Nor were officers required to obtain a new warrant once Mr. Simpson took possession of the vehicle, which was previously (and lawfully) equipped with a tracking device.
U.S. v. Simpson
Sixth Circuit Appellate Court
May 21, 2025
Why is this case important?
U.S. v. Simpson details that a GPS warrant and tracking is tethered to a vehicle not a person.
Background
Officers discovered a large-scale drug distribution scheme operating in Toledo, Ohio. From those revelations, Mr. Christopher Simpson, Mr. Marquise Figures, and Mr. Antuan Wynn were charged with a host of federal crimes related to trafficking in cocaine, cocaine base, and fentanyl. The three defendants were tried in a joint proceeding. And except as to one charge against Mr. Wynn, the jury returned guilty verdicts as to all three.
In this consolidated appeal, defendants challenge their convictions as well as their resulting sentences. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Note: The appeal includes Mr. Christopher Simpson, Mr. Marquiese Figures and Mr. Antuan Wynn. This article will only review one part of Mr. Simpson’s appeal – placement and maintenance of a vehicle GPS.
A taskforce of federal and local law enforcement officers in Toledo learned that Mr. Jackie Green was distributing narcotics in the city’s north end. Further investigation revealed a complex web of interdependent drug trafficking activity among Mr. Green and his associates involving powder and crack cocaine as well as fentanyl.
[S]elf-proclaimed “middleman king” in the Toledo drug trade
A leading figure in the distribution scheme was Anthony Duff, a self-proclaimed “middleman king” in the Toledo drug trade. Mr. Duff bought fentanyl from Mr. Green for resale. Transactions went in the other direction as well, albeit for a different narcotic, with Mr. Duff supplying powder cocaine to Mr. Green for resale. As evidence at trial later showed, Mr. Duff and Mr. Green were at the center of a vast drug distribution chain wherein a number of individuals supplied bulk drug amounts to Mr. Duff or Mr. Green, with others then obtaining those drugs and reselling them to end users.
Mr. Duff and Mr. Wynn separately pooled their money to buy a kilogram of cocaine.
In this vein, Mr. Duff utilized a host of associates to further his efforts. Among those in his criminal network were Antuan Wynn, a childhood friend and one of Mr. Duff’s key sources for cocaine. Over the course of several months, Mr. Duff regularly purchased large quantities of powder cocaine from Mr. Wynn and regarded Mr. Wynn’s supply as superior to his other suppliers’ product. In one instance, Mr. Duff and Mr. Wynn separately pooled their money to buy a kilogram of cocaine. They worked closely with each other in these ventures. For example, Mr. Duff would tell Mr. Wynn what his retail drug distributors needed, and Mr. Duff would procure the necessary amounts. Mr. Duff would warn Mr. Wynn of potential police activity. Mr. Wynn would also front drugs to Mr. Duff. When Mr. Duff did pay Mr. Wynn cash for the cocaine, Mr. Wynn was not concerned that Mr. Duff would short him.
Cooking Up the Conspiracy One Crack Rock at a Time
Another figure in the conspiracy was Marquise Figures, who helped Mr. Duff distribute drugs to consumers. Over a six-month period, Mr. Duff sold Mr. Figures a quarter-ounce or a half-ounce of cocaine every week or two. And Mr. Figures, as well as his purchasers, would, in turn, sometimes cook the powder cocaine into crack for redistribution.
Mr. Green told Mr. Duff that he had sold his 2018 blue Dodge Charger for 330 grams of fentanyl and $5,000 in cash.
But where was Mr. Green obtaining the fentanyl he sold to Mr. Duff and others? A phone call between Mr. Green and Mr. Duff offered a clue. During the call, Mr. Green told Mr. Duff that he had sold his 2018 blue Dodge Charger for 330 grams of fentanyl and $5,000 in cash. Officers were familiar with the Charger, having previously obtained a warrant to attach a GPS tracker to the vehicle. Upon learning of the sale, agents, aided by the GPS tracker, found the vehicle parked on Pomeroy Street, with Mr. Christopher Simpson sitting in the driver’s seat. Mr. Simpson, it turns out, was no stranger to the taskforce. He had been heard in earlier-traced phone calls purchasing powder cocaine from Mr. Green to convert into crack cocaine for retail sale. Mr. Simpson’s relationship with Mr. Green was thus both as a customer and supplier, as the incident with the Charger revealed. Officers arrested Mr. Simpson and impounded the vehicle. During an inventory search of the car, officers discovered Percocet pills and marijuana.

The Blue Charger was tracked and impounded on Pomeroy Street in Toledo, Ohio
Presented with the taskforce’s findings, a grand jury indicted 27 individuals on various drug crimes, including Mr. Duff and Mr. Green, the most prominent members of the alleged criminal network. Most defendants entered guilty pleas. But Mr. Simpson, Mr. Figures, and Mr. Wynn opted to go to trial. Each faced a charge of conspiring with 12 other defendants from December 2019 until November 2021 to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §846. They likewise faced at least one charge each of using a telecommunications facility to facilitate a drug felony in violation of 21 U.S.C. §843(b). Mr. Wynn was separately charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) for possessing a firearm as a felon and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) for distributing cocaine on or around November 12, 2020. Mr. Wynn pleaded guilty to the §922(g)(1) charge, leaving the remaining charges to be resolved at the ensuing consolidated trial. At the trial’s close, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges, save for the cocaine distribution charge against Mr. Wynn.
The district court sentenced Mr. Simpson and Mr. Wynn to within-Guidelines sentences of 300 [25 years] and 224 months [18.5 years] respectively. Mr. Figures, for his part, received a below-Guidelines sentence of 70 months [just under six years]. All three defendants filed timely appeals.
Note: Only one of Mr. Simpson’s appeals will be reviewed in this article.
We begin with Christopher Mr. Simpson, who challenges his conviction on constitutional grounds and his sentence due to purported procedural flaws.
Invoking the Fourth Amendment, Mr. Simpson challenges the district court’s motion-to- suppress ruling regarding the seizure of the Dodge Charger and the subsequent search of the car. In considering the issue, we review the district court’s legal conclusions with fresh eyes, while considering any of its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Williams, 68 F.4th 304, 307 (6th Cir. 2023).
The Vehicle IS the Contraband
The Fourth Amendment familiarly protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. With “reasonableness” being the “touchstone” of our analysis, Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (quotation omitted), several considerations guide whether the seizure and search of the Charger—itself an “effect” for Fourth Amendment purposes, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976)—were unreasonable. In view of historical concerns over evidence in a vehicle being whisked away before law enforcement can secure a warrant, we allow warrantless searches of an automobile if officers have probable cause (i.e., a “fair probability”) to believe the car contains evidence of a crime. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150–54 (1925) (discussing founding era legislation empowering customs officials to search ships for contraband); United States v. Lumpkin, 159 F.3d 983, 986 (6th Cir. 1998). This right extends to instances where the vehicle itself, as opposed to its contents, is the contraband sought. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 565 (1999).
[O]fficers may lawfully seize an automobile from a public place when they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle is forfeitable contraband.
Accordingly, officers may lawfully seize an automobile from a public place when they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle is forfeitable contraband. Id. at 566. And once the vehicle is impounded, officers may conduct an inventory search without violating the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Smith, 510 F.3d 641, 651 (6th Cir. 2007).
Taken together, these principles licensed the officers’ stop and search of the Charger acquired by Mr. Simpson. Consider first the seizure. Officers knew from recorded conversations that Mr. Green, a known drug dealer, had traded his blue Charger for 330 grams of fentanyl and cash.
In the end, all of this was by the books.
This evidence alone made it fairly probable that the car had been used to facilitate the distribution of a controlled substance, rendering the vehicle forfeitable contraband under federal and state law. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2981.02(A)(1) (West 2025). To effectuate the seizure, officers used a warrant-backed GPS tracker to identify the Charger’s location. See White, 526 U.S. at 565–66. After discovering and seizing the vehicle in a public place, officers then proceeded to conduct an inventory search of the car in accordance with Toledo Police Department tow policy. In the end, all of this was by the books. See Smith, 510 F.3d at 651.
Nor were officers required to obtain a new warrant once Mr. Simpson took possession of the vehicle, which was previously (and lawfully) equipped with a tracking device.
Mr. Simpson resists this conclusion on several fronts. He first contends that officers had no right to utilize the GPS device once they learned the car to which it was attached had a new owner. But the warrant permissibly allowed officers to use a tracking device on the Charger without respect to the vehicle’s ownership. Probable cause for a search warrant, after all, need not “be tied to any particular person.” United States v. Gibson, 996 F.3d 451, 462 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)); see also United States v. Sanchez- Jara, 889 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2018) (recognizing no constitutional flaw with “a warrant authorizing a GPS device that enables police to track the location of a moving car” no matter where it goes). Nor were officers required to obtain a new warrant once Mr. Simpson took possession of the vehicle, which was previously (and lawfully) equipped with a tracking device. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404, 409–10 (2012) (recognizing no physical trespass amounting to a Fourth Amendment search when a tracking device had been lawfully placed on a vehicle before coming into the defendant’s possession); see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984).
With officers having demonstrated probable cause that the Charger itself was contraband, officers were justified in seizing the vehicle.
Perhaps, as Mr. Simpson emphasizes, officers did not have probable cause to understand that the vehicle would contain evidence of a crime. Either way, that is not the relevant inquiry. With officers having demonstrated probable cause that the Charger itself was contraband, officers were justified in seizing the vehicle. See White, 526 U.S. at 565–66. Mr. Simpson’s view that the seizure of the car was pretextual not only belies the record, but is also irrelevant in the probable cause context, where officers’ subjective motives “play no role.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
Information for this article was obtained from U.S. v. Simpson, No. 23 – 3311 (2025).
U.S. v. Simpson, No. 23 – 3311 (2025) was issued by the Sixth Circuit Appellate Court on May 21, 2025 and is binding in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee.
Lessons Learned:
- Vehicle IS the Contraband – When a vehicle is the contraband, it may be seized under both O.R.C. §2981.02(A)(1) and 21 U.S.C. §853(a)(2). In this case the taskforce established probable cause that the 2018 blue Dodge Charger was traded for 330 grams of fentanyl and $5,000 in cash, thus developing the vehicle from property to contraband. On May 17, 1999 the U.S. Supreme Court held “The Fourth Amendment does not require the police to obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when they have probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband.” Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999) Consequently, the two statutes and the White case established a solid legal foundation for the unidentified taskforce to impound the Blue Dodge Charger from Pomeroy Street in Toledo, Ohio.
- Vehicle Search – On July 6, 1976 the U.S. Supreme Court issued South Dakota v. Opperman 428 U.S. 364 (1976) and the court held “[W]e conclude that in following standard police procedures … the conduct of the police was not ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.”. In this case the taskforce impounded the Blue Charger in accordance with Toledo Police impound policy and therefore the search was objectively reasonable. For more on vehicle impounds see: https://www.objectivelyreasonable.com/category/impounding/
- Is a Vehicle GPS Tethered to the Vehicle or a Person? In most cases, a GPS search warrant is secured for a vehicle, not the individual operating or owning it. This means that if the vehicle is driven by multiple people—or even if ownership transfers, a new warrant is not required. However, if the warrant specifically limits GPS tracking to a particular person, then a new warrant may be required. When in doubt, officers should always consult with their prosecutor or legal advisor for guidance. In this case when Mr. Jackie Green sold his Blue Charger for fentanyl and $5,000 cash a new GPS search warrant was not required.
- Pre-Sent Arms! The unidentified task force and the federal prosecutors should all be highly commended for their investigation, conviction and appeal work on this case. Well done!
Does your agency train on search warrants and vehicle impounds?
Don’t fail your training.
Don’t let your training fail you!
Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!