We therefore hold that Detective Olsen was not entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Salter’s suggestive identification claim.

 

Salter v. Detroit

Sixth Circuit Appellate Court

March 21, 2025

Why is this case important?

Salter v. Detroit provides a review of the requirements in Ohio for a photo line-up and the duty to inform the prosecution of exculpatory evidence. 

Background

Aaron Mr. Salter spent 15 years in prison for a deadly shooting he did not commit. Mr. Salter’s conviction rested on a single eyewitness’s testimony identifying him as one of two shooters. There was no physical evidence or other witness tying Mr. Salter to the murder. Instead, the eyewitness identified Mr. Salter when the lead investigator, Detective Donald Olsen, showed him a single mug shot of only Mr. Salter and said that police had already arrested one of the shooters. That same eyewitness testified that he also identified a different man as the shooter from a photo array. And that man more closely resembled the witness’s description of the shooter than Mr. Salter. The investigator’s file also contained a separate closeup photo of that man, suggesting he was a suspect. Mr. Salter claims that Detective Olsen failed to disclose any of this information, leading to an unfair trial and his wrongful conviction.

In this civil rights lawsuit, Mr. Salter contends that Detective Olsen violated his constitutional rights in two ways: first, by withholding favorable evidence pointing to a different suspect, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and second, by conducting an unnecessarily suggestive identification process that led to the eyewitness’s false identification of Mr. Salter. Detective Olsen moved for summary judgment on both these claims, arguing that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, and Detective Olsen appealed.

Because we do not have interlocutory jurisdiction over several aspects of this appeal, we dismiss in part. For the parts we review on the merits, we affirm.

Hanging Out, Drinking, Getting High and Getting Shot

In the early morning hours of August 6, 2003, Mr. Jamar Luster and two of his friends were “hanging out, drinking, and ‘getting high’” on a porch in Detroit, Michigan. Then gunshots rang out. Mr. Luster had an obstructed view from the porch, but he managed to get a view of two shooters 35 to 40 feet away from him. One of the shooters was shorter and fired a pistol, and a taller man fired a long gun. Mr. Luster escaped by jumping over the porch banister and crawling to safety, though he was wounded. Tragically, a man standing near the porch died of a gunshot wound.

Victim Describes Suspects

Rookie homicide detective Donald Olsen responded to the shooting and spoke with Mr. Luster in the hospital about four hours later. Mr. Luster told Detective Olsen that one of the shooters was “Rob,” a 5’7″ Black man in his mid-20s armed with a pistol whom Mr. Luster had seen in the neighborhood. Mr. Luster said he’d never seen the second shooter who fired the long gun but described him as “thin.” Id. Mr. Luster also informed Detective Olsen that a man named Earland Collins had shot up the same house about a month before. Mr. Luster described the two shooters in a similar way to another police officer a few hours later: (1) “Rob,” a 5’7″ Black man in his 20s, weighing between 150 and 170 pounds; and (2) an unknown Black man also in his 20s, standing about 6’0″ with a thin build.

Victim Identifies Suspect with a Single Photo

Thus far, Aaron Salter had no role in the story. And at 6’4″ and 250 pounds, he was much bigger than both suspects Mr. Luster described. Yet, with admittedly no articulable basis, Detective Olsen developed a “hunch” that Mr. Salter was “Rob.” Detective Olsen went to Mr. Luster’s house that same morning and showed him a single black-and-white mug shot of Mr. Salter—that is, not in an array of other suspects. At the time, the Detroit Police Department had a policy that said “[W]itnesses should never be shown only a photograph of the suspect.” DPD Policy, R. 36-20, PageID 935. Detective Olsen also told Mr. Luster “the police had picked up the guy with the rifle.” Then Mr. Luster signed a statement written by Detective Olsen identifying the man in the black-and-white mug shot (Mr. Salter) as “Rob.”

Different Photo Lineup – Different Identification

At the same meeting, after Mr. Luster identified Mr. Salter, Detective Olsen showed him a six- person photo array that did not include Mr. Salter. Mr. Luster later testified that he identified two more individuals as shooters from the photo array, one of whom was Earland Collins, the man Mr. Luster said had shot up his house about a month before. Law enforcement records listed Collins at 6’2″ and 200 pounds—a close match with Mr. Luster’s description of the taller shooter.

Exculpatory Evidence was Not Disclosed

Detective Olsen did not disclose Mr. Luster’s identification of Mr. Collins as a shooter to Mr. Salter or his defense attorney. There was also a large closeup photo of Mr. Collins, with some attached hand- written notes, that never made it from the police file to the prosecutor or Mr. Salter’s lawyer.

Detective Olsen Opined the Case Sucked

Detective Olsen decided to submit the case against Mr. Salter to the prosecutor, even though he later explained that he had always thought it “sucked.” Interview Mem., R. 36-18, PageID 930. After all, Mr. Luster was the only eyewitness, and no physical evidence or other testimony connected Mr. Salter to the shooting. Yet Mr. Luster’s identification of Mr. Salter based on the black-and- white mug shot apparently persuaded the prosecutor. The prosecutor sought and obtained an arrest warrant for Mr. Salter and initiated a murder prosecution against him in Michigan state court.

Objective to Single Suspect Photo Array was Denied

At a pretrial hearing, Mr. Luster reversed course on a few key details. He identified Mr. Salter as the taller shooter with “the big gun”—not the shorter shooter named “Rob.” Mr. Luster also said that he’d seen Mr. Salter “once or twice” before the shooting, which departed from his earlier statement that he’d never seen the taller shooter before. Id. at PageID 818. For his part, Detective Olsen testified that Mr. Luster didn’t identify anyone from the photo array as responsible for the shooting. He also admitted that he could have put Mr. Salter’s mug shot in a photo array but inexplicably chose not to. Mr. Salter objected to Detective Olsen’s single- person show-up as suggestive and moved to suppress Mr. Luster’s identification at the pretrial hearing, but the judge denied his motion.

Convicted and Sentenced to Life Without Parole

At trial, Mr. Luster and Detective Olsen testified about Mr. Luster’s identification of Mr. Salter. Mr. Luster again identified Mr. Salter as the bigger shooter with a “long gun,” even though he first identified Mr. Salter as the smaller assailant with a pistol. Trial Tr., R. 36-11, PageID 838–39. He said he never meant to label Mr. Salter as the shorter shooter named “Rob,” and that Detective Olsen had misquoted him in recording his identification. Detective Olsen testified that while he showed Mr. Luster a photo array without Mr. Salter, the array had “nothing to do” with the shooting and was “directed towards other cases.” Trial Tr., R. 36-12, PageID 895. Mr. Salter was convicted and sentenced to life without parole. Mr. Salter never knew that Mr. Luster had identified Collins as a shooter before he was convicted and sentenced.

Mr. Luster later recanted his identification of Mr. Salter.

Mr. Salter proclaimed his innocence in a letter to the trial judge in the aftermath of the trial. He also maintained his innocence throughout the post-conviction process, but his appeals and collateral attacks failed. Eventually, one of his attorneys discovered that the closeup photo of Collins had been withheld. An investigation by the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Conviction Integrity Unit followed. The CIU investigation yielded evidence that Collins was probably the taller shooter. When a CIU investigator asked Collins who shot Mr. Luster, he responded, “If I tell you, I could get arrested basically.” CIU Investigator Dep., R. 36-24, PageID 995. In his CIU interview, Detective Olsen admitted that the case against Mr. Salter “sucked” because it depended on Mr. Luster’s shaky identification. Interview Mem., R. 36-18, PageID 930. Detective Olsen commented, “[I] would not be shocked or upset if the case is overturned, and I hope you do something with it.” Id. at PageID 931 (cleaned up). In addition, Mr. Luster later recanted his identification of Mr. Salter.

[T]he Michigan court that oversaw Mr. Salter’s trial vacated the judgment against him and ordered him released from prison.

Based on the findings of the CIU investigation, the Wayne County prosecutor joined Mr. Salter’s attorneys in moving the trial court to vacate Mr. Salter’s convictions. Following a stipulation by the parties, the Michigan court that oversaw Mr. Salter’s trial vacated the judgment against him and ordered him released from prison. Mr. Salter had been incarcerated for 15 years.

Summary Judgment is Denied and Appeal

Mr. Salter then filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Detective Olsen violated his due process rights by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence and conducting an improper identification process. Detective Olsen moved for summary judgment on both claims based on qualified immunity. The district court denied Detective Olsen’s motions for summary judgment and reconsideration. He timely appealed.

Mr. Salter’s Brady Claim

To defeat qualified immunity on his Brady claim, Mr. Salter must first demonstrate that Detective Olsen violated his constitutional rights. The Fourteenth Amendment requires prosecutors, police officers, and forensic scientists to disclose favorable evidence to a criminal defendant that is material to their defense. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Clark v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov., — F.4th —, 2025 WL 732838, at *8–9 (6th Cir. Mar. 7, 2025). Police officers must turn over evidence with “apparent” exculpatory value to the prosecutor, who must then disclose that evidence to the defendant. Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 381, 388 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984)). To sustain a Brady claim based on withheld evidence, Mr. Salter must show: (1) the government withheld evidence from Mr. Salter, “either willfully or inadvertently”; (2) the evidence favored Mr. Salter, “either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching”; and (3) the evidence was material, such that its nondisclosure prejudiced Mr. Salter. Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 814 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999)). The district court concluded that Mr. Salter satisfied his burden at summary judgment on each of these elements. Detective Olsen disputes all three elements on appeal but raises arguments that we largely have no jurisdiction to review.

Appellate Court Cannot Resolve Factual Disputes

On the first Brady element, Detective Olsen argues that he did not withhold evidence pointing to Mr. Collins as the shooter. The dissent agrees with him. See Dissenting Op. at 30 n.3. But this is precisely the type of factual dispute that we cannot review at this stage. See Heeter, 99 F.4th at 908. Indeed, Detective Olsen abandons any factual argument in his reply brief, recognizing that we don’t have jurisdiction to resolve such factual disputes in an interlocutory qualified immunity appeal. Detective Olsen’s sole legal argument on this element (which we can review) is without merit. He contends that Mr. Salter must show that Detective Olsen withheld the evidence in “bad faith.” Appellant Br. at 39. But we have rejected the proposition that an officer’s Brady violation requires “bad faith.” Clark, 2025 WL 732838, at *5 (citing Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 388).

Appellate Court Cannot Resolve Whether the Evidence Withheld was Material

Nor do we have jurisdiction over Detective Olsen’s challenge to the district court’s conclusion on the second and third Brady elements—that a reasonable jury could find that the withheld evidence favored Mr. Salter and was material to his defense. In Detective Olsen’s view, and the dissent’s, the withheld evidence was either duplicative of other disclosed evidence or available to Mr. Salter from other sources. See Dissenting Op. at 30–32. So it was neither favorable nor material to Mr. Salter’s defense. But these arguments present “mixed” questions of law and fact. Clark, 2025 WL 732838, at *6. And our court recently clarified that, in the Brady context, we lack jurisdiction to consider such mixed questions in an interlocutory qualified immunity appeal. See id. at *5–7. We therefore cannot reach the merits of Detective Olsen’s arguments on the remaining Brady elements and dismiss them from his appeal.

Clearly Established Law on Withholding Material Evidence

Even if he violated Mr. Salter’s rights under Brady, Detective Olsen contends that he is still entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time, it was not clearly established that Brady applies to police officers. While we have jurisdiction to review this argument, see id. at *7, we will not consider it because Detective Olsen did not raise it in the district court.

In sum, to the extent we have jurisdiction, we reject Detective Olsen’s challenge to the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Mr. Salter’s Brady claim. The claim may proceed to the jury.

Qualified Immunity – Due Process

Suggestive Identification

Turning to qualified immunity, we now consider whether Detective Olsen violated Mr. Salter’s due process rights by using an unduly suggestive identification procedure. See Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 704 (6th Cir. 2007). We analyze suggestive identification claims in two steps. First, we assess whether the identification procedure was “unnecessarily suggestive.” Id. If it was, we consider whether, despite the suggestive procedure, the identification was “nevertheless reliable.” Id. We evaluate these prongs based on the totality of the circumstances. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968).

A Single Purpose Photo is Unduly Suggestive

The district court ruled that Detective Olsen abandoned any argument on the first prong of Mr. Salter’s suggestive identification claim—whether the identification was unnecessarily suggestive. We agree. Detective Olsen has not disputed that the single-person show-up was unduly suggestive. In his motion for summary judgment, he argued only that Mr. Luster “had an independent basis for identification of Mr. Mr. Salter apart from the photograph he was shown.” Put differently, Detective Olsen argued that the identification was reliable, not that it wasn’t unnecessarily suggestive in the first place. And he pursues the same argument on appeal.

Five Factors to Evaluate if the Identification was Reliable

Accordingly, we proceed to the second element of Mr. Salter’s claim—whether the identification was reliable even if the procedure was unnecessarily suggestive.  In assessing reliability, we look at the totality of the circumstances based on five factors: (1) the witness’s opportunity to view the suspect, (2) the witness’s degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the suspect, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the time he identified the suspect, and (5) the time between the crime and the identification. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). Together, these factors weigh in Mr. Salter’s favor.

Limited View of the Suspects, at Night with Limited Lighting

First, Mr. Luster didn’t have a good opportunity to view the shooters. Mr. Luster saw them from 35 to 40 feet away, “at night, with limited lighting.” He also didn’t get a good look at the shooters’ faces in the chaos of the moment.

Smoking Weed and Drinking Hennessy

Second, Mr. Luster’s attention was compromised. During the criminal proceedings, Mr. Luster said he wasn’t drinking or smoking marijuana in the leadup to the shooting, but in this civil litigation, he admitted he had been “smoking weed” and drinking Hennessy. Mr. Luster also testified that his priority was to escape from the shooting, not to identify the people around him.

Physical Description was Distinguishable

Third, Mr. Luster’s description of the shooters bore little resemblance to Mr. Salter. Our caselaw strongly indicates that an identification cannot be reliable if there were significant inconsistencies between the witness’s description of the suspect and the person identified. Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 756 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Webb v. Havener, 549 F.2d 1081, 1086 (6th Cir. 1977)). Mr. Luster described a shorter shooter who was 5’7″ and thin, and a taller shooter who was 6’0″ and also thin. He first said Mr. Salter was the shorter shooter, then testified that Mr. Salter was the taller one. Either way, neither description matched Mr. Salter’s 6’4″ 250-pound frame. And, according to the testimony of a Detroit Police Department representative, Detective Olsen would have automatically received Mr. Salter’s weight and height when he pulled Mr. Salter’s mug shot from the police database and could have seen that they didn’t match.

Mr. Luster identified three different people as the two shooters

Fourth, Mr. Luster told Detective Olsen that he was “not sure” when he identified Mr. Salter as one of the shooters from Mr. Salter’s black-and-white mug shot. To make matters worse, Mr. Luster identified three different people as the two shooters: Mr. Salter based on his single mug shot and two people in the photo array, including Collins. This evidence suggests that Mr. Luster was not certain about his identification of Mr. Salter.

[T]iming is only one factor, and the other four factors all weigh against reliability here

Fifth, timing is the only factor that works in Detective Olsen’s favor. Mr. Luster’s identification came only a matter of hours after the incident. That length of time between “observation and identification” does not undermine the reliability of an identification. See Howard v. Bouchard, 405 F.3d 459, 473 (6th Cir. 2005). That said, timing is only one factor, and the other four factors all weigh against reliability here.

Corrupting Effect of the Single-Person Show-Up

Detective Olsen didn’t present an argument on the traditional reliability factors to the district court. Instead, he relied on Mr. Luster’s purported familiarity with Mr. Salter to argue that the single-person show-up was constitutionally permissible. See Haliym, 492 F.3d at 706 (providing that a court may consider reliability factors that do not fit within the traditional five-factor analysis). And he reiterates that argument on appeal. Mr. Luster’s seemingly limited familiarity with Mr. Salter does not outweigh the “corrupting effect” of the single-person show-up. Manson, 432 U.S. at 116. We have held that a witness’s familiarity with a suspect increases the reliability of an identification. Haliym, 492 F.3d at 706. But Mr. Luster said he knew “Rob”—who later turned out to be Mr. Salter’s cousin—not Mr. Salter. That means Detective Olsen did not show Mr. Luster a photo of the person Mr. Luster claimed to know. In any event, “problems with identification testimony may exist even where the witness is familiar with the [suspect].” Id. Here, multiple problems remain even after we factor in Mr. Luster’s alleged familiarity with Mr. Salter. Even if he knew Mr. Salter, Mr. Luster still had to “sufficiently observe” the shooters to identify them as persons he knew. Id. As explained, he did not have the opportunity to do so. Mr. Luster was also uncertain about his identification of Mr. Salter. And there were glaring discrepancies between Mr. Salter’s physical appearance and Mr. Luster’s description of the shorter shooter—the one Mr. Luster identified as Mr. Salter in a signed statement during the show-up. We have “never found that an identification arising from a suggestive format was anything but unreliable when the witness’[s] prior description of the suspect was significantly inconsistent with the suspect’s actual appearance.” Gregory, 444 F.3d at 756. We won’t depart from that course here.

The risk of a misidentification increases when “the police indicate to the witness that they have other evidence that . . . the person pictured committed the crime.”

Detective Olsen also exacerbated the unreliability of the single-person show-up by telling Mr. Luster that police had already “picked up” the taller shooter—the one Mr. Luster later claimed he had identified as Mr. Salter from the start. The risk of a misidentification increases when “the police indicate to the witness that they have other evidence that . . . the person pictured committed the crime.” Simmons, 390 U.S. at 383. And Detective Olsen only increased that risk by showing Mr. Luster a single photo of Mr. Salter. Gregory, 444 F.3d at 755 (“By presenting only a single suspect to a witness, police convey an implicit message that ‘this is the guy.’”). Under those circumstances, Mr. Luster could have felt pressure to make an identification regardless of his degree of confidence, undermining his identification’s reliability.

Because the unreliable single-person show-up appeared in evidence at Mr. Salter’s criminal trial, it can form the basis of Mr. Salter’s suggestive identification claim.

Detective Olsen further argues that the single-person show-up did not violate Mr. Salter’s “core right” to a fair trial, and thus cannot support a due process claim. Appellant Br. at 46. “It is true that an unduly suggestive identification does not, in and of itself, violate constitutional rights.” Gregory, 444 F.3d at 747. But the admission at trial of such an identification, unless harmless, can violate a criminal defendant’s core due process rights. See Webb, 549 F.2d at 1087. Mr. Luster signed a statement identifying Mr. Salter as a shooter based on the show-up, and that statement was admitted into evidence at Mr. Salter’s trial. At trial, Detective Olsen and Mr. Luster also testified extensively about Mr. Luster’s out-of-court identification. Detective Olsen stated that he showed Mr. Luster “one single photograph that related to the shooting,” a “photograph of Aaron Mr. Salter.” Trial Tr., R. 36-12, PageID 894. And Mr. Luster told the jury that he picked Mr. Salter’s photo “[b]ecause he fit the description of the person that was shooting.” During the same testimony, Mr. Luster also twice identified Mr. Salter as his shooter in court. Because the unreliable single-person show-up appeared in evidence at Mr. Salter’s criminal trial, it can form the basis of Mr. Salter’s suggestive identification claim. See Gregory, 444 F.3d at 735, 745–47.

We therefore hold that Detective Olsen was not entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Salter’s suggestive identification claim.

Information for this article was obtained from Salter v. Detroit, No. 22 – 165.

Salter v. Detroit, No. 22 – 165 was issued by the Sixth Circuit Appellate Court and is binding in the following states: Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee.

Lessons Learned:

  1. Photo Lineup – Law enforcement cannot show a single photo of a suspect to a victim or witness and ask for identification. In Ohio, O.R.C. §2933.83 took effect on July 6, 2010 and provides a detailed process for photo lineups. One specific requirement that would conflict with the process Detroit Police took in this case, is use of a Blind Administrator.  R.C. §2933.83(A)(2) “Blind Administrator” means the administrator does not know the identity of the suspect. “Blind administrator” includes an administrator who conducts a photo lineup through the use of a folder system or a substantially similar system.
  2. Qualified Immunity – In this case the City of Detroit filed for Qualified Immunity that would have ended the lawsuit. Both the District Court [entry level] the Sixth Circuit Appellate Court denied Qualified Immunity based on a previous decision.  On April 14, 1977, the Sixth Circuit Appellate Court evaluated police station identification of a suspect, when the police only showed one in-person suspect to the witness and the court held “This identification was made under circumstances so suggestive that its reliability is seriously impaired even without discrepancies.” Webb v. Havener, 549 F.2d 1081 (6th, 1977). Because the same court had decided a similar case, the Qualified Immunity defense cannot be raised as a defense because this doctrine has been ‘clearly established’.
  3. Exculpatory Evidence – What is exculpatory evidence? A statement or other evidence which tends to justify, excuse or clear the defendant from alleged fault or guilt.  Blacks Law Dictionary, 566 (6th, 1990) On May 13, 1963 the U.S. Supreme Court issued Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and the court held that both law enforcement and the prosecution have an obligation to provide exculpatory information to the defense; We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.  In practical application, law enforcement should provide all evidence to the prosecutor and permit the prosecutor the responsibility to notify the defense of what may be exculpatory.  In this case the detective failed to disclose “Detective Olsen did not disclose Mr. Luster’s identification of Mr. Collins as a shooter to Mr. Salter or his defense attorney. There was also a large closeup photo of Mr. Collins, with some attached hand- written notes, that never made it from the police file to the prosecutor or Mr. Salter’s lawyer.”.  This Brady violation in and of itself, would likely lead to a successful appeal.

Does your agency train on Photo Lineups?

Don’t fail your training.

Don’t let your training fail you!

Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!

Robert H. Meader Esq.