mr. Eurton and asking, “What did you do?”
Mr. Eurton Hands in his Pockets – Walking Away – Attempt to Shut the Door
Officer Thomas and Officer Covington, who had arrived during this interaction, walked toward the house. At once, Mr. Eurton began backing into the house and closing the door in front of him while keeping a hand in the pocket of his pants. Officer Thomas said, “No, no, we’re not doing that,” “we’re gonna talk.” Ms. Whisman reached out to prevent the door from closing and gasped as Mr. Eurton forcefully shut the door. Officer Thomas immediately forced the door back open with his shoulder, damaging the latch, and he and Officer Covington drew their weapons (a gun and a taser, respectively), yelling for Mr. Eurton to put his hands up. Mr. Eurton complied, calmly raising his hands and asking the officers what he had done. The officers’ weapons were pointed at Mr. Eurton for a total of about seventeen seconds, during which Ms. Whisman became increasingly distraught.
Mr. Eurton Escalates the Incident to Suicide by Cop
Officer Thomas and Officer Covington then asked Mr. Eurton to turn around, at which point he became agitated, demanding to know if the officers had a warrant. Mr. Eurton did not comply with the officers’ instructions and instead began to reach in his pocket again, at which point Officer Thomas repeated his command for Mr. Eurton to take his hand out of his pocket. Mr. Eurton said, “Kill me, then,” to which Officer Covington replied, “We’re not here to do that, we’re trying to make sure you’re okay.” Mr. Eurton asked for his lawyer and said he wanted to reach into his pocket to call his attorney, but he continued to disregard the officers’ requests that he approach them to be patted down.
Officer Thomas and Officer Covington stepped into Mr. Eurton’s home and he ordered them to leave, yelling that their actions were unconstitutional. Officer Thomas asked why Ms. Whisman was crying, to which Mr. Eurton responded, “Because she thinks that I did something stupid because I drank three beers.” As Officer Thomas and Officer Covington stood in place, Mr. Eurton became increasingly aggressive, swearing at the officers and threatening them with lawsuits, ordering them to leave, and slurring his speech. Mr. Eurton began rummaging in his pockets, prompting the officers to command him again to keep his hands out of his pockets, to which Mr. Eurton shouted, “Shoot me, then!” Mr. Eurton retreated further into his house and the officers followed him at a distance, still asking to talk as Mr. Eurton shouted angrily and repeatedly challenged the officers to assault him. Officer Thomas told Mr. Eurton that he and Officer Covington would leave once he spoke with them; they also reassured Mr. Eurton that he was not under arrest. As Mr. Eurton yelled at Officer Thomas and Officer Covington to leave, they explained that they were acting for their own safety in addition to his.
Sgt. Ellison Arrives and Clears the Scene
This pattern continued for about twelve minutes. Eventually, Officer Thomas and Officer Covington’s supervisor, Sergeant Jared Ellison, arrived. Ellison largely “fail[ed] to communicate” with the “irate” and “hostile” Mr. Eurton. After Mr. Eurton disappeared into another room in the house, Ellison asked Officer Thomas if he “ha[d] anything.” Officer Thomas responded, “No,” and the officers left.
Mr. Eurton and Ms. Whisman Files a Lawsuit Against Law Enforcement
Mr. Eurton and Ms. Whisman sued Officer Thomas, Officer Covington, and Oldham County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful warrantless entry, excessive force, and improper arrest or detainment. They also levied a variety of state law claims, including assault, false arrest or imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass to land, and negligence per se. Upon the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ official capacity claims against Officer Thomas and Officer Covington and all claims against Oldham County but declined to dismiss the individual capacity and state law claims.
Law Enforcement Files for and is Granted Summary Judgment
After discovery, Officer Thomas and Officer Covington moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The court found that, based on the information provided to Officer Thomas and Officer Covington by 911 dispatch, Ms. Whisman’s distraught behavior, and Mr. Eurton’s own actions, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on each of the federal claims. The court also concluded as to the state claims that Officer Thomas and Officer Covington’s actions were protected by qualified official immunity under Kentucky law.
Appeal
Mr. Eurton and Ms. Whisman now appeal. For brevity, from this point on, we refer to Mr. Eurton and Ms. Whisman’s joint suit using only Mr. Eurton’s name.
Established Case Law – Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields public officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). So recovery under §1983 requires Mr. Eurton to show that (1) Officer Thomas and Officer Covington violated one of his constitutional rights, and (2) the right was clearly established when it was violated. Jones v. Byrnes, 585 F.3d 971, 975 (6th Cir. 2009). When the “contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right,” the right is clearly established. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Usually, this requires a plaintiff to “point to a case showing that reasonable officers would have known their actions were unconstitutional under the specific circumstances they encountered.” Bell v. City of Southfield, 37 F.4th 362, 367 (6th Cir. 2022). And “courts of appeals [are] permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances” at hand. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
Mr. Eurton’s Legal Claims are all Rejected
Mr. Eurton argues that Officer Thomas and Officer Covington violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they entered his home without a warrant, used excessive force against him, and arrested him without probable cause. We reject his arguments and affirm as to all three claims.
Warrantless Home Entry
Mr. Eurton argues that Officer Thomas and Officer Covington unlawfully entered his home. He also argues that the district court disregarded relevant facts related to the presence of exigent circumstances during the incident. Mr. Eurton’s arguments are unavailing.
Fourth Amendment and Established Case Law – Crossing the Threshold
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme Court warns that “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed,” making warrantless home entries “presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980). But the presumption is not absolute. Warrantless entries are permissible if “exigent circumstances” justify the entry. Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1375 (6th Cir. 1992).
One recognized exigency, known as the “emergency aid exception,” permits police to “enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 402-03 (2006). Relatedly, exigent circumstances exist where a suspect poses “an immediate threat to the arresting officers and public” such that “immediate and serious consequences” would occur if police left to get a warrant before acting. Barton v. Martin, 949 F.3d 938, 948 (6th Cir. 2020).
Established Case Law – The Case Case
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Brigham City in the suicide-prevention context, explaining that a warrantless entry to prevent a suicide does not require probable cause, because “[T]he probable-cause requirement is rooted in, and derives its meaning from, the criminal” investigation context. Case v. Montana, 146 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2026). Officers therefore need only “an objectively reasonable basis for believing” that the “homeowner intended to take his own life.” Id. (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400).
Mr. Eurton Alleges ‘Hell No’ Was Enough for the Officers to Immediately Leave his Home
Here, Mr. Eurton alleges that no exigency justified Officer Thomas and Officer Covington’s entry into his home, and he takes issue with the district court’s factual description of the incident. Mr. Eurton claims that, contrary to the district court’s description, Ms. Whisman was not outside the home until a few minutes after the officers arrived, and she was “not in evident distress until some time after the officers had arrived.” Mr. Eurton believes that jurors “could determine that [his] answers to Officer Thomas’s questions objectively allayed any suspicion of self-harm, and that a single utterance from [Ms. Whisman] . . . afforded the officers no probable cause or exigent circumstance[s]” for their warrantless entry. Id. at 31-32.1
[G]iven [the officer’s] information and the great potential harm at issue, an unacceptable risk remained that [the] plaintiff was deceiving him in order to attain his.
Again, suicide prevention is an exigency under the emergency aid exception. See Case, 146 S. Ct. at 508-09. And we have found such an exigency even where a subject did not clearly appear suicidal to officers. To illustrate, in Monday v. Oullette, we held that a police officer had probable cause to conduct a warrantless seizure where the plaintiff had “telephoned a mental health worker and stated that he . . . had ingested some pills and was drinking alcohol in an effort to commit suicide.” 118 F.3d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the plaintiff “appeared coherent and denied that he was attempting to commit suicide” when the officer arrived, the officer testified that “based upon his experience in responding to suicide attempts, people who have overdosed exhibit no typical behavior, the absence or presence of which will indicate reliably [his] true condition.” Id. We concluded that “given [the officer’s] information and the great potential harm at issue, an unacceptable risk remained that [the] plaintiff was deceiving him in order to attain his” goal. Id. at 1103.
On these facts, the police had an “objectively reasonable basis for believing” that he posed a danger to himself.
Case, Brigham City, and Monday support the district court’s finding of qualified immunity here. The cases counsel that preventing self-harm is a cognizable exigency. They also insinuate that a plaintiff’s apparent initial coherence or absence of immediately obvious, dangerous behavior does not preclude an exigency finding, particularly when police have other relevant information about the plaintiff’s condition. In Mr. Eurton’s brief initial interaction with Officer Thomas and Officer Covington, he did not immediately appear distressed. But, as in Monday, the officers had information about Mr. Eurton’s condition and threats of suicide from his family members, and the officers heard Mr. Eurton’s wife ask what he had done. On these facts, the police had an “objectively reasonable basis for believing” that he posed a danger to himself. Case, 146 S. Ct. at 503.
Mr. Eurton points out that, contrary to the district court’s opinion, Ms. Whisman was inside the house when the officers arrived and was “not in evident distress” until after their arrival. Additionally, Mr. Eurton claims that the district court “discount[ed]” the fact that he answered Officer Thomas’s questions in a “measured, non-threatening tone” for nearly two minutes.
The “totality” of these circumstances suffices for Officer Thomas and Officer Covington to receive qualified immunity for their warrantless entry.
But Mr. Eurton’s factual clarifications do not move the needle. Although we read the facts in Mr. Eurton’s favor on summary judgment review, Hartman v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 569 F.3d 606, 611 (6th Cir. 2009), the officer’s perspective still guides the qualified immunity analysis, see Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 501 (6th Cir. 2002). Here, Officer Thomas and Officer Covington responded to a welfare check on a possible suicide victim who had been drinking and apparently ingested two bottles of unknown pills, neglected his mental health medication, was likely to become violent with police, and might be armed. When Officer Thomas arrived, Mr. Eurton stood alone in his doorframe, smoking a cigarette, and calmly reassured Officer Thomas that he was okay. As Officer Covington arrived, Ms. Whisman came out of the house, asking her husband what he had done. When asked if she was okay, Ms. Whisman began to cry and responded that she was not. And as soon as the officers tried to speak to the couple further, Mr. Eurton backed into his house and forcefully closed the door while putting his hand into his pocket. All of this occurred before the officers’ entry into Mr. Eurton’s home. The “totality” of these circumstances suffices for Officer Thomas and Officer Covington to receive qualified immunity for their warrantless entry. Case, 146 S. Ct. at 508.
[A] “911 call alone is insufficient to justify . . . warrantless entry,” particularly where officers “heard nothing and saw nothing amiss” and “saw no one who appeared to be injured or upset.”
Our decision in Reed v. Campbell County is instructive. 80 F.4th 734 (6th Cir. 2023). There, we affirmed a denial of qualified immunity where officers made a warrantless entry after a neighbor called 911 to report that he might have heard a domestic dispute. Id. at 740-41. But the officers “did not see or hear anything amiss” when they arrived at Reed’s home, and when Reed answered the officer’s knock, the woman standing behind him “was not crying” or injured. Reed eventually closed the door after learning that the officers had no warrant. An officer then kicked down Reed’s door, drew his firearm on Reed, and patted him down. This court held that a “911 call alone is insufficient to justify . . . warrantless entry,” particularly where officers “heard nothing and saw nothing amiss” and “saw no one who appeared to be injured or upset.” Id. at 744. We distinguished the entry in Reed from cases in which “the 911 caller made a significantly more detailed report” or where “there were other indications” of an emergency. Id.
Court Applies a Totality of the Circumstances
Although Mr. Eurton asks this court to rely on his initial calm during the incident to deny qualified immunity to the officers, Reed instructs otherwise. Officer Thomas and Officer Covington responded to a detailed 911 call from Mr. Eurton’s own family, combined with a dispatch warning that Mr. Eurton was likely intoxicated, possibly armed, and expected to react violently to police presence. Furthermore, when the officers arrived, Ms. Whisman was emotional, told the officers that she was not okay, and asked her husband what he had done. Reed makes clear that officers need not see “outward manifestations of violence” to find exigency where other circumstances are at play. And although Mr. Eurton is correct that “the mere presence of firearms does not create exigent circumstances,” (quoting United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 674, 680 (6th Cir. 1994)), a showing “that the police possessed information that the suspect was armed and likely to use a weapon or become violent” suffices, Barton, 949 F.3d at 948-49. Here, the officers’ dispatch report explicitly satisfies that qualification.
Does a Violation of Department Equate to a Constitutional Violation?
Mr. Eurton’s argument improperly attempts to establish a constitutional violation piecemeal.
Finally, Mr. Eurton alleges that Officer Thomas and Officer Covington violated Oldham County Police Department Standard Operating Procedures (“OCPD SOPs”) regarding domestic-violence related home entries. Mr. Eurton specifically cites OCPD SOP 28.02, which provides that officers responding to domestic violence calls “may make a warrantless entry and search of a location when there is probable cause to believe that a victim may be in danger.” But Mr. Eurton’s argument improperly attempts to establish a constitutional violation piecemeal, seemingly suggesting that every potential exigency had to independently justify the entry. The officers needed only a single exigency to enter the home—in this case, emergency aid. See Case, 146 S. Ct. at 505. Besides, police department policy violations do not independently demonstrate constitutional violations. Coitrone v. Murray, 642 F. App’x 517, 522 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court has been cautious to draw a distinction between behavior that violates a statutory or constitutional right and behavior that violates an administrative procedure of the agency for which the officials work.” (quoting Cass v. City of Dayton, 770 F.3d 368, 377 (6th Cir. 2014))).
Conclusion – Warrantless Entry into the Home
Viewing the facts from a reasonable officer’s perspective and drawing inferences in favor of Mr. Eurton, we affirm the district court’s grant of qualified immunity on Mr. Eurton’s warrantless entry claim at the first step of the analysis.
Did the Officers Use Excessive Force?
Mr. Eurton next claims that Officer Thomas and Officer Covington violated his constitutional rights when they drew a gun and a taser on him after forcing his door open. “A law enforcement officer uses force against another when he or she aims a firearm at an individual.” Brown v. City of Wyoming, (citing Kent v. Oakland County, 810 F.3d 384, 394 (6th Cir. 2016)). And “all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force . . . in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Courts analyze uses of force “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” making “allowance[s] for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments . . . about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396-97.
Established Case Law – Excessive Force
Graham further counsels courts to assess “[1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether he [was] actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. This court “review[s] the actions of each officer separately” because each “can be held liable only for his own wrongdoing,” even where the officers acted together and arrived just minutes apart. Reed, 80 F.4th at 748 (citing Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 650 (6th Cir. 2010)).
Officer Thomas Excessive Force Claim
Officer Thomas claims that he forced Mr. Eurton’s front door open and raised his service firearm because he feared for both Mr. Eurton’s safety and his own. Indeed, Officer Thomas had information that Mr. Eurton was possibly armed, unstable, and likely to become violent, and saw Mr. Eurton’s hand in his pocket as the door closed. Officer Thomas’s gun was pointed at Mr. Eurton for seventeen seconds total, just enough time to see that Mr. Eurton was not in immediate possession of a weapon.
Officer Thomas’s use of force was reasonable under Graham.
Officer Thomas’s use of force was reasonable under Graham. The first Graham factor (severity of the crime) is inconclusive because there is no specific crime to guide the analysis. Mr. Eurton claims that the only relevant “crime” is “basic domestic violence,” which he describes as a misdemeanor. That is incorrect; domestic violence can be a misdemeanor or felony in Kentucky. See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 403.720(2)(A). But here, without knowing more about any potential domestic violence against Ms. Whisman, it would have been impossible for Officer Thomas to rely on any specific domestic violence offense.
Officer Thomas was justified in his belief that Mr. Eurton posed an “immediate threat”.
The second Graham factor (theat to safety) “clearly favors” Officer Thomas. Officer Thomas and Officer Covington do not dispute that they forced their way into Mr. Eurton’s house and drew a gun and taser, respectively, on Mr. Eurton. But they persuasively argue that their show of force was reasonable under Graham because of the possibility of domestic violence against Ms. Whisman; because Mr. Eurton was “uncooperative” and ignoring commands; because they were aware that Mr. Eurton was intoxicated and possibly suicidal, likely had a weapon, and kept moving his hands to his pockets; and because they had credible information that he was likely to become violent. This evidence supports Officer Thomas’s reasonable fear that Mr. Eurton might quickly and unpredictably become violent toward the officers, Ms. Whisman, or himself. And the facts considered in a light favorable to Mr. Eurton do not erase the context of the encounter and Officer Thomas’s awareness about Mr. Eurton’s intoxication, potential suicide attempt, and documented inclination to become violent; his family’s warning that he was likely armed; and Ms. Whisman’s response that she was not okay. In light of all the relevant circumstances, Officer Thomas was justified in his belief that Mr. Eurton posed an “immediate threat” to merit qualified immunity on Mr. Eurton’s excessive force claim.
The third and final Graham factor asks whether a plaintiff was “actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” 490 U.S. at 396. This factor likely favors Mr. Eurton; although Mr. Eurton ignored the officers and retreated quickly and unexpectedly into his home, that cannot aptly be characterized as active resistance. See Reed, 80 F.4th at 749.
Conclusion – Excessive Force Claim Against Officer Thomas
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we affirm the grant of qualified immunity to Officer Thomas.
Excessive Force Claim Against Officer Covington
The analysis of Officer Covington’s actions is largely identical to the analysis of Officer Thomas’s actions, if not even more favorable to Officer Covington. Officer Covington arrived at Mr. Eurton’s home a few minutes after Officer Thomas and in time to hear Officer Thomas’s entire interaction with Ms. Whisman. But his delayed arrival meant that he also missed Mr. Eurton telling Officer Thomas that he had no plans to hurt himself. Officer Covington, then, was aware of all the information relayed by 911 dispatch and saw that Ms. Whisman was distraught, but he had no indication that Mr. Eurton was safe. Officer Covington watched as Mr. Eurton backed into the house while reaching into his pocket. Officer Thomas, not Officer Covington, forced the front door open, and Officer Covington pointed his taser at Mr. Eurton for about seventeen seconds. For the reasons set forth above, Officer Covington should also receive qualified immunity on Mr. Eurton’s excessive force claim.
Conclusion – Excessive Force Claim Against Officer Covington
Because Officer Thomas and Officer Covington’s force against Mr. Eurton did not violate his constitutional rights, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
Was Mr. Eurton Unreasonably Seized?
After their initial entry, Officer Thomas and Officer Covington followed Mr. Eurton a short distance into his home for about twelve minutes, repeatedly asking him to talk to them and to show his hands, and assuring Mr. Eurton that he was not under arrest. Mr. Eurton appears to argue that the officers’ investigative stop was unreasonable and ripened into an arrest for which they lacked probable cause. But Mr. Eurton fails to state a specific constitutional violation or explain how Officer Thomas and Officer Covington’s alleged seizure violated clearly established law. That is problematic because “[T]he burden falls on the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Mockeridge v. Harvey, 149 F.4th 826, 833 (6th Cir. 2025).
Was the Twelve Minute Entry Into a Home to Determine if Mr. Eurton was Suicidal Unconstitutional?
We begin and end our analysis with the clearly established prong. A police officer’s conduct “violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of [the] right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (citation modified). “The ‘clearly established’ standard also requires that the legal principle clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances before him.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018). The specific question at issue is whether it was clearly established, at the time of the incident between Mr. Eurton and the officers, that a 12-minute home entry to determine whether Mr. Eurton posed an immediate threat to himself or others was an unconstitutional seizure.
The officers had articulable reasons to believe that Mr. Eurton might be armed, violent, or imminently suicidal.
But Mr. Eurton does not point to any “existing precedent [that] placed th[is] . . . constitutional question beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. Mr. Eurton first cites Fisher v. Harden, where we held that “[A]bsent suspected criminal activity, in this circuit a law enforcement official may not physically restrain an individual merely to assess his mental health.” 398 F.3d 837, 842 (6th Cir. 2005). Instead, “an officer must have probable cause to believe that the person seized poses a danger to himself or others.”. But in Fisher, officers responded to a suicide dispatch from a passerby’s 911 call by laying Fisher face down on the road at gunpoint and handcuffing him even though he showed no outward signs of distress. Here, by contrast, the officers had articulable reasons to believe that Mr. Eurton might be armed, violent, or imminently suicidal. And the officers did not restrain Mr. Eurton in any way but stood in the front hall of his house asking to speak with him out of concern for their safety, Ms. Whisman’s, and Mr. Eurton’s own.
Sixth Circuit Rejects Mr. Eurton’s Application of Established Case Law
Mr. Eurton’s reliance on Monday is similarly unavailing. Monday held that no unlawful seizure occurred even when officers responded to a suicide prevention dispatch, pepper-sprayed the plaintiff when he refused to accompany them to the hospital for a mental health assessment, and took him to the hospital in a stretcher, where he had to stay for five days because of his severe reaction to the spray. 118 F.3d at 1101-02. Officer Thomas and Officer Covington’s attempts to speak with Mr. Eurton are a far cry from the aggressive events of Monday, and do not constitute a seizure “specifically for purposes of a professional psychiatric evaluation,” as we have later read Monday. Fisher, 398 F.3d at 846 (citing Monday, 118 F.3d at 1102).
Conclusion and Holding
Because Mr. Eurton cannot show that a reasonable officer in Officer Thomas and Officer Covington’s position would have believed a twelve-minute home entry to assess Mr. Eurton’s wellness violated his constitutional rights, qualified immunity is appropriate.
Note: There were additional state claims that were also granted summary judgment, though those claims are not evaluated in this article.
Information for this article was obtained from Mark Eurton and Lauren Whisman v. Parker Officer Thomas, et. al., No. 25 – 5733.
Mark Eurton and Lauren Whisman v. Parker Officer Thomas, et. al., No. 25 – 5733 was issued on April 23, 2026 and is binding in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee.
Lessons Learned
- Warrantless Entry Into a Home on a Suicidal Person – On January 14, 2026 the U.S. Supreme Court issued William Case v. Montana, 607 U.S. ____ 2026 and held “An officer may enter a home without a warrant [or consent] if he has ‘an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such an injury.”. In this case, the officers had a reasonable belief that Mr. Eurton was suicidal, so the entry into the home was objectively reasonable.
- Scope and Duration of Home Entry – Throughout the encounter with Mr. Eurton, the officers observed him place his hand in his pocket even after lawful orders for him to remove his hand. The initial call included that Mr. Eurton may have had a firearm so the officers concern for Mr. Eurton being armed was objectively reasonable. Mr. Eurton was uncooperative, said just ‘kill me’, walked away, a female was emotional during the encounter and admitted to drinking three beers. All of these factors justified the twelve minute entry into the home to assure that Mr. Eurton was not a threat to himself or others.
- Excessive Force Claim – The Sixth Circuit Appellate Court concluded that the officers were reasonable in forcing their way into the home and pointing a taser and firearm at Mr. Eurton as the court explained “[B]ecause Mr. Eurton was “uncooperative” and ignoring commands; because they were aware that Mr. Eurton was intoxicated and possibly suicidal, likely had a weapon, and kept moving his hands to his pockets; and because they had credible information that he was likely to become violent. This evidence supports Officer Thomas’s reasonable fear that Mr. Eurton might quickly and unpredictably become violent toward the officers.”. Cooperation will go a long way for suspects during encounters with law enforcement. Additionally, de-escalation is a technique and can be helpful. HOWEVER, de-escalation requires TWO PEOPLE and in this case only the officers wanted to de-escalate the incident, not Mr. Eurton.
- Qualified Immunity – William Case v. Montana, 607 U.S. ____ 2026 was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on January 14, 2026. The incident involving Mr. Eurton occurred on February 11, 2022. Because Mr. Eurton’s case occurred four years prior there was no ‘clearly established’ case law concerning entering a home for a suicidal person. Based on this timeline the officers were granted Qualified Immunity. Going forward there is now ‘clearly established’ case law but this case law supports law enforcement’s entry into a home if it is objectively reasonable to believe the person inside the home is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such an injury.” William Case v. Montana, 607 U.S. ____ 2026
- Role of Dispatch – When Officers Parker Thomas and Kimberly Gunsett were dispatched to 2500 Stoner, Road, La Grange, Kentucky on a report of a suicidal male the dispatcher relayed … “Mr. Eurton’s family also told the dispatcher that Mr. Eurton had just gotten into a fight with his wife Lauren Whisman, who had separated from him a month before; neglected his medication for bipolar disorder; and likely had a gun at home.”. These factors were critical to the officers evaluation and legal justification to enter the Mr. Eurton’s home and evaluate him for being suicidal. Dispatchers and dispatcher training are critical to these incidents and likely saved the municipality a lot of money in a legal settlement or litigation.
- Violation of Policy versus Constitutional Violation – On Thursday October 3, 1974 Memphis Police Officer Elton Hyman shot Eddie Garner fleeing from a burglary. On March 27, 1985 the U.S. Supreme Court held that law enforcement cannot shoot a fleeing a felon unless “[T]he officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). However, Memphis Police and the City of Memphis made a serious attempt to justify the shooting because at the time of the shooting the State of Tennessee had a state law that permitted shooting a fleeing felon and Memphis Police had a policy that permitted shooting a fleeing felon. The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed these facts as it stated “A police officer may not seize an unarmed, non-dangerous suspect by shooting him.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). Consequently, the actions by law enforcement are either constitutional or not, irrespective of department policy. This concept was firmed up on January 6, 1992 when the Sixth Circuit evaluated a plaintiff’s claim that an officer violated department policy when Officer Pete Schulcz shot and killed Mr. Brent Smith on October 31, 1988. Mr. Smith’s mother, the plaintiff made a feeble §1983 claim against Springdale Police alleging that Officer Schulcz’s shooting violated Springdale’s deadly force policy. The Sixth Circuit dismissed this legal claim “A city can certainly choose to hold its officers to a higher standard than required by the Constitution without being subjected to increased liability under §1983. To hold that cities with strict policies commit more Constitutional violations than those with lax policies would be an unwarranted extension of the law, as well as a violation of common sense.” Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 348 (6th Cir., 1992).
- Pre-Sent Arms! Oldham County Police Officer Parker Thomas, Officer Kimberly Gunsett, Officer Tyler Covington, Sergeant Jared Ellison, the unnamed dispatcher, and city attorneys who investigated and successfully defended this lawsuit should be highly commended. Well done!
Does your agency train on Entering a Home for a Suicidal Occupant?
Don’t fail your training.
Don’t let your training fail you!
Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!