The failure to issue a traffic citation when there is an indication of a potentially far more significant crime is easily excused when more pressing issues are being addressed.
State v. Batchilli, 2007 – Ohio – 2204
State v. Fulton
Eleventh District Appellate Court
Portage County, Ohio
May 12, 2025
Why is this case important?
State v. Fulton provides the application of a pre-textual stop. Mr. Fulton’s vehicle was seen at a known drug house and was later stopped for a minor traffic violation that resulted in his arrest for possession of methamphetamine. The trial court held the stop was unreasonable because it was a pre-textual stop. The Eleventh District Appellate Court overturned the trial court.
Background
Appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals from the judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas that granted the motion to suppress of appellee, Mr. Zachary Fulton. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
After being bound over from the Ravenna Municipal Court, a grand jury indicted Mr. Fulton on three counts: (1) Aggravated possession of drugs, a third-degree felony, in violation of O.R.C. §2925.11; (2) Aggravated trafficking in drugs, a third-degree felony, in violation of O.R.C. §2925.03; and (3) Possessing criminal tools, a fifth-degree felony, in violation of O.R.C. §2923.24.
Motion to Suppress
Mr. Fulton filed a motion to suppress, contending the officers did not have probable cause to stop the vehicle; no consent to search the vehicle was requested or given; and any un-Mirandized statements, admissions against interest, and related physical evidence should be suppressed.
Two Officers Testified
The trial court held a hearing at which the State presented as witnesses the two officers from the Ravenna Police Department that were involved in the traffic stop. Officer Zachary Milush testified that on April 5, 2024, he was on patrol during the midnight shift in Ravenna. At approximately 1:14 a.m., he observed a pick-up truck exiting the side driveway of Taco Bell. The vehicle failed to stop prior to the sidewalk before exiting onto the public roadway of South Walnut Street. The officer further explained the driver, later identified as Mr. Fulton, did stop the vehicle to look for oncoming traffic before turning onto the roadway but “stopped beyond the sidewalk.”

Mr. Zacharay Fulton was exiting the Ravenna Taco Bell located at 308 East Main Street when he failed to stop prior to the sidewalk when he exited on to South Walnut Street in violation of O.R.C. §4511.431(A). That stop led to a consensual search of Mr. Fulton’s backpack, discovery of methamphetamine, a conviction and appeal. Was the traffic stop lawful? The Taco Bell is represented by the red tear drop marker.
Failure to Stop Prior to Driving Onto or Across a Sidewalk
Officer Milush notified Officer Dominic Nicolino of the traffic violation (pursuant to O.R.C. §4511.431(A), “stopping prior to driving onto or across sidewalk”) as a “professional courtesy.” Officer Nicolino was nearby and had observed the pick-up truck at a known drug location earlier in the evening. Officer Nicolino effectuated the traffic stop, and Officer Milush assisted by standing with Mr. Fulton on the roadside while Officer Nicolino obtained consent from Mr. Fulton to search the vehicle.
On cross-examination, Officer Milush testified that the only way to exit the parking lot was to stop and yield to any oncoming traffic, as Mr. Fulton did. He could not recall any traffic when Mr. Fulton turned onto the roadway, and there were no stop signs or other signs by the exit.
Mr. Fulton Consented to Search His Backpack and it Contained Methamphetamine
Officer Nicolino testified that he observed Mr. Fulton’s vehicle leave “a location that [the police] are very familiar with in the city.” He advised Officer Milush the vehicle was at Taco Bell. Officer Milush reported that he observed a traffic code violation, prompting Officer Nicolino to effectuate a traffic stop. Officer Nicolino further testified he made contact with Mr. Fulton, advised him of the violation, and obtained Mr. Fulton’s driver’s license. He did a second approach of the vehicle and asked Mr. Fulton if he had insurance and anything illegal in the vehicle. Mr. Fulton advised him there was marijuana inside the vehicle and, upon further questioning, disclosed the marijuana was from a dispensary but that he had not purchased it directly from there. Mr. Fulton denied there were any other illegal drugs or weapons in the vehicle and granted the officer consent to search. Upon further questioning, Officer Nicolino clarified that Mr. Fulton said “sure” and gestured. Officer Nicolino asked Mr. Fulton to step out of the vehicle and performed a search of Mr. Fulton’s pockets, locating a marijuana bowl. He then had Mr. Fulton stand by the roadside with Officer Milush while he searched the inside of the vehicle. Officer Nicolino located a backpack with methamphetamine inside. After reading Mr. Fulton his Miranda rights, Mr. Fulton refused to speak with him and requested a lawyer.
You’re gonna do what you’re gonna do, and threw his hands up
On cross-examination, Officer Nicolino testified both his cruiser and body cameras recorded the traffic stop, but neither were introduced into evidence. He believed Officer Milush advised him Mr. Fulton stopped on the sidewalk, and he agreed that anybody exiting the Taco Bell must cross over the sidewalk at some point. Officer Nicolino had been parked “catty-corner” to the Taco Bell and was not able to observe Mr. Fulton go through the drive-thru or leave the restaurant’s parking lot. Mr. Fulton informed the officer that the vehicle he was driving belonged to a friend and that his vehicle was being worked on at the residence the officer had been watching. Officer Nicolino disputed that when Mr. Fulton said, “You’re gonna do what you’re gonna do, and threw his hands up,” Mr. Fulton did not give him consent to search. Officer Nicolino stated he did not witness the traffic violation, and he did not charge Mr. Fulton with a traffic violation.
Mr. Fulton Vehicle was at a Known Drug House
The trial court granted Mr. Fulton’s motion to suppress, making the following findings of facts:
Officer Nicolino of the Ravenna Police Department observed Defendant’s vehicle at a known drug house. The vehicle left and Officer Nicolino notified Officer Milush to keep an eye on the vehicle. The vehicle pulled into the Taco Bell parking lot, as observed by Officer Milush.
Mr. Fulton’s Traffic Violation and Consent
Upon exiting the Taco Bell parking lot, it did not stop behind the sidewalk, but stopped on the sidewalk to let other traffic pass. There is no stop sign, there is no exit parking lot sign. Officer Milush then notified that [the vehicle] did not stop behind the sidewalk to Officer Nicolino and Officer Nicolino proceeded to stop the vehicle. Officer Nicolino did not witness the traffic violation and Officer Nicolino did not charge him with a traffic violation. Upon stopping the vehicle, he approached the vehicle, asked the Defendant to consent to search, if there were any dangerous drugs. He was granted consent to search, and drugs were found.
The trial court concluded there was “insufficient probable cause to stop the vehicle.” And the … traffic violation was a pretext to stop the vehicle, that no traffic citation was issued
The trial court concluded there was “insufficient probable cause to stop the vehicle.” More specifically, the court found that the observed traffic violation was a pretext to stop the vehicle, that no traffic citation was issued, and that Mr. Fulton did stop the vehicle for oncoming traffic prior to exiting the parking lot.
The State Appealed
Established Case Law
The police may constitutionally stop a motorist if the seizure is premised upon either a reasonable suspicion or probable cause. State v. Eggleston, 2015-Ohio- 958, ¶ 20 (11th Dist.). Specifically, “[T]he United States Supreme Court has stated that a traffic stop is constitutionally valid if an officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” Mays at ¶ 7. “[I]f an officer’s decision to stop a motorist for a criminal violation, including a traffic violation, is prompted by a reasonable and articulable suspicion considering all the circumstances, then the stop is constitutionally valid.” Id. at ¶ 8. In addition, “[w]here a police officer stops a vehicle based on probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution even if the officer had some ulterior motive for making the stop, such as a suspicion that the violator was engaging in more nefarious criminal activity.” Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 (1996), syllabus.
Further, “[W]here a police officer conducts a traffic stop at the request of another officer, it is the knowledge of the requesting officer that determines the presence of articulable suspicion or probable cause.” State v. McClellan, 2010-Ohio-314, ¶ 39 (3d Dist.), citing Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297 (1999).
Review of Facts
In this case, the trial court found Officer Nicolino observed Mr. Fulton’s vehicle at a known drug house; he notified Officer Milush to keep an eye on the vehicle; upon exiting the Taco Bell parking lot, the vehicle did not stop behind the sidewalk, but stopped on the sidewalk to let other traffic pass; there is no stop sign or exit parking lot sign; Officer Milush notified Officer Nicolino that the vehicle did not stop behind the sidewalk; Officer Nicolino effectuated a traffic stop; Officer Nicolino did not witness the traffic violation; Officer Nicolino did not charge Mr. Fulton with a traffic violation; after stopping the vehicle, Officer Nicolino asked Mr. Fulton to consent to a search; and drugs were found in the vehicle.
Established Case Law that Refutes Trial Court Holding
In its findings of fact, the trial court found that a traffic violation was observed but erroneously drew the legal conclusion that there was no probable cause to stop the vehicle, citing it as a mere pretext for the stop. However, “[W]here a police officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion that any offense, including a minor traffic offense, is occurring, the officer is permitted to stop the vehicle, even if the stop is allegedly pretextual.” State v. Cunningham, 2009-Ohio-4394, ¶ 14 (7th Dist.), citing Erickson at 11-12; accord State v. Howard, 2010-Ohio-2817, ¶ 30 (11th Dist.). Further, whether the officer issued a traffic citation for the observed violation is not determinative. The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that “the constitutionality of a prolonged traffic stop does not depend on the issuance of a citation.” State v. Batchili, 2007-Ohio-2204, ¶ 21. “The failure to issue a traffic citation when there is an indication of a potentially far more significant crime is easily excused when more pressing issues are being addressed.” Id. at ¶ 20.
Conclusion and Holding
Accordingly, based on the findings of fact, the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress. The State’s sole assignment of error has merit.
The judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas is reversed.
Information for this article was obtained from State v. Fulton, 2025 – Ohio – 1707.
State v. Fulton, 2025 – Ohio – 1707 was issued on May 12, 2025 by the Eleventh District Appellate Court and is binding in the following Ohio Counties: Ashtabula, Geauga, Lake, Portage and Trumbull.
Lessons Learned:
- Pre-Textual Stop Established Case Law – On June 10, 1996 the twenty-eighth anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court issuing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, (1968), the same court issued Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996). In Whren, on January 18, 1990 D.C. Metro Police stopped a Nissan Pathfinder for fail to signal. Upon approaching the vehicle an officer observed Mr. Whren with two large bags of crack cocaine in his lap. Whren appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court that held “Here the District Court found that the officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners [Mr. Whren] had violated the traffic code. That rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the evidence thereby discovered admissible.”. This is commonly known as a pre-textual stop because the officers in Whren were in an unmarked vehicle in plain clothes and enforced a minor traffic violation. [Note: In Ohio law enforcement must be in a marked vehicle, in uniform to conduct traffic stops.] However, the U.S. Supreme Court opined that law enforcement could enforce traffic laws irrespective of an underlying motivation, so long as the driver violates a traffic regulation. For more on Whren see: Wh(r)en is it lawful to stop a vehicle?. For more on pre-textual case law see: https://www.objectivelyreasonable.com/?s=whren
- Knowledge of the Law – Both Officer Zachary Milush and Officer Dominic Nicolino were knowledgeable of O.R.C. §4511.431(A) Stop Prior to Driving on Sidewalk Area – “The driver of a vehicle …. Emerging from … driveway within a business … district shall stop the vehicle … immediately prior to driving onto a sidewalk.”. In this case Mr. Fulton failed to stop his vehicle prior to crossing the sidewalk as he left Taco Bell and drove onto South Walnut Street. The trial court judge held that this traffic violation originated with a pre-textual stop and therefore was unreasonable. Based on Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996) and O.R.C. §4511.431(A) Stop Prior to Driving on Sidewalk Area, this traffic stop was objectively reasonable. If either of the officers were questioned about stopping ‘everyone’ who fails to stop for a violation of O.R.C. §4511.431(A) a former co-worker of mine would have opined Yes!. I stop every vehicle I observe that violates O.R.C. §4511.431(A) who was previously seen at a known drug house. This stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment it was simply exceptional police work.
- Failure to Issue a Traffic Citation – If an officer stops a person for a traffic violation, he does not have to issue a traffic citation for that violation. On May 23, 2007 the Supreme Court of Ohio held “The failure to issue a traffic citation when there is an indication of a potentially far more significant crime is easily excused when more pressing issues are being addressed.”. State v. Batchilli, 2007 – Ohio – 2204
- Can an Officer Stop a Vehicle Based on Another Officer’s Observation? On February 1, 2010 Ohio’s Third District Appellate Court held “However, where a police officer conducts a traffic stop at the request of another officer, it is the knowledge of the requesting officer that determines the presence of articulable suspicion or probable cause.” State v. McClellan, 2010 – Ohio – 314
- Pre-Sent Arms! Ravenna Officer Zachary Milush, Officer Dominic Nicolino and the Portage County Prosecutor’s Office should be highly commended for their investigation, arrest, prosecution and appeal of Mr. Fulton. Well done!
Does your agency train on Pre-Textual Stops?
Don’t fail your training.
Don’t let your training fail you!
Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!