The interest in protecting the other driver and the public from Mr. Sexton’s erratic behavior, particularly when Officer Green believed that Mr. Sexton may have been intoxicated or having a mental health breakdown while driving, outweighed any possible restraint there may have been on Mr. Sexton’s liberty interest.

 

State v. Sexton

2026-Ohio-2636

Second District Appellate Court

Montgomery County, Ohio

July 10, 2026

Why does Bob Meader think this case important?

State v. Sexton provides reassurance that an objectively reasonable response to a developing public-safety situation will not necessarily become unconstitutional merely because it crosses a municipal or township boundary.  While an officer’s authority to stop and detain a suspect for a misdemeanor outside the officer’s territorial jurisdiction is narrowly limited under Ohio law, State v. Sexton illustrates one of the uncommon circumstances in which such an extraterritorial stop was constitutionally justified.

Background

Defendant-Appellant Danny Sexton appeals from his convictions in the Kettering Municipal Court following a jury trial on charges of obstructing official business and failure to comply with the signal or order of a police officer. First, he contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress and motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that his arrest pursuant to an extraterritorial stop was unconstitutional and that the police officer lacked probable cause. However, during a police officer’s lawful traffic stop of another motorist outside of the officer’s jurisdiction, not only did Mr. Sexton obstruct official business by interfering with the officer’s stop, but when the officer pursued Mr. Sexton for that obstruction, the officer saw Mr. Sexton commit traffic violations. Second, Mr. Sexton argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to the two charges. The record, however, demonstrates that Mr. Sexton not only obstructed the police officer’s official business of conducting an unrelated traffic stop, but he also failed to comply with the officer’s direction to pull over after the officer observed Mr. Sexton’s traffic violations. Finally, in relation to the failure to comply charge, Mr. Sexton contends that the trial court erred in giving an additional jury instruction regarding the police officer’s authority to give an order. Because the police officer had conducted an extraterritorial stop, the jury had sought clarification regarding jurisdictional issues,. The trial court clarified that, under the facts of this case, the officer had legal authority to give a lawful order or direction in the City of Moraine, which was outside of his jurisdiction, Miami Township. Since this was an accurate statement of law, the trial court did not mislead the jury in giving its clarifying instruction.

For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Female is Speeding within Miami Township, though she is Stopped Outside Miami Township

On October 30, 2024, Miami Township Police Officer Kurtis Green was on patrol near Springboro Pike in Miami Township. While within the territorial limits of Miami Township, Officer Green observed a speeding vehicle and initiated a routine traffic stop of a female driver. Though Officer Green’s pursuit of the driver started in Miami Township, he eventually pulled her over in the parking lot of a commercial retail business complex located in the City of Moraine close to the township border.

Mr. Sexton Offers Unsolicited, Incorrect and a Profane Legal Analysis

While Officer Green was talking with the female driver at her car window, Mr. Sexton pulled up to the site of the stop and said, “Thought you might like to know you’re not in Miami Township.” Officer Green replied, “Okay, you can go ahead and get away from my traffic stop,” and Mr. Sexton responded belligerently by yelling and cursing at Officer Green, insisting that Officer Green was not authorized to be there.

AI-created image.

Officer Green Requests Backup from Moraine Police

Officer Green ordered Mr. Sexton to leave the area of his traffic stop. Instead of leaving, Mr. Sexton pulled away, circled the parking lot, and returned to Officer Green’s location. Mr. Sexton stopped his vehicle close to the door of the cruiser and began to yell, curse, and interfere with the stop again. Due to Mr. Sexton’s actions, Officer Green contacted dispatch and requested the assistance of a Moraine police officer, but no officers were available. Officer Green told Mr. Sexton to leave a second time, and Mr. Sexton later exited the parking lot, turning north toward his home in Moraine. Once Mr. Sexton left the parking lot, Officer Green terminated the traffic stop, released the other driver without issuing a citation, and pursued Mr. Sexton instead.

Mr. Sexton Extends His Middle Finger to Officer Green

In pursuit of Mr. Sexton, Officer Green exited the parking lot and turned north into Moraine to catch up to him. Officer Green’s pursuit of Mr. Sexton occurred entirely within the geographical boundary of the City of Moraine. When Officer Green activated his lights to signal Mr. Sexton to stop, Mr. Sexton gestured with a middle finger and ignored him. Mr. Sexton did not stop until after he pulled into his driveway, located on Pinnacle Park Drive in Moraine. Other Miami Township officers immediately arrived to assist Officer Green. Outside of Mr. Sexton’s house, Officer Green and the other officers exited their cruisers and ordered Mr. Sexton to come from his driveway to the street where the officers were located. Mr. Sexton refused, stating that he would wait for a Moraine police officer to arrive before complying with their orders.

Mr. Sexton is Arrested for Obstructing Official Business and Failure to Comply

Shortly thereafter, a Moraine officer arrived on the scene, and Mr. Sexton complied with the Moraine officer’s requests. Sergeant Albrinck of the Moraine Police Department then arrived at the scene, and he and Officer Green discussed jurisdictional issues associated with the City of Moraine falling within the territorial jurisdiction of Kettering Municipal Court and Miami Township falling within the jurisdiction of Miamisburg Municipal Court. Based on Officer Green’s report to him, Sgt. Albrinck returned to the Moraine police department to prepare criminal complaints charging Mr. Sexton with one count of obstructing official business in violation of O.R.C. §2921.31(A) and one count of failure to comply with the signal or order of a police officer in violation of O.R.C. §2921.331(A). Sgt. Albrinck returned to Mr. Sexton’s house to have Officer Green execute the probable cause affidavits, and Officer Green then transported Mr. Sexton to the Montgomery County jail.

Mr. Sexton Files Motions to Suppress

On January 10, 2025, Mr. Sexton filed motions to suppress and dismiss. Mr. Sexton asserted that Officer Green acted outside of his jurisdiction when he pursued and arrested him, because his sole interaction with Mr. Sexton occurred in Moraine, rather than in Officer Green’s jurisdiction in Miami Township. He argued that the exceptions to jurisdictional limits set forth 5 under O.R.C. §2935.03 did not apply, because Officer Green’s pursuit of him did not begin in Officer Green’s jurisdiction and he had not committed any of the statutorily permitted offenses for expansion of an officer’s jurisdiction. Mr. Sexton also argued that Officer Green lacked probable cause to pursue him for obstructing official business, as his actions were mere annoyances and did not rise to the level of obstruction. Mr. Sexton claimed that he complied with Officer Green’s instructions by leaving the area, that he never left his vehicle, that he made no comment to the other driver whom Officer Green had pulled over, that he was no threat to Officer Green, and that he did not prevent Officer Green from conducting his traffic stop. Mr. Sexton further claimed that there was no emergent or dangerous situation, that Officer Green lacked probable cause to pursue and arrest him outside of his territory, and that no exception permitting Officer Green to conduct a warrantless arrest of him outside of Officer Green’s jurisdiction of Miami Township applied. In other words, according to Mr. Sexton, Officer Green unnecessarily terminated his traffic stop to pursue Mr. Sexton without reason and then, without probable cause to pursue him, exceeded his territorial jurisdiction in pursuing and arresting him.

Officer Green Testifies at the Motion to Suppress

The suppression matter proceeded to hearing, and the following evidence was admitted. Officer Green testified that, during his traffic stop of the female driver, Mr. Sexton approached him and yelled profanities out his vehicle window regarding jurisdictional concerns. Officer Green observed that Mr. Sexton was very agitated, and he believed that Mr. Sexton’s actions were unpredictable. He was uncertain if Mr. Sexton was armed or would have used his vehicle as a weapon. He stated that Mr. Sexton’s behavior impeded his ability to do his job in investigating the traffic stop because his attention from the stop was diverted away from the other driver to Mr. Sexton. Officer Green contacted dispatch for additional assistance from the City of Moraine in accordance with a mutual aid agreement, but the Moraine police never arrived, because the department’s officers were busy on another call. Believing that Mr. Sexton should be arrested for obstructing official business, Officer Green pursued Mr. Sexton in his cruiser and observed him making marked lane, stop sign, and turn signal violations, substantiating his concerns that Mr. Sexton was driving while impaired. Officer Green did not attempt to stop Mr. Sexton until after additional Miami Township officers accompanied him en route. Once Officer Green attempted to stop Mr. Sexton by turning on his lights, Mr. Sexton signaled the middle finger, refusing to pull over. Officer Green and the other officers followed Mr. Sexton to his house.

Upon arriving, Mr. Sexton refused to exit his vehicle into police custody until Moraine officers arrived on the scene. Sergeant Albrinck of the Moraine Police Department prepared the documents to charge Mr. Sexton with obstruction of official business and failure to comply, and Officer Green placed Mr. Sexton into custody. Officer Green stated that Mr. Sexton prolonged and impeded his ability to do his job during the traffic stop and that he was unable to issue a speeding citation and finish the stop of the other driver. Officer Green instead decided to pursue Mr. Sexton because Mr. Sexton’s behavior and unpredictability created concerns regarding his own safety, the safety of the other driver, and the safety of the general public.

Trial Court Overrules Mr. Sexton’s Motions

The trial court disagreed with Mr. Sexton, overruling his motions to suppress and dismiss. The court found that there were reasonable suspicion and probable cause for Officer Green to follow Mr. Sexton and conduct a traffic stop of him. The court also found that there was probable cause for Officer Green to arrest Mr. Sexton and charge him with obstructing official business and failure to comply. The court stated that even if Officer Green was outside of his Miami Township jurisdiction in Moraine when he pursued Mr. Sexton, there were still no grounds for suppression of the evidence, emphasizing that the seizure of a motorist by an officer acting outside of his territorial jurisdiction was not unreasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment.

Officer Green testified that he … was unsure if Mr. Sexton was intoxicated or having a mental health breakdown.

The matter proceeded to jury trial on September 24, 2025. During the trial, Officer Green again testified that Mr. Sexton interrupted his traffic stop by yelling and cursing at him regarding jurisdictional concerns. Officer Green stated that he told Mr. Sexton to get away from his traffic stop, but Mr. Sexton ignored him, continuing to yell and curse at him. Officer Green testified that Mr. Sexton drove away briefly, only to return a few moments later with additional yelling and cursing before eventually driving away again. Officer Green testified that he was concerned about his and the other driver’s safety and that he was unsure if Mr. Sexton was intoxicated or having a mental health breakdown. Officer Green told the jury that, for those reasons, he decided to terminate the stop of the other driver and pursue Mr. Sexton. Mr. Sexton sought a Rule 29 acquittal at the close of the State’s case, arguing both that the evidence was insufficient to support the obstructing official business charge and that there was no probable cause for the subsequent attempt to stop Mr. Sexton, which formed the basis of the failure to comply charge. The trial court overruled the motion. Defense counsel raised the issue of the officer being outside the territorial limits of his jurisdiction, and the trial court stated that the issue had already been ruled upon and was not an issue for the jury.

The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts.

During jury deliberations, the jury delivered the following written question to the court: “Is additional information available regarding jurisdiction issues or pertinent agreements in this case?” The trial court responded by stating, “[E]ven though Officer Green is a Miami Township police officer, he has legal authority to give a lawful order or direction in the City of Moraine, so you can assume the Court has already decided any legal issue regarding the officer’s legal authority in this situation.” The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts, and Mr. Sexton timely appealed.

Appeal – Probable Cause

Probable cause is a fundamental concept in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and serves as a threshold for law enforcement to make arrests. For a warrantless arrest, probable cause requires that the arresting officer possess sufficient information at the time of the arrest “that would cause a reasonable and prudent person to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.” State v. Elmore, 2006-Ohio-6207, ¶ 39, citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-112 (1975) and Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). In determining whether probable cause existed, an appellate court examines the “totality” of facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest. Id., citing State v. Homan, 89 Ohio St.3d 421, 427 (2000). A lack of probable cause will render a warrantless arrest invalid. 10

The proper remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation is a motion to suppress evidence. State v. Lloyd, 126 Ohio App. 3d 95, 100 (7th Dist. 1998). Ohio law makes no provision for a motion to dismiss based on a lack of probable cause. Id. Our standard of review for a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. In considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of the trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Cosby, 2008-Ohio-3862, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Clay, 34 Ohio St.2d 250 (1973); State v. Turner, 2015-Ohio-4612, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.). Thus, the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses at a suppression hearing are matters for determination by the trial court. See State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 (1982). We accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence, but we apply the do novo standard of review to evaluate whether the trial court’s conclusions of law regarding those factual findings are correct. State v. Brock, 2010-Ohio-5885, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8; see also State v. Rhines, 2011-Ohio-3615, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.).

Authority to Arrest Without Warrant – Pursuit Outside Jurisdiction

O.R.C. §2935.03 is the primary statute governing a peace officer’s authority to make a warrantless arrest. It establishes where an officer can arrest, what offenses justify a warrantless arrest, and the conditions under which officers can pursue a suspect outside of their standard jurisdiction. R.C. 2935.03(A)(1) mandates peace officers to arrest and detain any person found violating state laws, local ordinances, or township resolutions within their territorial jurisdiction until a warrant can be secured. It generally provides that a peace officer within a township may arrest a person found violating the law without a warrant so long as the officer is acting within the political subdivision in which he is employed. O.R.C. §2935.03(A)(1).

Ohio Revised Code – Jurisdiction

Divisions of O.R.C. §2935.03 provide exceptions to the territorial restrictions on a peace officer’s authority to conduct a warrantless arrest. For example, O.R.C. §2935.03(B)(1) permits an officer to make a warrantless arrest outside the officer’s jurisdiction where there is reasonable ground to believe that a specified offense has been committed, including but not limited to offenses of violence, domestic violence, protection order violations, stalking, theft, or criminal child enticement. O.R.C. §2935.03(C) permits an authorized peace officer to stop, detain, and investigate any individual whom the officer has a reasonable ground to believe is operating a motor vehicle while impaired and holding a commercial driver’s license or operating a vehicle regulated by the public utilities commission. O.R.C. §2935.03(D) authorizes fresh pursuits by peace officers across jurisdictional lines with certain restrictions, and O.R.C. §2935.03(E) permits officers to make warrantless arrests and traffic stops for certain violations on streets or highways located immediately adjacent to their physical jurisdiction.

Established Case Law – Extra Jurisdiction

However, “[w]here a law enforcement officer, acting outside the officer’s statutory territorial jurisdiction, stops and detains a motorist for an offense committed and observed outside the officer’s jurisdiction, the seizure of the motorist by the officer is not unreasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Weideman, 2002-Ohio-1484, syllabus. As a result, “the officer’s statutory violation does not require suppression of all evidence flowing from the stop.” Id. Moreover, “when an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, the balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally reasonable.” Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008); see State v. Jones, 2009-Ohio-316, ¶ 1 (when an officer has probable cause to initiate a stop because he personally observed a traffic violation, the officer’s extraterritorial traffic stop in contravention of O.R.C. §2935.03 does not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution). 12

Obstructing Official Business

Mr. Sexton was charged with obstructing official business under R.C. 2921.31(A), which states: No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act within the public official’s official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of the public official’s lawful duties. Mr. Sexton contends that Officer Green was employed in Miami Township and thus lacked the authority under R.C. 2935.03(A) to arrest him in Moraine. He argues that none of R.C. 2935.03’s exceptions to the basic territorial limits on an officer’s authority to conduct a warrantless arrest are applicable to the facts of this case, as the charges against him are not qualifying offenses. He contends that the obstructing official business charge was alleged to have occurred inside the boundaries of the City of Moraine. Thus, no pursuit originated inside Officer Green’s jurisdiction, nor did the alleged offenses arise on any street or highway adjacent to Miami Township. Finally, Mr. Sexton argues that Officer Green lacked probable cause to arrest him for obstructing official business, as his actions did not rise to the level of obstruction.

Forcing an officer to abandon a lawful traffic stop certainly impedes the officer’s performance of his lawful duties.

In the case before us, it is undisputed that Officer Green, while lawfully engaged in an extraterritorial traffic stop of another driver in the City of Moraine, conducted an extraterritorial stop when he detained and arrested Mr. Sexton in Moraine outside of his Miami Township jurisdiction. It is also undisputed, however, that Officer Green personally observed Mr. Sexton approach in his vehicle while yelling profanities at Officer Green while Officer Green was in the midst of that traffic stop of the other driver. Officer Green advised Mr. Sexton to get away from his stop, but Mr. Sexton ignored him and continued interrupting by yelling and cursing about Officer Green’s lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Sexton did not merely yell briefly at Officer Green; he actively returned to the scene of the traffic stop to continue harassing Officer Green after Officer Green told him to leave, and he stopped his vehicle very close to Officer Green’s cruiser. Officer Green observed that Mr. Sexton was very agitated, believed that Mr. Sexton’s actions were unpredictable, and felt uncertain about whether Mr. Sexton was armed or planned to use his vehicle as a weapon. This created a direct safety concern, forcing Officer Green to abandon his initial investigation of the speeding motorist and release her without citation. Officer Green testified that Mr. Sexton’s behavior impeded his ability to do his job in investigating the traffic stop because his attention from the stop was diverted from the other driver to Mr. Sexton and that Mr. Sexton ignored his order to leave. Believing that Mr. Sexton should be arrested for obstructing official business, Officer Green pursued Mr. Sexton and followed him to his house. According to Officer Green, Mr. Sexton prolonged the traffic stop and impeded Officer Green’s ability to do his job during the stop. Officer Green therefore decided to abort the traffic stop and pursue Mr. Sexton because Mr. Sexton’s behavior and unpredictability created concerns regarding Officer Green’s own safety, the safety of the other driver, and the safety of the general public. Forcing an officer to abandon a lawful traffic stop certainly impedes the officer’s performance of his lawful duties.

[T]he exclusionary rule does not apply to suppress the evidence.

Given the totality of the facts and circumstances, Officer Green had probable cause to detain and arrest Mr. Sexton for obstructing official business. Mr. Sexton’s conduct of interfering with Officer Green’s traffic stop and ignoring Officer Green’s order to leave the area, coupled with Officer Green’s premature termination of the stop, constituted the basis of Officer Green’s determination that the exclusionary rule does not apply to suppress the evidence. Mr. Sexton obstructed official business. Officer Green personally observed the offense, so he had probable cause to initiate the stop. Mr. Sexton’s detention and eventual arrest, even though made by an officer outside of his jurisdiction, did not violate his constitutional rights, and thus the exclusionary rule does not apply to suppress the evidence. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court erred in overruling Mr. Sexton’s motions to suppress and dismiss the obstructing official business charge.

[W]hen Officer Green believed that Mr. Sexton may have been intoxicated or having a mental health breakdown while driving, outweighed any possible restraint there may have been on Mr. Sexton’s liberty interest.

We acknowledge that Mr. Sexton also argued that Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution contains virtually identical language to that of the Fourth Amendment but provides greater protections than the Fourth Amendment. State v. Craig, 2019-Ohio-4962, ¶ 22 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Brown, 2015-Ohio-2438. “[U]nder the greater protections against unreasonable searches and seizures provided by the Ohio Constitution, the government’s interest in permitting the officer to then make an arrest outside of that officer’s jurisdiction must outweigh the individual’s privacy rights, or will be found to violate the defendant’s rights under the Ohio Constitution.” Id., citing Brown at ¶ 21, 25. Even in consideration of this balancing test, we find that the government’s interest in this case outweighed the restraints on Mr. Sexton’s privacy rights. The interest in protecting the other driver and the public from Mr. Sexton’s erratic behavior, particularly when Officer Green believed that Mr. Sexton may have been intoxicated or having a mental health breakdown while driving, outweighed any possible restraint there may have been on Mr. Sexton’s liberty interest.

Established Case Law – Failure to Comply with an Order of a Police Officer

Mr. Sexton was also charged with a violation of O.R.C. §2921.331(A), which prohibits an individual’s failure to comply with a lawful order or direction of a police officer who is invested with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. In State v. Redd, 2004-Ohio4689, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), we considered the meaning of the term “lawful order” and explained that it reasonably encompasses the officer’s lawful exercise of his authority over the direction, control, or regulation of traffic. The “lawful order” of a police officer contemplated by O.R.C. §2921.331(A) is one that involves the offender’s act or omission in operating a motor vehicle, which by law an officer is charged with authority to direct, control, or regulate. Id. at 15 ¶ 19. We explained that it was “only necessary that the officer be charged by law with authority to direct it and that the offender fails to comply with the officer’s particular direction.” Id; see State v. Wilburn, 2025-Ohio-4312, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.) (“the police officer must be engaged in traffic regulation at the time the order is given.”).

Mr. Sexton Argues the Law Did Not Apply to Him

Mr. Sexton contends that Officer Green did not issue a “lawful order or direction” to him as a “police officer invested with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic.” He asserts that the charge against him for failure to comply should have been dismissed because, under the facts of this case, there were no circumstances giving rise to a violation of O.R.C. 2921.331(A) and “the law simply [did] not apply.”

Court Concludes the Law Did Apply to Mr. Sexton

The factual allegations giving rise to the failure to comply charge against Mr. Sexton occurred when Officer Green pursued Mr. Sexton for obstructing official business, observed Mr. Sexton making marked lane and turn signal traffic violations, and activated his cruiser lights to stop Mr. Sexton, and Mr. Sexton failed to stop for Officer Green. As already explained, when an officer has probable cause to initiate a stop because he personally observed a traffic violation, the officer’s extraterritorial traffic stop in contravention of O.R.C. §2935.03 does not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Moreover, when Officer Green pursued Mr. Sexton, Officer Green already had probable cause to believe that Mr. Sexton had committed the crime of obstructing official business in his presence. When an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, the balancing of private and public interests is not in doubt, and the arrest is constitutionally reasonable.

Mr. Sexton’s detention and arrest for failure to comply, even though made by an officer outside of his jurisdiction, did not violate his constitutional rights.

Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances, we conclude that Officer Green’s observations of Mr. Sexton’s traffic violations gave Officer Green probable cause to give an order and signal Mr. Sexton to pull over. Mr. Sexton refused to do so. Mr. Sexton’s refusal to pull over constituted the basis of Officer Green’s conclusion that he failed to comply with an order and gave Officer Green probable cause to arrest and charge him with a violation of O.R.C. §2921.331(A). Additionally, Officer Green had a duty to protect the public from any danger potentially posed by Mr. Sexton. The government’s interest in protecting the public again outweighed the restraints on Mr. Sexton’s privacy rights, particularly when Officer Green believed that Mr. Sexton may have been intoxicated while driving. Mr. Sexton’s detention and arrest for failure to comply, even though made by an officer outside of his jurisdiction, did not violate his constitutional rights, and thus the exclusionary rule did not apply to suppress the evidence. We cannot say that the trial court erred in overruling Mr. Sexton’s motions to suppress and dismiss the failure to comply charge.

[T]he stop in this case was constitutionally valid.

We want to emphasize, as noted in Jones, that the General Assembly chose not to provide any remedy for a violation of O.R.C. §2935.03(A)(1). Jones, 2009-Ohio-316, at ¶ 21, 23 (“We share the concerns that appellees express about law-enforcement officers who violate the territorial requirements of R.C. 2935.03. However, as discussed above, the remedy for a violation of the statute falls within the realm of the legislative branch.”). Like the Court in Jones, we are not in the position to rectify this by elevating a violation of O.R.C. §2935.03 to a Fourth Amendment violation subject to the exclusionary rule, particularly when the stop in this case was constitutionally valid.

In his second assignment of error, Mr. Sexton argues that his convictions for obstructing official business and for failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer were not supported by sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Obstructing Official Business

Statute and Established Case Law

Mr. Sexton was found guilty of obstructing official business in violation of O.R.C. §2921.31(A), which includes five essential elements: “‘(1) an act by the defendant, (2) done with the purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay a public official, (3) that actually hampers or impedes a public official, (4) while the official is acting in the performance of a lawful duty, and (5) the defendant so acts without privilege.’” State v. Morrow, 2023-Ohio2891, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Kates, 2006-Ohio-6779, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.). “A person 18 acts purposely when it is the person’s specific intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender’s specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.” O.R.C. §2901.22(A).

“An affirmative act is required in order to support a finding that an individual was guilty of obstructing official business.” State v. Harris, 2015-Ohio-5378, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), citing North Ridgeville v. Reichbaum, 112 Ohio App.3d 79, 84 (9th Dist. 1996). “In order to commit obstructing official business, an individual must commit ‘an overt act done with an intent to obstruct the officers’ and the act must succeed in actually hampering or impeding the officers.” State v. Davis, 2017-Ohio-5613, ¶ 37 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Crawford, 2013-Ohio-4398, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.).

Mr. Sexton Argues he Did Not ‘Actually’ Impede Officer Green

Regarding the obstructing official business charge, Mr. Sexton contends that there was no evidence that he actually impeded Officer Green from conducting the traffic stop. Mr. Sexton argues that Officer Green merely claimed that, because of perceived safety concerns after his interaction with Mr. Sexton, he felt it necessary to terminate the traffic stop and chose to terminate the stop when he could have finished it.

The evidence demonstrated that Mr. Sexton’s actions actually impeded Officer Green from completing the traffic stop.

During the trial, Officer Green testified that he ordered Mr. Sexton to leave the area, but Mr. Sexton persisted in interrupting his traffic stop by remaining at the scene and continuing to yell and curse at him. Officer Green stated that, after observing Mr. Sexton’s agitation and erratic, unpredictable behavior, he was concerned about the safety of himself, the other driver, and the general public. He testified that he was unsure if Mr. Sexton was armed and that Mr. Sexton’s behavior impeded his ability to do his job in investigating the traffic stop because his attention from the stop was diverted to Mr. Sexton. After observing Mr. Sexton’s behavior, Officer Green believed that Mr. Sexton may have been intoxicated or experiencing a mental health breakdown and thus may have been operating a vehicle while impaired. Considering the circumstances, Mr. Sexton believed that he had no choice but to abandon the traffic stop and pursue Mr. Sexton, who had obstructed official business and may have been posing a risk to the public. The evidence demonstrated that Mr. Sexton’s actions actually impeded Officer Green from completing the traffic stop.

Mr. Sexton, without privilege, repeatedly yelled and cursed at Officer Green during the traffic stop of the other driver.

Given the testimony presented at trial, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence of obstructing official business when Mr. Sexton, without privilege, repeatedly yelled and cursed at Officer Green during the traffic stop of the other driver; Mr. Sexton did so with the purpose of obstructing Officer Green from performing his lawful duty in conducting the stop because Mr. Sexton believed Officer Green was outside of his jurisdiction; and Officer Green’s execution of his duties were, in fact, impeded when he terminated the traffic stop to pursue Mr. Sexton for Mr. Sexton’s obstruction and investigate his concerns about Mr. Sexton’s erratic, potentially dangerous behavior. This was enough to persuade a reasonable trier of fact that the elements of obstructing official business had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Although Officer Green was outside of his jurisdiction at that time, he personally observed Mr. Sexton’s traffic violations while in pursuit of him, and Mr. Sexton was required to comply with his orders because Officer Green had authority to manage traffic.

Mr. Sexton was also found guilty of failure to comply with an order of a police officer. Under O.R.C. §2921.331(A), Mr. Sexton was required to comply with a lawful order or direction of a police officer invested with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. Officer Green pursued Mr. Sexton in his cruiser after observing Mr. Sexton’s obstruction of official business and, as an officer, was invested with the authority to direct, control, and regulate traffic. Although Officer Green was outside of his jurisdiction at that time, he personally observed Mr. Sexton’s traffic violations while in pursuit of him, and Mr. Sexton was required to comply with his orders because Officer Green had authority to manage traffic. The record plainly shows that Mr. Sexton did not comply with Officer Green’s orders to pull over or to come from his vehicle to the street once Officer Green was outside of his house. This was also enough to persuade a reasonable trier of fact that the elements of failure to comply with the order of a police officer had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Mr. Sexton’s second assignment of error is overruled.

Note: There was a third appeal based on the jury instructions.  Like the first two appeals, the jury instruction appeal was also overruled, however, that analysis is not included in this article.

Conclusion and Holding

Having overruled Mr. Sexton’s three assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Information for this article was obtained from State v. Sexton, 2026-Ohio-2636.

State v. Sexton, 2026-Ohio-2636 was issued by the Second District Appellate Court on July 10, 2026 and is binding in the following Ohio counties: Champaign, Clark, Darke, Greene, Miami and Montgomery.

Lessons Learned

Can Law Enforcement Stop a Vehicle Outside of the Officer’s Territorial Jurisdiction? 

Maybe.

The Supreme Court of Ohio has issued two decisions on stopping vehicles outside of an officer’s territorial jurisdiction:

On April 3, 2002 the Supreme Court of Ohio issued State v. Weideman, 94 Ohio St.3d 501 (2002) and the court held “The state’s interest in protecting the public from a person who drives an automobile in a manner that endangers other drivers outweighs Weideman’s right to driver unhindered … As Officer Rarrick’s detention of defendant under the circumstances presented here did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the trial court was not required to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop and detention.”.

On June 23, 2015 the Supreme Court of Ohio issued State v. Brown, 143 Ohio St. 3d 444 (2015) and the court held “A traffic stop for a minor misdemeanor made outside a police officer’s statutory jurisdiction or authority violates the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.”.

In the Weideman case, on Sunday May 24, 1998, Ravenna Police Officer David Rarrick observed Ms. Pam Weideman driving erratically, as she crossed a double yellow line and almost head-on collided with Officer Rarrick.  He turned around and stopped Ms. Weideman.  At that point he called for the Ohio State Highway Patrol and Sgt. Don Dunbar arrived and charged Ms. Weideman with OVI as she tested .239 BAC.  Ultimately the Supreme Court of Ohio determined that the stop was objectively reasonable because Ms. Weideman a danger to the public.

In the Brown case, On Wednesday March 16, 2011 the police officer stopped Mr. Terence Brown for a lane violation outside of her jurisdiction.  Following the stop and canine alert, the officer searched the vehicle and found 120 oxycodone tablets and a baggie of marijuana, when marijuana was illegal.  The Supreme Court of Ohio suppressed the drugs because the traffic stop occurred outside of the officer’s territorial jurisdiction for a minor misdemeanor.

Was Miami Township Police Officer Kurtis Green objectively reasonable to stop Mr. Sexton outside of his territorial jurisdiction?

Yes.

Mr. Sexton drove up to Officer Green during his traffic stop and informed Officer Green that he was outside of Miami Township.  Officer Green told him to leave and the following occurred “Mr. Sexton pulled away, circled the parking lot, and returned to Officer Green’s location. Mr. Sexton stopped his vehicle close to the door of the cruiser and began to yell, curse, and interfere with the stop again.”. Based on these HIGHLY unusual behaviors Officer Green cleared the initial traffic stop and followed Mr. Sexton and attempted to stop him.  During this traffic stop attempt the following occurred “When Officer Green activated his lights to signal Mr. Sexton to stop, Mr. Sexton gestured with a middle finger and ignored him. Mr. Sexton did not stop until after he pulled into his driveway, located on Pinnacle Park Drive in Moraine.”.

Consequently, the traffic stop of Mr. Sexton was analogous to Officer Rarrick’s traffic stop of Ms. Weideman as both presented a reasonable danger to the community. Here the court explained the lawfulness of Officer Green’s traffic stop; “The interest in protecting the other driver and the public from Mr. Sexton’s erratic behavior, particularly when Officer Green believed that Mr. Sexton may have been intoxicated or having a mental health breakdown while driving, outweighed any possible restraint there may have been on Mr. Sexton’s liberty interest.”.

Did Mr. Sexton Commit the Act of Obstructing Official Business?

Yes.

Obstructing Official Business O.R.C. §2921.31(A) “‘(1) An act by the defendant, (2) Done with the purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay a public official, (3) That actually hampers or impedes a public official, (4) While the official is acting in the performance of a lawful duty, and (5) The defendant so acts without privilege.

Mr. Sexton REPEATEDLY hampered and impeded Officer Green in the performance of his official duties.  The legal analysis on Obstructing Official Business [OOB] is not a close call.  Mr. Sexton was a textbook example of OOB by interrupting Officer Green during the traffic stop and informing him that he was not in Miami Township.  Immediately thereafter he circles Officer Green’s traffic stop that raised significant safety concerns of a potential ambush.  Consequently the court held “This was enough to persuade a reasonable trier of fact that the elements of obstructing official business had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”.

Did Mr. Sexton Commit the Act of Failure to Comply with an Order of a Police Officer?

Yes.

Failure to Comply with the Signal or Order of a Police Officer O.R.C. §2921.331

(A) No person shall fail to comply with any lawful order or direction of any police officer invested with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic.

(B) No person shall operate a motor vehicle so as willfully to elude or flee a police officer after receiving a visible or audible signal from a police officer to bring the person’s motor vehicle to a stop.

In this case the court described Mr. Sexton’s behaviors that comported with the Failure to Comply statute “When Officer Green activated his lights to signal Mr. Sexton to stop, Mr. Sexton gestured with a middle finger and ignored him. Mr. Sexton did not stop until after he pulled into his driveway, located on Pinnacle Park Drive in Moraine. Other Miami Township officers immediately arrived to assist Officer Green. Outside of Mr. Sexton’s house, Officer Green and the other officers exited their cruisers and ordered Mr. Sexton to come from his driveway to the street where the officers were located. Mr. Sexton refused, stating that he would wait for a Moraine police officer to arrive before complying with their orders.”.

Based on these behaviors the court concluded “Although Officer Green was outside of his jurisdiction at that time, he personally observed Mr. Sexton’s traffic violations while in pursuit of him, and Mr. Sexton was required to comply with his orders because Officer Green had authority to manage traffic.”.

Pre-Sent Arms!  Miami Township Police Officer Kurtis Green and Attorney Kent Depoorter should be highly commended for investigating, charging, prosecuting and successfully defending the appeal of Mr. Sexton. Well done!

Does your agency train on Jurisdictional Limits?

Don’t fail your training.

Don’t let your training fail you!

Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!

Robert H. Meader Esq.