[W]e see no reason why the deputies could not have waited on the public road leading to Mr. Bradley’s driveway while they obtained a search warrant. The only means of egress from the property in a vehicle appears to have been the driveway, which led to a public road. The deputies could have effectuated an arrest had Mr. Bradley driven the car onto the roadway. Further, the deputies could have continued to utilize the drone to ensure that Mr. Bradley did not flee the property on foot.
State v. Bradley
Second District Appellate Court
Clark County, Ohio
January 10, 2025
Why is this case important?
Drones may be lawfully flown over the open fields of a suspect and that information is likely to be admissible in court and to obtain a search warrant. However, physical intrusion on to a suspect’s open fields will be unreasonable if it requires passing through a suspect’s curtilage without an arrest or search warrant, consent or an exigent circumstance.
Information on a Stolen Trailer
In November 2023, the Clark County Sheriff’s Office received information from a person whose trailer had been stolen that the trailer was behind Mr. Billy Bradley’s home. After receiving the tip, Detective #1 arranged to conduct surveillance of Mr. Bradley’s property via drone. Det. #1 received permission to stage the operation from a business located across the street from Mr. Bradley’s home. The drone was piloted by a deputy licensed to pilot a drone and was operated over the property of the business and over a public park adjacent to Mr. Bradley’s property. The drone was not operated over Mr. Bradley’s property.
Note: Detective #1 is identified in the case, I have redacted his name.

Warrantless Drone Search
The images relayed from the drone did not reveal the presence of the trailer. However, deputies observed a red automobile parked beside a barn behind Mr. Bradley’s residence. One of the deputies indicated that the vehicle matched the description of a car that had been reported stolen. A computer check of the license plate confirmed that it matched that of the stolen vehicle. Mr. Bradley was observed seated inside the vehicle and moving objects around in the vehicle’s trunk. At some point, Mr. Bradley removed the license plates.
Consent to Search Resulted in a Stolen Vehicle, Trailer, ATV and a Forklift
Although they did not have a warrant, deputies entered the property and immediately arrested Mr. Bradley. After Mr. Bradley was informed of his constitutional rights, he orally consented to a search of the premises. Deputies discovered several stolen items, including the trailer, an all-terrain vehicle (ATV), and a forklift.
Indicted and the Motion to Suppress is Partially Granted
On December 12, 2023, Mr. Bradley was indicted on four counts of receiving stolen property in violation of O.R.C. §2913.51(A). In January 2024, he filed a motion to suppress evidence. After a suppression hearing, the trial court sustained the motion in part and overruled it in part; it suppressed evidence regarding the ATV, trailer, and forklift but not regarding the automobile.
No Contest Plea and Appeal
Thereafter, Mr. Bradley entered a no contest plea to one count of receiving stolen property, and the other counts were dismissed. The trial court found him guilty and imposed a prison term of 15 months. Mr. Bradley appeals.
Illegal Entry and Arrest
Mr. Bradley’s first assignment of error states as follows:
OFFICERS VIOLATED MR. MR. BRADLEY’S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WHEN THEY CONDUCTED A SEARCH WITHOUT REASONABLE SUSPICION AND ENTERED HIS PRIVATE PROPERTY WITHOUT A WARRANT.
A Lack of Reasonable Suspicion Argument
Mr. Bradley claims the information received by the Sheriff’s Office regarding the stolen trailer did not provide law enforcement with enough reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of Mr. Bradley’s private property. Specifically, he argues there was no information regarding the trustworthiness of the person relaying the information. He further argues that, even if the person was trustworthy, the State’s entry onto his property without a warrant was improper.
Reasonable Suspicion Appeal was Tardy – Dismissed
“It is well-settled law that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal because such issues are deemed waived.” Columbus v. Ridley, 2015-Ohio-4968, ¶ 28 (10th Dist.). More specifically, “[I]f a motion to suppress fails to state a particular basis for relief, that issue is waived and cannot be argued on appeal.” State v. Demus, 2011- Ohio-124, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). Here, Mr. Bradley did not raise the reliability of the informant or the tip in his written motion to suppress, and he did not address the issue at the hearing or in his post-hearing memorandum. Because this argument is raised for the first time in this appeal, we decline to address it.
We next turn to the warrantless entry onto Mr. Bradley’s property. We agree with the trial court that this entry and Mr. Bradley’s subsequent arrest were problematic.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Established Case Law to Search
“The essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment proscription ‘is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.’” State v. Eads, 2020-Ohio-2805, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.). Thus, unless certain exceptions apply, a warrant must be secured in order for a search to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 49 (2000), citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
Established Case Law – Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Whether a search has occurred for Fourth Amendment purposes depends upon whether the government has infringed upon a person’s “legitimate expectation of privacy.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). This inquiry turns on whether an individual has a subjective expectation of privacy and whether that expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.
The “[W]arrantless entry by law enforcement personnel into premises in which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy is per se unreasonable, unless, it falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” State v Harris, 2005-Ohio-399, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.), citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990). Valid exceptions to the warrant requirement include the following: “search of arrestee’s immediate area incident to arrest; inventory search; consent; investigatory stop with protective search incident to arrest or incident to investigatory stop; hot pursuit; exigent circumstances; and plain view.” State v. Thomas, 2015-Ohio-1778, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Adams, 2011-Ohio-5361, ¶ 34 (7th Dist.). “The police ‘bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.’ ” State v. Hodge, 2011-Ohio-633, ¶ 24 (2d Dist.), quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984).
A Lack of Exigency to Enter the Property
Here, the State attempts to justify the warrantless entry under the exigent circumstances exception by claiming that Mr. Bradley had started the car. However, we find no competent evidence in this record to support a finding that Mr. Bradley was preparing to flee the scene in the car. Further, we see no reason why the deputies could not have waited on the public road leading to Mr. Bradley’s driveway while they obtained a search warrant. The only means of egress from the property in a vehicle appears to have been the driveway, which led to a public road. The deputies could have effectuated an arrest had Mr. Bradley driven the car onto the roadway. Further, the deputies could have continued to utilize the drone to ensure that Mr. Bradley did not flee the property on foot.
Stolen Car and Mr. Bradley were Within the Curtilage
The State also attempts to justify the entry by arguing that the area where the car was located and where Mr. Bradley was arrested was an open field not protected by the Fourth Amendment. However, the trial court specifically found that the car was located within the curtilage of the home. The State has not appealed that finding and, based upon the evidence in the record, we agree with the trial court.
The trial court suppressed the evidence of the stolen property located by the deputies after Mr. Bradley’s arrest upon a finding that Mr. Bradley’s consent to the search of his property was “tainted” by the illegal entry and arrest. The State did not appeal that ruling. Thus, we must resolve whether the trial court erred by its failure to suppress the evidence regarding the automobile.
Derivative Evidence
“The derivative-evidence rule, or fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine . . . , requires suppression of evidence that was seized in a seemingly lawful manner but about which police learned because of a prior constitutional violation such as an illegal search or seizure.” State v. McLemore, 2012-Ohio-521, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). “The exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence that is subsequently discovered and derivative of that prior illegality.” Id., citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). However, the independent-source exception to the derivative-evidence rule “provides that if knowledge of the derivative evidence is gained from an independent source, rather than from the government’s own illegality, the derivative evidence may be used.” Id. at ¶ 22, citing, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
[T]he drone surveillance of Mr. Bradley’s property did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights
As discussed in Section III, below, the drone surveillance of Mr. Bradley’s property did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. Further, the car was observed and identified as a stolen vehicle prior to the illegal entry onto Mr. Bradley’s property. Thus, the car was discovered independently of any improper action by the deputies. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the request to suppress evidence concerning the vehicle.
The first assignment of error is overruled.
Drone Surveillance
Mr. Bradley’s second assignment of error states:
THE WARRANTLESS DRONE SEARCH OF MR. MR. BRADLEY’S HOME AND CURTILAGE CONSTITUTED AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.
Mr. Bradley argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the search of his property by the drone did not fall within any recognized exception to the warrant requirement.
Ohio courts have recognized that a property owner has rights in the air space over his or her land. Chance v. BP Chemicals, Inc., 77 Ohio St.3d 17, 25 (1996).
However, those rights are not unlimited. Id. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that aerial surveillance by helicopter or airplane, as a general rule, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989) (a plurality of the court agreed that surveillance by helicopter over a subject’s property at an altitude of at least 400 feet did not require a search warrant). Riley focused on whether law enforcement had had the legal right to be in the airspace it occupied. Id. at 450-451. The question of the lawfulness of law enforcement’s presence turned on whether it had violated Federal Aviation Administration rules or other laws. Id. at 451-452. See also California v. Ciraolo, 479 U.S. 207 (1986).
Conclusion – Drone Search was Lawful
There is a dearth of case or statutory law concerning the use of drones as related to the protections of the Fourth Amendment. However, the Fifth District Court of Appeals has upheld the use of drone surveillance in criminal investigations, finding it no more intrusive than the use of a helicopter. State v. Stevens, 2023-Ohio-889, ¶ 32 (5th Dist.).
Importantly, in this case, the record supports a finding that the drone did not fly over Mr. Bradley’s property but, instead, relied on the use of an adjacent park and a nearby business for its flight path. Thus, this case is more akin to surveillance via the use of a camera attached to a utility pole in a public space, which we have found to be constitutional. See State v. Rigel, 2017-Ohio-7640 (2d Dist.). Therefore, we agree with the trial court’s determination that the deputies did not violate the Fourth Amendment by the use of the drone to conduct surveillance.
Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.
Information for this article was obtained from State v. Bradley, 2025 – Ohio – 58.
State v. Bradley, 2025 – Ohio – 58 was issued by the Second District Appellate Court on January 10, 2025 and is binding in the following Ohio Counties: Champaign, Clark, Darke, Greene, Miami and Montgomery.
Lessons Learned:
- Drone Search – On Monday May 5, 1924 the U.S. Supreme Court held “[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment … is not extended to the open fields.”, Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). As the Fourth Amendment explicitly states The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and affects… . The right of the Fourth Amendment does not include open fields. In this case the Clark County Sheriff’s Office utilized the drone to search Mr. Bradley’s open fields and it was objectively reasonable.
- Why was the evidence suppressed? The Second District Appellate Court is not specifically clear but it appears that the deputies entered Mr. Bradley’s curtilage to arrest him and seize the car. At the moment the vehicle license plate was confirmed to be stolen with the drone camera, the deputies should have obtained a search warrant before physically entering the property.
- What is Curtilage? The doctrine of curtilage means that the protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to outside the home. Exactly what is curtilage will be evaluated on the facts of the case and the four factors that the U.S. Supreme Court developed on March 3, 1987; (1) the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home; (2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home; (3) the nature of the uses to which the area is put; and (4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the areas from observation by passersby. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 302-303, (1987). This is further described by the Fifth District Appellate Court on April 8, 2011 when it held “The only areas where officers may lawfully go are those impliedly open to the public, including walkways, driveways, or access routes to the house.”. State v. Cook, 2011 – Ohio – 1776. The drone flight above the property was lawful but the physical entry on to Mr. Bradley’s property should have been delayed until a search warrant was obtained.
- Undeveloped Area of Law – Drones are an undeveloped area of law; however, the Open Fields Doctrine has been valid for nearly one hundred and one years. Though a drone can fly over property that is an open field, law enforcement may not physically enter the open field if it means passing through the suspect’s curtilage.
- Airspace above a Landowner’s Land – The Second District Appellate Court states in this case “Ohio courts have recognized that a property owner has rights in the air space over his or her land.” Chance v. BP Chemicals, Inc., 77 Ohio St.3d 17, 25 (1996), Chance is a Supreme Court of Ohio decision. However, I do not have the same analysis when reviewing Chance. That case centered on BP Chemicals releasing chemicals below the ground in a deep well and subsequent damage to neighboring properties. The closest the Supreme Court of Ohio comes to claiming that property owners have air space ‘rights’ in Chance was “Just as a property owner must accept some limitations on the ownership rights extending above the surface of the property, we find that there are also limitations on property owners’ subsurface rights.” Id at 26. That statement in the Chance case does not establish property rights in the air space above a person’s property. There have been three authoritative cases issued by the U.S. Supreme Court that do not support the Second District’s claim that property owners have air space rights above their property; California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), Dow Chemical v. U.S. 476 U.S. 227 (1986), and Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). In each of these cases, the government flew a helicopter or plane above the property to conduct a search without a warrant the U.S. Supreme Court held the searches were lawful.
Does your agency train on Drone Searches?
Don’t fail your training.
Don’t let your training fail you!
Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!