Detective Martens’s seizure of Hale was not an unconstitutional investigatory stop and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

 

State v. Hale

2024 – Ohio – 4866

Supreme Court of Ohio

October 10, 2024

Note:  This case was issued by the Fifth District Appellate Court on March 30, 2023 as State v. Hale, 2023 – Ohio – 1057 and I posted an article on my website on June 9, 2023.  That article has been removed as the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio and now this case supersedes the previous.

Central Ohio Drug Enforcement Task Force is On Duty

On August 30, 2021, Detective Benjamin Martens of the Licking County Sherriff’s Office was in uniform, driving a marked cruiser. Detective Martens was working with officers of the Central Ohio Drug Enforcement Task Force, including Detectives Conley and Boerstler.

A Drug Trafficker with a Suspended License

Detective Conley saw Terrance Cunningham driving a gold van. The van drove into the parking lot of an apartment complex, remained a short time, then left the parking lot. Mr. Cunningham was known to the detectives of the task force as a drug trafficker.  Detective Boerstler relayed the van’s license plate number and the identity of the driver to Detective Martens, who ran the information through LEADS and learned Mr. Cunningham had a suspended license. Detective Martens radioed to inquire whether he should initiate a traffic stop, and Detective Conley responded affirmatively.

Criminal Activity Afoot at Circle K

Detective Martens located the van in the parking lot of a Circle K store. Detective Martens pulled his cruiser behind the van with his emergency lights activated. A Newark Police Department officer also responded to the Circle K parking lot. The encounter was recorded on Detective Martens’s cruiser camera and his body camera. 

As Detective Martens turned into the lot, Mr. Cunningham was standing outside the van. Although Detective Martens did not notice Ms. Hale at the time he first pulled into the lot, his camera captured Ms. Hale exiting the store, returning to the passenger side of the vehicle, and reaching inside the open window before walking back toward the store. The van was parked directly in front of the entrance to the store.

This graphic was created with Artificial Intelligence and is a representation of the stop, not an exact recreation.

Who was Driving?

Detective Martens asked Mr. Cunningham whether he was supposed to be driving. Mr. Cunningham said Ms. Hale was driving and pointed toward Ms. Hale as she was entering the store. Detective Martens approached Ms. Hale and asked her for identification. Ms. Hale indicated she felt sick and wanted to go into the store to use the restroom. Detective Martens told Ms. Hale she was not free to leave. Ms. Hale was carrying a black zipper purse and a grey zipper purse/pouch. She produced identification, and Detective Martens told Ms. Hale to go have a seat on the bumper of his police cruiser.

Ms. Hale Felt Sick

Ms. Hale again asked to go inside the store because she felt sick. Detective Martens told Ms. Hale to put her bags on the hood of the police cruiser. Detective Martens informed Ms. Hale that Mr. Cunningham did not have a valid driver’s license. She admitted she knew Mr. Cunningham did not have a license, yet she asked him to drive to the store.

Firearm and Cocaine

Returning to Mr. Cunningham, Detective Martens informed Mr. Cunningham he knew Mr. Cunningham was driving, and could charge Ms. Hale with negligent entrustment because she admitted she knew Mr. Cunningham did not have a valid license. Detective Martens conducted a pat down search of Mr. Cunningham, finding a baggie in Mr. Cunningham’s pocket. Mr. Cunningham told the officer it was cocaine. Detective Martens asked Mr. Cunningham if there was a weapon in the van. Mr. Cunningham explained there was a firearm which belonged to Ms. Hale in the van. After allowing Mr. Cunningham to finish smoking a cigarette, Detective Martens placed Mr. Cunningham in the cruiser.

Ms. Hales Felonious Grey Bag

 Detective Martens returned to Ms. Hale, moving the bags a bit further out of her reach. Detective Martens asked Ms. Hale if there was a firearm in the van. Ms. Hale responded there was a registered, unloaded handgun in the van. Detective Martens asked Ms. Hale if there were drugs in the van. Ms. Hale responded she had roach clips in her cigarette package and admitted she did not have a medical marijuana card. Detective Martens unzipped the grey bag Ms. Hale had placed on the cruiser, which he believed could contain a small firearm or marijuana. He found a substance in the bag which he suspected was methamphetamine. A search of the van revealed an unloaded firearm in a drawer underneath the passenger seat, two loaded magazines in a bag on the floor of the passenger side, a digital scale, and a box with drug residue.

Indicted

Ms. Hale was indicted by the Licking County Grand Jury with aggravated possession of methamphetamine (O.R.C. §2925.11(A)(C)(1)(c)), aggravated trafficking in methamphetamine (O.R.C. §2925.03(A)(2)(C)(1)(d)), and improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle (O.R.C. §2923.16(B)). A superseding indictment was later filed, adding an additional charge of possession of methamphetamine (O.R.C. §2925.11(A)(C)(1)(a)).

Note: Ms. Hale filed a motion to suppress that was granted by the trial court as it held that she was unreasonably detained.  The Fifth District Appellate Court overturned the trial court and Ms. Hale appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.

Was the Stop Objectively Reasonable?

The crux of Ms. Hale’s argument is that her detention by Detective Martens in the convenience store’s parking lot violated her constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. And because that initial stop was unconstitutional, everything that flowed from the stop—including Detective Martens’s discovery of the methamphetamines in one of her purses—was impermissible and should be suppressed.

Established Case Law – Investigative Detention

“The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops . . . when a law enforcement officer has ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’ ” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014), quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981). This “reasonable, articulable suspicion that [a] person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity” acts as a sort of middle ground for the amount of knowledge required of law-enforcement officers to justify a stop. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983). The level of suspicion must be more than a “mere hunch” that something criminal is afoot, but it need not rise to “proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence”; the required standard of proof is “obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Navarette at 397. When deciding whether reasonable suspicion existed to justify an investigatory stop, courts look at the totality of the circumstances of the stop “to see whether the [law-enforcement] officer [had] a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002), quoting Cortez at 417.

Once an investigatory stop has occurred, the detaining officer must tailor the scope and duration of the stop to the circumstances of the encounter. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). Thus, the investigative methods used by law enforcement must be the “least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion” of criminal activity. Id. Similarly, the detention “must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary” to carry out the stop’s purposes. Id.

Do Not Miss the Forest for the Trees

To be sure, the facts here cut both ways concerning whether the encounter between Ms. Hale and Detective Martens was a “traffic stop.” In favor is the fact that Detective Martens initiated the stop after plain-clothes law-enforcement officers reported witnessing Mr. Cunningham commit an alleged traffic violation, which Detective Martens confirmed when he learned Mr. Cunningham had been driving without a valid driver’s license. On the other hand, Mr. Cunningham had parked the minivan and Hale was no longer a passenger inside the vehicle when Detective Martens initiated his detention of Mr. Cunningham; by that time, Hale had exited the vehicle and entered the convenience store. But when Detective Martens detained Ms. Hale, she’d been identified as a potential driver of the minivan and had returned to the vehicle’s vicinity. In sum, the facts do not clearly answer whether the encounter between Ms. Hale and Detective Martens falls within the realm of a traffic stop. But focusing on answering that question misses the forest for the trees.

Det. Martens was Objectively Reasonable

When the circumstances of Detective Martens’s detention of Ms. Hale are viewed in their totality, they show that Detective Martens possessed a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. For that reason, Detective Martens’s investigatory stop of Ms. Hale to confirm or dispel that suspicion was reasonable.

Mr. Cunningham was Rolling Reasonable Suspicion

Let’s start at the beginning. Law-enforcement officers witnessed Mr. Cunningham, who was known to them as a suspected drug trafficker, driving a gold minivan. They radioed that information to Detective Martens, who checked the relevant law-enforcement database and confirmed that Mr. Cunningham’s driver’s license had been suspended. Yet Mr. Cunningham had been seen driving. At that point, Detective Martens had a particularized and objective belief that Mr. Cunningham —who did not have a valid driver’s license but had been seen driving—had committed the crime of operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license. See generally O.R.C. §4510.12; see also Glover at 381-383 (facts leading a law-enforcement officer to infer that a vehicle was being driven by an unlicensed driver are sufficient to support the officer’s reasonable suspicion of the traffic violation, justifying an investigatory stop). Based on that belief, Detective Martens had the authority to briefly detain Mr. Cunningham to confirm or dispel his suspicion of criminal activity. See Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297 (1999), citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 231 (1985) (law-enforcement officers may rely on police dispatches for facts to justify an investigatory stop). And that is what Detective Martens did in the convenience store’s parking lot.

Katrina was Just like John

It was during that valid investigatory stop of Mr. Cunningham that Detective Martens also detained Ms. Hale. Ms. Hale argues that Detective Martens could not detain her, because when he effected the stop, she was no longer a passenger in the minivan—i.e., the vehicle was parked and she had exited the vehicle and entered the convenience store. But whether Ms. Hale was still a passenger in the vehicle when Detective Martens detained her is not dispositive of the question whether Detective Martens had a reasonable suspicion to believe that Ms. Hale was involved in criminal activity. Rather, the dispositive question is whether the facts that Detective Martens possessed when he stopped Ms. Hale provided a reasonable basis for his suspicion. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968), citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), and Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964). And we conclude that they did.

Note:  Mr. John Terry was stopped by Cleveland Police Det. Marty McFadden on October 31, 1963.  As a result of that stop, on June 10, 1968 the U.S. Supreme Court established the Reasonable Suspicion Doctrine and the Terry stop.  Hence, Katrina was just like John.

Ms. Hale was at the Center of Suspected Criminal Activity

After being lawfully stopped by Detective Martens, Mr. Cunningham claimed that Ms. Hale had been driving the minivan and pointed toward her. When Detective Martens approached Ms. Hale, she was in the vicinity of the minivan. Indeed, the dashboard-camera video footage from Detective Martens’s patrol car shows that Ms. Hale had exited the convenience store, leaned into the minivan’s passenger’s-side window, and retrieved items from or replaced items in the minivan while Detective Martens spoke with Mr. Cunningham. Far from being a dispassionate and unrelated observer to what was going on, Ms. Hale actively associated herself with and exercised control over the vehicle that was at the center of the suspected criminal activity.

Ms. Hale’s Statements Provided Enough Information for her Detention to be Extended

 What is more, evidence at the hearing on Ms. Hale’s motion to suppress shows that Ms. Hale was walking from the minivan and attempting to go back inside the convenience store when Detective Martens stopped her to investigate her involvement in the suspected criminal activity that precipitated his stop of Mr. Cunningham. At that point, given Mr. Cunningham assertions that Ms. Hale had been the person driving the minivan and Detective Martens’s own observations, Detective Martens possessed facts that supported his suspicion that Ms. Hale was involved in suspected criminal activity.

This suspicion was bolstered by Detective Martens’s continued interaction with Ms. Hale. In response to Detective Martens’s questioning, Ms. Hale admitted that she knew Mr. Cunningham did not have a valid driver’s license and that despite that knowledge, she still asked him to drive her to the store. This admission by Ms. Hale gave Detective Martens reasonable suspicion to believe that Ms. Hale had wrongfully entrusted a motor vehicle to an unlicensed driver. See O.R.C. §4511.203(A)(1) (prohibiting a person who owns or controls a motor vehicle from knowingly entrusting it to another person who does not have a valid driver’s license). The discovery of these facts allowed Detective Martens to extend Ms. Hale’s detention so that he could investigate his additional suspicions of criminal activity. See State v. Robinette, 1997-Ohio-343, ¶ 27 (law-enforcement officers may extend investigatory stops after obtaining additional facts that give rise to a suspicion of criminal activity that warrants further investigation).

The purpose of the investigatory stop was for Detective Martens to confirm or dispel law enforcement’s reasonable suspicion that the minivan was being driven illegally.

Applying the law to the facts here shows that Detective Martens’s actions satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s touchstone for search and seizure— reasonableness. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006), citing Flippo v. West Virgina, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The purpose of the investigatory stop was for Detective Martens to confirm or dispel law enforcement’s reasonable suspicion that the minivan was being driven illegally. That was more than enough justification for Detective Martens to detain Mr. Cunningham, the suspected driver, and it was enough for Detective Martens to detain Ms. Hale once she was identified as a possible driver of the minivan while the detective investigated the suspected criminal activity. Furthermore, the facts that show Ms. Hale was associating herself with and exercising some control over the minivan when Detective Martens first approached her. Indeed, even if Ms. Hale had exited the vehicle and entered the convenience store while Detective Martens detained and questioned Mr. Cunningham, the fact remains that Ms. Hale had returned to the vehicle, leaned inside it, and was walking away from the vehicle when she was detained by Detective Martens. These circumstances provided a reasonable basis for Detective Martens to detain Ms. Hale. And as a result, Ms. Hale’s detention by Detective Martens did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Conclusion and Holding

Nothing in this case leads us to believe that Detective Martens’s detention of Ms. Hale as part of his investigatory stop after plain-clothes officers reported witnessing Mr. Cunningham commit an alleged traffic violation is unreasonable. As a result, Detective Martens’s seizure of Hale was not an unconstitutional investigatory stop and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. And given Ms. Hale’s failure to argue in her briefs to this court any other grounds on which Detective Martens’s search of her purses might have violated the Fourth Amendment, we decline to discuss whether that search was unconstitutional. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Fifth District Court Appeals reversing the trial court’s judgment granting Ms. Hale’s motion to suppress.

Information for this article was obtained from State v. Hale, 2024 – Ohio – 1466.

This case was issued by the Supreme Court of Ohio on October 10, 2024 and is binding in the State of Ohio.

Lessons Learned:

  1. Is a Passenger Seized During a Traffic Stop? The key question is whether or not a vehicle passenger is seized at the moment the vehicle is stopped by law enforcement. First, a passenger is detained when an officer stops a vehicle.  The legal foundation for this legal ideology can be found in two cases.  In 1980 the U.S. Supreme Court held “[I]n view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”.  U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).  Also, in 2007 the U.S. Supreme Court held “Brendlin [a vehicle passenger] was seized from the moment Simeroth’s car came to a halt on the side of the road, and it was error to deny his suppression motion on the grounds that seizue occurred only at the formal arrest.”.  Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007) Both cases provide the legal framework that a passenger IS seized during a traffic stop.
  2. Pat Down for Officer Safety? Though the court does not make issue of statement, it glosses over a key issue. It is instructive to spend some time breaking it down. The court states in pertinent part “While patting down Mr. Cunningham for officer safety, officers found a baggie in his pocket.”.  First, there is no pat down for officer safety, it does not legally exist.  For additional information see Is There a Pat Down for Officer Safety?. Second, once the bag was felt by the officer it is unlikely that the officer determined the baggie to be a weapon. Since, it was not a weapon, then the Plain Feel Doctrine may have been used.  For more on the Plain Feel Doctrine, see What Do Breast Implants and the Plain Feel Doctrine have in Common?.
  3. Vehicle Search – The court also does not provide analysis on the Automobile Exception to the Fourth Amendment. For more information on this exceptional exception see What’s in Bandit’s Paper Bag?.
  4. Traffic Stops and Miranda Warnings – Was there a Miranda violation when … “Detective Martens informed Ms. Hale that Mr. Cunningham did not have a valid driver’s license. She admitted she knew Mr. Cunningham did not have a license, yet she asked him to drive to the store.”? There is a immeasurable amount of time from the start of the traffic stop until the person is in Miranda-custody.  There is no finite amount of time, it is a fact-based determination on a case-by-case basis.  For more on when a roadside Miranda warning is required see Were Gary’s Self-Incriminating Statements Roadside during a Traffic Stop require the Miranda Warning?.
  5. Pre-Sent Arms! Detective Benjamin Martens, Detective Conley and Detective Boerstler should all be commended for working in concert on the arrest, conviction and successful appeal of Ms. Hale!

 

Does your agency train on Traffic Stops?

Don’t fail your training.

Don’t let your training fail you!

Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!

Robert H. Meader Esq.