But the imperative of a policy does not make each jot and tittle of it a constitutional imperative. A search that imperfectly complies with department policies still passes muster absent proof that the officers sought to circumvent the Fourth Amendment.

Does a ‘Complete Physical Inventory’ Include Locked Containers?

When faced with a policy requiring officers to inventory all “articles and property” contained in a car, for example, we interpreted that to “include closed containers” and their contents.

Henderson v. New Holland

No. 26 – 3051

Sixth Circuit Appellate Court

August 7, 2026

Why does Bob Meader think this case important?

Henderson v. New Holland reinforces three important principles. First, probable cause requires only a reasonable probability, NOT certainty. Second, the Sixth Circuit held that a department policy requiring a “complete physical inventory” may encompass locked containers, even when the policy does not expressly mention locked containers. Most importantly, the court reaffirmed that an alleged violation of departmental policy does not, by itself, rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation.

Background

New Holland is a small town in south-central Ohio with a population of about 800. New Holland Village, Ohio, United States Census Bureau. One of its residents is Cody Henderson.

Note: Throughout the case the Sixth Circuit Appellate Court refers to Chief William Lawless as officer.  I corrected is title throughout this article.

Mr. Henderson’s Vision of Fields Full of Hemp Blowing in the Wind

Mr. Henderson came to New Holland with the hope of expanding his CBD oil business. While visiting a friend’s farm near New Holland, Mr. Henderson “received a vision” in which he “witnessed the fields full of hemp, blowing in the wind.” After Mr. Henderson secured a promise of funding from an investor, he left Washington Court House, also in Ohio, and moved to New Holland in 2022 with plans to establish an “Organic Hemp Farm.”

Mr. Henderson, the White Rastafarian Would Not be Profiled

Not long after Mr. Henderson moved to New Holland, he became suspicious of one of the village’s police officers, the non-eponymously (we venture) named police chief, William Lawless. Mr. Henderson first noticed Chief Lawless when he saw his police cruiser trailing him as he rode his motorcycle down the village’s main street. When the cruiser turned and drove away, that seemed to be the end of it. But Mr. Henderson did not like being “followed . . . with no reason.” He decided to turn the tables and opted to follow the police car. After catching up to the cruiser, Mr. Henderson pulled next to it and “began having words” with Officer Lawless. Mr. Henderson, who is a white Rastafarian, told Chief Lawless that he would “not put up with being profiled, targeted, and harassed in this small town.” Before long, another driver sped by, and the officer drove away to perform a traffic stop.

Mr. Henderson is Cited for Multiple Violations

About a week later, on September 13, 2022, Officer Chief Lawless was on patrol with another officer, Darnell Pate. When a black Prius approached the village “at an excess rate of speed,” Officer Pate used a radar gun to clock the car going 47 miles per hour, which exceeded the village’s 35-miles-per-hour speed limit. The officers stopped the car and told the driver, Mr. Henderson, that he was speeding. Mr. Henderson insisted that he had not been speeding. Officer Pate responded that “the side of the road isn’t the place to argue.” The officers eventually issued Mr. Henderson citations for speeding, not wearing a seat belt, failing to present his driver’s license, having an improperly dark window tint, and driving with an expired vehicle registration.

Mr. Henderson Stopped for Expired Tags and Refuses to Exit the Vehicle

Another week brought another encounter. On September 22, Officers Chief Lawless and Officer Pate saw Mr. Henderson driving the same black Prius with the same expired registration tags. They stopped Mr. Henderson. Mr. Henderson filmed the encounter on his cell phone. When Officer Pate approached the car, Mr. Henderson refused to roll the window down more than an inch or two, even after Officer Pate expressed his safety concerns about the dark tinted windows. Officer Pate asked Mr. Henderson to step out of the vehicle.

Mr. Henderson Insists He Did Not Consent to an Inventory Search

After Mr. Henderson exited the car, Officer Chief Lawless told Mr. Henderson that he had cited him for expired tags once before and that he had seen Mr. Henderson driving the still-unregistered car at another time and gave Mr. Henderson a break by not citing him again at that point. Because Mr. Henderson still had not updated his registration tags, Officer Chief Lawless told him that he was “not allowed to legally drive” his car until he renewed the registration. The officers told Mr. Henderson that they would have to impound his car until he renewed its registration, and told him to sit on the curb away from the car so they could conduct an inventory search. When the officers began to search the vehicle, Mr. Henderson insisted that he did not consent to the search, yelled at the officers, refused to sit down, and walked toward them. At that point, the officers arrested Mr. Henderson for “not cooperating” and put him in the back of the police cruiser.

Inventory – Forced Open Locked Black Tote

The inventory search revealed a large black tote locked with a padlock. The officers forced the tote open and discovered large quantities of hemp, CBD, and similar substances. Unsure of the legality of these substances, the officers spoke with a deputy of the Pickaway County Sheriff’s Department who had arrived on the scene. At the deputy’s suggestion, the officers called the county prosecutor’s office for guidance and received advice to send the materials to a lab for testing. The officers arrested Mr. Henderson for obstruction of official business and brought him to the county jail. When Mr. Henderson tested positive for COVID-19, however, they could not incarcerate him. They decided instead to release Mr. Henderson with a citation. Mr. Henderson received a list of the property contained within his black tote, which remained in police custody along with his car. Mr. Henderson updated his registration and received his car and property back. The county prosecutors dismissed all of the charges against him, apparently because the substances were all legal forms of hemp.

1983 Lawsuit – Malicious Prosecution, Conversion and Civil Conspiracy

Mr. Henderson filed a lawsuit in federal court against the two officers and the Village of New Holland. Invoking § 1983, he alleged violations of his rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments as well as several state-law malicious prosecution, conversion, and civil conspiracy claims. The court dismissed the claims against Officer Pate, who was murdered in an unrelated incident before Mr. Henderson filed the complaint.

Partial Summary Judgment

After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified-immunity and Monell grounds. The district court granted the motion as to all claims against the Village and most claims against Officer Lawless. But it allowed the Fourth Amendment and malicious prosecution claims to proceed against the officer.

Pro Bono Counsel is Assigned

Chief Lawless appeals the denial of qualified immunity as to the surviving claims. Mr. Henderson obtained pro bono appellate counsel, Connie Gong, who skillfully discharged her duties in this case.

Established Case Law – Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity protects officers from “the time, expense and risk of money-damages actions unless they violate clearly established constitutional rights.” Moore v. Oakland County, 126 F.4th 1163, 1167 (6th Cir. 2025) . It “reflects the reality” that subjecting officers to money-damages suits for “uncertain violations of the Constitution” would “dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.” Aaron v. King, 171 F.4th 822, 826 (6th Cir. 2026) (quoting in part Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 404 (2019)).

Because no constitutional violation occurred at each point, we need not address the clearly established prong of the inquiry.

To overcome a qualified immunity defense, Mr. Henderson bears the burden of demonstrating that Chief Lawless violated a constitutional right and that the right was clearly established. Sumpter v. Wayne County, 868 F.3d 473, 480 (6th Cir. 2017). Mr. Henderson alleges that Chief Lawless violated his Fourth Amendment rights at three junctures. Because no constitutional violation occurred at each point, we need not address the clearly established prong of the inquiry.

Established Case Law – Probable Cause for Traffic Stops

Mr. Henderson claims that Chief Lawless violated the Fourth Amendment when he (and Officer Pate) stopped him for speeding on September 13. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from “unreasonable . . . seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop constitutes a “seizure of the occupants of the vehicle,” Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014) , and requires a “reasonabl[e]” basis to justify it, United States v. Stevenson, 43 F.4th 641, 644 (6th Cir. 2022).

As a side note, it is not clear what “level of justification” the Fourth Amendment requires before an officer may conduct a stop for a civil traffic violation. Id. at 645; see Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 263 n.7 (2007) (citing inconsistent Supreme Court precedent on this point); King v. City of Rockford, 97 F.4th 379, 391 n.3 (6th Cir. 2024) (noting that our precedent “has been inconsistent”). Some cases say that reasonable suspicion suffices. Heien, 574 U.S. at 60; Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2014); United States v. Jordan, 100 F.4th 714, 718 (6th Cir. 2024). Other cases require probable cause. King, 97 F.4th at 390–91; United States v. Pacheco, 841 F.3d 384, 390 (6th Cir. 2016). We need not resolve the point, as the parties agree that the higher standard (probable cause) applies, and we conclude that the officers met that standard.

Probable cause “is not a high bar.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018)

Probable cause “is not a high bar.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018). It requires “only a probability or substantial chance” based on the “totality of the circumstances,” that a driver “has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense,” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). An officer has probable cause to pull over a driver when he “observes [the] motorist violate a traffic law.” United States v. Lott, 954 F.3d 919, 923 (6th Cir. 2020). A radar gun offers one way, though not the only way, for an officer to identify a speeding car. Probable cause exists when a radar gun shows that a car exceeds the speed limit. See United States v. Littleton, 15 F. App’x 189, 192 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Norton, 893 F.3d 464, 466–67 (7th Cir. 2018).

One other consideration overlays this inquiry. The Fourth Amendment requires officers to “be reasonable,” “not to be perfect.” Heien, 574 U.S. at 60. Because “reasonable men make mistakes,” an officer’s misapprehension of a relevant fact or point of law does not defeat a finding of probable cause. Id. at 61. So, for example, an officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment if he “stop[s] a motorist for traveling alone in a high-occupancy vehicle lane, only to discover upon approaching the car that two children are slumped over asleep in the back seat.” Id. at 57. Nor does a constitutional violation occur when an officer makes a traffic stop based on his reasonable misunderstanding of traffic regulations. Id. at 60–61. An officer’s reasonable mistake in conducting a traffic stop, then, does not undermine the existence of probable cause. Id. at 61.

Chief Lawless had probable cause to stop Mr. Henderson.

Chief Lawless had probable cause to stop Mr. Henderson. He saw Mr. Henderson driving toward the village “at an excess rate of speed.” He asked Officer Pate to deploy his radar. Officer Pate “confirm[ed]” that Mr. Henderson “was traveling in excess of the posted speed limit.” The radar read-out gave the officers a “reasonable ground” to stop Mr. Henderson. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)

Mr. Henderson was Speeding

Chief Lawless reasonably relied on what the radar gun showed. No evidence suggests that the radar gun malfunctioned, and Officer Chief Lawless confirmed that Officer Pate “used proper technique” when verifying Mr. Henderson’s speed. Even if that were not the case, even if the radar gun misfired or the officers somehow measured Mr. Henderson just before rather than just after he entered the village, the worst that could be said is that the officers made a mistake in ascertaining Mr. Henderson’s speed within the city. But such a reasonable mistake, as shown, does not defeat the existence of probable cause. Heien, 574 U.S. at 60–61.

[H]e has not created a “genuine dispute” of “material fact”

Mr. Henderson resists this conclusion, claiming he slowed down from 47 miles per hour (under the 55-miles-per-hour speed limit outside the village) to 34 miles per hour before he reached the village (under the 35-miles-per-hour speed limit within the village). His deposition testimony to this effect, he contends, creates a “dueling narrative” that undermines Chief Lawless’s account and defeats summary judgment. But a stop “based on mistakes of fact” does not undermine probable cause so long as the mistakes are “reasonable.” Heien, 574 U.S. at 61 . Based on his own visual observations and Officer Pate’s radar-gun confirmation, Chief Lawless reasonably found that Mr. Henderson violated the town’s speed limit. Even if Mr. Henderson is right, even in other words if an error occurred in measuring the speed of Mr. Henderson’s decelerating vehicle, that mistake does not fall on the unreasonable side of the line. That means that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred either way. And that means that he has not created a “genuine dispute” of “material fact” with respect to the officers’ probable cause determination.

To constitutionalize a requirement that officers detect a driver’s speed with Chief Lawless precision would erase the “probable” from “probable cause.” …

Probable cause in the end requires just that: probability, not certainty.

The question at hand, it is well to remember, is not whether Mr. Henderson actually exceeded the New Holland speed limit. It is whether the officers had probable cause to believe that he did. To constitutionalize a requirement that officers detect a driver’s speed with Chief Lawless precision would erase the “probable” from “probable cause.” At the same time, that approach would turn a good many speeding tickets into potential § 1983 jury trials in which the officer and driver could provide dueling evidence about whether the driver actually exceeded the posted speed limit. If you doubt us, ask yourself how many speeding tickets are issued each year to drivers who think they decelerated before they approached a small town with a slower speed limit. All of this explains why an actual traffic violation need not occur for officers to have probable cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983). They need only to identify a “substantial chance” that a violation occurred or was about to occur. Wesby, 583 U.S. at 51. Probable cause in the end requires just that: probability, not certainty. No Fourth Amendment violation occurred.

Appeal – Vehicle Search Violated the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment generally requires that police obtain a warrant before conducting a search. United States v. Whitlow, 134 F.4th 914, 919 (6th Cir. 2025). A “well-defined exception” to this general rule, however, permits inventory searches of an impounded car. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987).

Established Case Law – Vehicle Inventory

To fit the exception, the inventory search must have two features. One: a “warrantless inventory search may only be conducted if police have lawfully taken custody of a vehicle.” United States v. Hockenberry, 730 F.3d 645, 658 (6th Cir. 2013). To impound a car lawfully, the officers must invoke “standard criteria” and “something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” United States v. Snoddy, 976 F.3d 630, 634 (6th Cir. 2020). Two: an inventory search “may not be undertaken for purposes of investigation.” United States v. Jackson, 682 F.3d 448, 455 (6th Cir. 2012). Consistent with the first requirement, the officers must follow “standardized criteria . . . or established routine” to ensure that the search does not become “a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.” Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990). While police departments have discretion in shaping those criteria, an inventory policy or routine should set guidelines regarding whether and when to search a seized vehicle, Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375–76, and the permissible scope of the search, Wells, 495 U.S. at 3–4. See United States v. Alexander, 954 F.3d 910, 915 (6th Cir. 2020).

Established Case Law – Inventory Searches Cannot be Used for an Investigative Search

Through it all, “the question is not whether the policy was complied with to the T.” Hockenberry, 730 F.3d at 661 . We do not condition the Fourth Amendment on “mechanical” adherence to police department policies. United States v. Kimes, 246 F.3d 800, 805 (6th Cir. 2001) . We instead treat compliance with such policies as one means of sifting out officers trying to “hide an investigative search under the pretext of an inventory search.” Snoddy, 976 F.3d at 634. The Fourth Amendment permits an inventory search that does not comply in every way with a police department’s guidelines so long as the evidence does not indicate that the officers used the inventory search as an end-run around the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and warrant requirements. See United States v. Rogers, 861 F. App’x 8, 16–17 (6th Cir. 2021). As the Supreme Court put the point in rejecting a related claim that the police engaged in a pretextual stop: “[I]t is a long leap from the proposition that following regular procedures is some evidence of lack of pretext to the proposition that failure to follow regular procedures proves (or is an operational substitute for) pretext.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816 (1996).

The officers had ample reasons to impound Mr. Henderson’s car.

By these lights, this inventory search satisfied the Fourth Amendment. The officers, to start, lawfully impounded Mr. Henderson’s car. New Holland’s impoundment ordinance permits officers to impound “[a]ny vehicle . . . connected with[] the commission of a crime.” That “standard[ized]” criterion existed here. Snoddy, 976 F.3d at 634 . Driving with an expired registration amounts to a misdemeanor under Ohio law. Ohio Rev. Code § 4503.11(A), (D). There is no better way to ensure compliance with a registration requirement by a repeat offender than to impound his car. The officers had ample reasons to impound Mr. Henderson’s car based on its expired registration, which they observed at least twice before they seized the car.

The New Holland Police Department’s inventory policy sets parameters for when to conduct an inventory search (“[w]hen officers impound a vehicle”) and the scope of that search (“always do a COMPLETE physical inventory of its contents”). The officers followed these requirements.

Do Policy Violations Rise to a Fourth Amendment Violation?

Mr. Henderson objects to this conclusion, first on the ground that Chief Lawless violated the village’s inventory policy. The policy requires an officer to list all property found in a vehicle and to make “[t]wo copies” of the resulting written inventory. While the officers wrote a list of Mr. Henderson’s property in the car, they made only one copy of it and the copy seemed to include only those objects contained in Mr. Henderson’s black tote. These policy violations, says Mr. Henderson, render the search unconstitutional.

A search that imperfectly complies with department policies still passes muster absent proof that the officers sought to circumvent the Fourth Amendment.

But the imperative of a policy does not make each jot and tittle of it a constitutional imperative. A search that imperfectly complies with department policies still passes muster absent proof that the officers sought to circumvent the Fourth Amendment. See Hockenberry, 730 F.3d at 661. That consideration is particularly salient when the violated procedure covers nothing more than after-the-fact paperwork. “The post-discovery listing of items discovered in a search . . . has no pertinent connection to the discovery” of those items and thus may not on its own invalidate an inventory search. Kimes, 246 F.3d at 805; see Hockenberry, 730 F.3d at 661 (approving of inventory search despite officers “omit[ing] many items from” the written inventory in violation of department policy); Rogers, 861 F. App’x at 16–17; United States v. Mundy, 621 F.3d 283, 293–94 (3d Cir. 2010).

That amounts to an everyday feature of legitimate law enforcement, not a constitutional violation.

Nor did the officers misuse the impoundment as a pretext for an illicit investigatory search. The record confirms that Chief Lawless had a perfectly legitimate reason for the impoundment and subsequent inventory search of Mr. Henderson’s car. Despite serial warnings and one prior citation, Mr. Henderson repeatedly drove an unregistered vehicle through the village. After watching Mr. Henderson continually flout the law, Chief Lawless fixed the problem in the most direct and easy-to-remedy way: He impounded Mr. Henderson’s car until he renewed his registration. That amounts to an everyday feature of legitimate law enforcement, not a constitutional violation.

Does an Inventory of a Vehicle Include Locked Containers?

Mr. Henderson separately argues that the policy gave insufficient direction over how to conduct an inventory search. In doing so, he points to Florida v. Wells, in which the Supreme Court held that a policy does not satisfy the Fourth Amendment if it fails to provide guidance “with respect to the opening of closed containers” found during an inventory search. 495 U.S. at 4–5. New Holland’s policy, he adds, did not provide sufficient direction to police officers about whether to open the locked black tote found in Mr. Henderson’s car.

A Complete Inventory

But “closed containers” are not “buzz words,” much less magic words, that a policy must explicitly describe and explicitly address. United States v. Jackson, 2025 WL 80372, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 2025) . When faced with a policy requiring officers to inventory all “articles and property” contained in a car, for example, we interpreted that to “include closed containers” and their contents. United States v. Hill, 1990 WL 208767, at *1, *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 18, 1990); accord Jackson, 2025 WL 80372, at *4 (policy requiring search of “vehicle’s contents” required opening closed containers in the car). Just so here. The policy for this 800- person village directs officers to “always do a COMPLETE physical inventory of its contents.” R.56-8 at 29.

Established Case Law – Closed Containers

That is in line with our sister circuits. They interpret policies that require a comprehensive inventory of all property to apply to the opening of closed containers. See Mundy, 621 F.3d at 290–91; United States v. Thompson, 29 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Wilson, 938 F.2d 785, 789 (7th Cir. 1991).

Opening Closed Containers is Objectively Reasonable

The officers in the end fairly construed the policy to require them to open the black tote and inventory its contents. No Fourth Amendment violation occurred.

Appeal – Obstructing Official Business

Mr. Henderson next claims that Officer Chief Lawless violated the Fourth Amendment when he arrested Mr. Henderson for obstructing the inventory search.

Established Case Law – Probable Cause

The Fourth Amendment requires officers to have probable cause of a crime to arrest someone. Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 592–93 (6th Cir. 1999). The officers arrested Mr. Henderson for violating New Holland Ordinance 136.06 by obstructing official business. R.64 at 10. The question, then, is whether Chief Lawless had probable cause to believe that Mr. Henderson violated this law. Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 573 (6th Cir. 2005). Because the ordinance directly mirrors Ohio Revised Code §2921.31(A), we may look to our interpretations of § 2921.31 to shed light on the meaning of the ordinance. Patrizi v. Huff, 690 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2012).

Established Case Law – Obstructing Official Business

Under Ohio law, obstruction of official business requires “(1) the performance of an unprivileged act (2) with the purpose of preventing, obstructing or delaying the performance by a public official of an authorized act within his official capacity (3) which hampers or impedes the public official in the performance of his lawful duties.” Patrizi, 690 F.3d at 464 . To meet the “unprivileged act” element, an individual must commit an “affirmative act.” Lyons, 417 F.3d at 573. Simply “doing nothing, such as refusing to provide identification or other information to the police,” does not suffice. Id. at 574. Someone who “walk[s] towards [an] officer” who attempts to “keep a ‘buffer’ between himself and” the individual, on the other hand, commits an affirmative act. State v. Mahalli, 2016 WL 936170, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2016). “[F]ailure to respond to a law enforcement officer’s request . . . coupled with loud, boisterous, and uncooperative conduct,” also constitutes an affirmative act. State v. Shoe, 2018 WL 3621052, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. July 30, 2018) .

Mr. Henderson, for starters, committed a parade of affirmative obstructive acts.

Gauged by these standards, Chief Lawless had probable cause to believe that Mr. Henderson obstructed official business. Mr. Henderson, for starters, committed a parade of affirmative obstructive acts. Barely a minute into the interaction, Mr. Henderson attempted to close and lock his car to prevent the officers from accessing it for the inventory search. Mr. Henderson did not relent once the search began. Even after the officers repeatedly asked Mr. Henderson to sit on the sidewalk and away from the car for their safety, Mr. Henderson continued to walk toward them as they conducted the inventory search. Throughout, Mr. Henderson engaged in loud, boisterous conduct, yelling at the officers that he “d[idn’t] have to cooperate” and interrupting their attempts to explain the procedure for the inventory search. These actions satisfied the affirmative act test and count as the performance of an unprivileged act.

Mr. Henderson’s own words show that he intended to obstruct the inventory search.

The officers had probable cause for the other two elements too. Mr. Henderson’s own words show that he intended to obstruct the inventory search. His cell phone footage records him repeatedly yelling at the officers and repeatedly trying to stop the search. He forced the officers to spend several minutes corralling him before they could begin the inventory search in earnest, all the while hampering the performance of their lawful duties. All of this suffices to establish probable cause that he obstructed official business.

Mr. Henderson insists that the impoundment and inventory search were unlawful and that he had a right to resist them. But as explained above, Chief Lawless’s actions complied with the relevant ordinances and the Fourth Amendment.

Mr. Henderson Admitted Evidence that Established his Guilt

Mr. Henderson points to case law saying that “refusing to comply with an officer’s request is not enough” to qualify as an affirmative act under Ohio law. Jones v. City of Elyria, 947 F.3d 905, 915 (6th Cir. 2020). But Jones stands only for the common-sense proposition that “simply . . . doing nothing” does not constitute an affirmative act. Lyons, 417 F.3d at 574; see Jones, 947 F.3d at 915 (pointing to “a suspect’s refusal to turn over his driver’s license” as an example). Mr. Henderson, as his own cell phone footage confirms, did not insist on doing nothing.

He may not now transfigure the incident that he took care to capture on video into something it wasn’t.

Mr. Henderson contends that his conduct did not meaningfully hamper or impede the officers’ search. In his telling, his actions led to only a “‘few seconds’ of disagreement.” (quoting Smith v. City of Wyoming, 821 F.3d 697, 716 (6th Cir. 2016)). But Mr. Henderson’s video shows and tells another story. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). His belligerence and refusal to comply with basic commands led to several minutes of confrontation and delay. He may not now transfigure the incident that he took care to capture on video into something it wasn’t. No Fourth Amendment violation occurred.

Note: There was another appeal for Malicious Prosecution but that appeal was also denied.  The Malicious Prosecution appeal is not evaluated in this article.

Information for this article was obtained from Henderson v. New Holland, No. 26 – 3051 (6th Cir., 2026).

Henderson v. New Holland, No. 26 – 3051 (6th Cir., 2026) was issued by the Sixth Circuit Appellate Court on August 7, 2026 and is binding in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee.

Lessons Learned

Traffic Stop for Speed – Mr. Henderson alleged that Chief Lawless did not have probable to stop for speeding as the court explained “Mr. Henderson claims that Chief Lawless violated the Fourth Amendment when he (and Officer Pate) stopped him for speeding on September 13.”. To stop a vehicle for a traffic violation, the U.S. Supreme Court held on June 10, 1996 that law enforcement only needs to establish probable cause “Here, the District Court found that the officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners had violated the traffic code. That rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”. Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996). This court when on to detail what is probable cause “Probable cause “is not a high bar.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018).”.  Consequently, Chief Lawless established probable cause to stop Mr. Henderson.

Vehicle Inventory and the Locked Container – Law enforcement may inventory the contents of a vehicle prior to impound in accordance with the police agency policy.  The Vehicle Inventory was established by the U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday July 6, 1976 “[W]e conclude that in following standard police procedures [vehicle inventory by the]… police was not “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).  In this case Chief Lawless discovered a locked container and opened it “The inventory search revealed a large black tote locked with a padlock. The officers forced the tote open and discovered large quantities of hemp, CBD, and similar substances.”.  Was Chief Lawless permitted to open the locked container?  That depended upon his agency policy, irrespective of his position as chief of police.  Here the court identified the New Holland Police Inventory Policy “The New Holland Police Department’s inventory policy sets parameters for when to conduct an inventory search (“[w]hen officers impound a vehicle”) and the scope of that search (“always do a COMPLETE physical inventory of its contents”).”  Though the court determined that a ‘COMPLETE physical inventory of its contents’ included locked containers, I believe that the policy should be clearer and included some language that includes ‘locked containers’.  If the language was more finite, it would have removed a court to evaluate the meaning of ‘COMPLETE physical inventory’.  Every officer should know and understand their agency’s policy on vehicle inventory and locked containers.

Does a Policy Violation Rise to a Fourth Amendment Violation? No. This is not the first time a defendant or plaintiff has raised this issue.  The U.S. Supreme Court spoke clearly on this issue on March 27, 1985 when the court issued Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).  In that case a Memphis, Tennessee Police Officer Elton Hymon shot Eddie Garner a sixteen burglar who was fleeing from a burglary.   The family of Eddie Garner sued the City of Memphis and the City of Memphis defended Officer Hymon.  The city defense centered on a Tennessee state law and Memphis Police policy that both permitted law enforcement to shoot a fleeing felon.  Tennessee Code Ann. 407-108 (1982) “[I]f after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest.”

However, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the state law and policy explaining “[T]his Court has not simply frozen into constitutional law those law enforcement practices that existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s passage.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 13 (1985)

Seven years after Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), the Sixth Circuit Appellate Court analyzed a civil case where a plaintiff alleged that the Springdale, Ohio Police Department violated their use of force policy and that resulted in a Constitutional violation.  The Sixth Circuit held the legal principal that an agency policy does not determine whether a law enforcement officer’s actions are constitutional or not.  On January 6, 1992 the Sixth Circuit issued Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343 (6th Cir., 1992) and the court explained “A city can certainly choose to hold its officers to a higher standard than required by the Constitutional without being subjected to increased liability under §1983.  To hold that cities with strict policies commit more Constitutional violations than those with lax policies would be an unwarranted extension of the law, as well as a violation of common sense.”.

In Henderson v. New Holland, No. 26 – 3051 (6th Cir., 2026) the court explained “But the imperative of a policy does not make each jot and tittle of it a constitutional imperative. A search that imperfectly complies with department policies still passes muster absent proof that the officers sought to circumvent the Fourth Amendment.”.

Accurate Documentation – Law enforcement should always take the time to document suspect’s behaviors.  Officers body camera video should always comport to what the written report identifies.  In this case the court explained “When the officers began to search the vehicle, Mr. Henderson insisted that he did not consent to the search, yelled at the officers, refused to sit down, and walked toward them. At that point, the officers arrested Mr. Henderson for “not cooperating” and put him in the back of the police cruiser.”.  During his trial and appeal, Mr. Henderson alleged that Chief Lawless did not have probable cause to arrest him for Obstructing Official Business.  But the federal District and Sixth Circuit Appellate Court concluded that Chief Lawless did establish probable cause … “The officers had probable cause for the other two elements too. Mr. Henderson’s own words show that he intended to obstruct the inventory search.”.

Pre-Sent Arms! – Chief Lawless and Zachary T. Weigel, Paul-Michael La Fayette, of FREEMAN, MATHIS & GARY LLP, Columbus, Ohio for their successful litigation in this case.  Well done!

Does your agency train on Vehicle Inventory and Obstructing Official Business?

Don’t fail your training.

Don’t let your training fail you!

Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!

Robert H. Meader Esq.