[T]he state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Coffman’s running from police hampered or impeded the officers’ performance of their duties.

 

State v. Coffman

2024 – Ohio – 1182

First District Appellate Court

Hamilton County, Ohio

March 29, 2024

Breaking and Entering

Police officers investigating a breaking and entering at a shopping mall received a description of a person of interest and information that a person matching that description was squatting with others in a house on residential street. When officers searched the house, they found no one matching the description of the person of interest.

Note: The agency, shopping mall and street of the residential house are identified in the case.  These identifiers have been redacted in this article.

Person of Interest Pushing a Lawnmower

As the officers were concluding the investigation at that address, an officer saw a person, who was later identified as Mr. Timothy Coffman, walking down the other side of the street pushing a lawn mower. The officer believed that Mr. Coffman matched the description of the person of interest.

 Twenty Second Foot Pursuit Ended with a Tasering

The officer’s body-worn camera footage showed the officer crossing the road to intercept Mr. Coffman and Mr. Coffman continuing to push the lawnmower around a corner and down a side street. Once the officer got within earshot of Mr. Coffman, he asked Mr. Coffman to “come here for a second.” Mr. Coffman turned to face the officer, who repeated his request. Mr. Coffman then left the lawn mower and began to run down the street, away from the officer. Within a few steps, Mr. Coffman dropped a bag he was carrying. The officer followed Mr. Coffman, twice warning him that he would use his taser on Mr. Coffman if he did not stop, but Mr. Coffman continued running. The officer deployed the taser and Mr. Coffman fell onto the pavement. Officers surrounded Mr. Coffman and arrested him. The whole chase lasted approximately twenty seconds.

Mr. Coffman was not the B and E Suspect

The assembled officers placed Mr. Coffman in handcuffs and searched him. Because an officer deployed his taser, a supervisor had to come to the scene. After approximately ten to fifteen minutes, the assembled officers verified Mr. Coffman’s identity and determined he was not the person of interest. The state charged Mr. Coffman with obstruction of official business in violation of O.R.C. §2921.31(A). Mr. Coffman was held one night at the Hamilton County Justice Center.

Guilty of Obstruction of Official Business

After a bench trial, the trial court found Mr. Coffman guilty and sentenced him to one day of imprisonment, with credit for the one day that he spent in jail. The trial court did not impose a fine, court costs, or other sanctions.

Mr. Coffman now appeals.

Obstructing Official Business O.R.C. §2921.31

To support an obstructing-official-business-conviction under O.R.C. §2921.31(A), the state must prove the defendant “(1) performed an act; (2) without privilege; (3) with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance of a public official of any authorized act within the public official’s official capacity; and (4) that hampered or impeded the performance of the public official’s duties.” In re Payne, 2005-Ohio-4849.

Basis of Appeal

Mr. Coffman argues his conviction must be reversed for several reasons. First, Mr. Coffman argues that he did not perform an affirmative act, but merely refused to cooperate with the officer’s demand to halt. Second, Mr. Coffman contends that the court could not infer he acted with the purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the officer’s performance of his official duties. Third, Mr. Coffman argues that his conduct did not hamper or impede the officer’s investigation.

Affirmative Act

Mr. Coffman contends that rather than performing an affirmative act, he merely refused to cooperate with the officer’s demand to stop. And an O.R.C. §2921.31 conviction requires the state to prove the defendant performed an affirmative act. State v. Wellman, 2007-Ohio-2953. A defendant’s refusal to comply with a police officer’s order is not an affirmative act and cannot, standing alone, support an obstructing-official-business conviction. See State v. Buttram, 2020-Ohio-2709.

Fleeing IS an Affirmative Act

But this court has long held that a person performs an affirmative act within the meaning of O.R.C. §2921.31 by fleeing from a police officer when the person has some knowledge that the police officer intends to lawfully detain that person. See, e.g., State v. Lohaus, 2003-Ohio-777, ¶ 11 (fleeing from an officer conducting a lawful Terry stop); State v. Harris, 2023-Ohio-4387, ¶ 24 (walking away from an officer while the officer was issuing a ticket); State v. Davis, (walking away from officers attempting to detain defendant).

Mr. Coffman was walking down the street pushing a lawn mower and carrying a bag. When the officer stated, “Come here for a second, I want to ask you something,” Mr. Coffman ran away from the officer, leaving his lawn mower behind and dropping his bag. This constitutes an “act” under O.R.C. §2921.31(A) because the circumstances show Mr. Coffman knew that the police officer intended to detain him. After the officer issued his command, Mr. Coffman changed his actions from walking to running and left his lawn mower and bag behind. He did not merely refuse to answer questions or fail to stop walking. Rather, Mr. Coffman made a conscious decision to flee from the officer in response to the officer’s request for him to stop. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence that Mr. Coffman performed an affirmative act.

Purposeful Mental State

Mr. Coffman asserts that the court could not infer he acted with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the officer’s performance of his official duties. A person acts “purposely” when it is the person’s specific intention to cause a certain result. O.R.C. §2901.22(A). “The purpose with which a person does an act is determined from the manner in which it is done, the means used, and all the other facts and circumstances in evidence.” In re Payne, 2005-Ohio-4849.

Running from the Officer was Purposeful to Prevent, Obstruct or Delay the Investigation

Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances, a rational trier of fact could have found that Mr. Coffman knew the officer was conducting an investigative stop and intended to delay the officer’s investigation by his choice to run from the officer. The officer asked Mr. Coffman to stop and submit to questioning. Mr. Coffman turned, saw the uniformed officer, and ran. Mr. Coffman discarded his lawn mower and bag when he ran. The officer warned Mr. Coffman that if he continued to flee, he would be subdued with a taser. Yet, he continued to refuse to comply. Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the state, sufficient evidence supported that Mr. Coffman’s fleeing from a uniformed officer showed his purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the investigation.

Hamper or Impede

To support Mr. Coffman’s conviction, the state must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Coffman’s conduct in fact hampered or impeded the officers’ investigation. Id. at ¶ 19, quoting Wellman, 2007-Ohio-2953.

After the close of evidence, the trial court stated, “Here I find that there is no substantial stoppage and find him guilty of the affirmative act of running and then the time it took to call the supervisor or superior. So that’s guilty.”

Supervisor Arrived Fifteen Minutes Later and Ruled Out Mr. Coffman as a Suspect

The video showed that the time between the officer calling for Mr. Coffman to stop and handcuffing Mr. Coffman was approximately twenty seconds. And the officer testified that it took ten to fifteen minutes to summon his supervisor and rule Mr. Coffman out as the perpetrator of the breaking-and-entering crime. He testified that had Mr. Coffman not run, he would have been able to ask Mr. Coffman questions and could have ruled him out as a suspect.

Failing to Answer Questions

First, any delay caused by Mr. Coffman’s passive act—failing to answer questions or otherwise assist the officers in clearing him as the suspect in the breaking and entering—cannot support an obstruction conviction. See Wellman, 2007-Ohio-2953.

Supervisor Arrival Time Delay Cannot be Attributed to Mr. Coffman

Second, any delay caused by the officer summoning his supervisor cannot be attributed to Mr. Coffman. There must be a nexus between the defendant’s affirmative act and the alleged substantial stoppage of the official’s business. The officer testified, “Every time we have a tasing on scene [the supervisor] shows up.” But the officer needing to summon a supervisor was dictated by internal police policy on the use of tasers, not Mr. Coffman’s decision to flee.

First District’s Misplaced Emphasis on Twenty Seconds

The nexus between Mr. Coffman’s flight and the alleged substantial stoppage of the police officer’s investigation ended after approximately twenty seconds— the time it took for the officer to spot, intercept, stop, and handcuff Mr. Coffman. While no set amount of time is necessary to constitute substantial stoppage, the amount of time is a relevant factor for this court to consider.

We agree with the trial court that Mr. Coffman’s flight did not create a substantial stoppage to the officers’ investigation. The chase, from beginning to end, lasted approximately twenty seconds. The state did not establish that Mr. Coffman’s brief flight was anything more than a de minimis interference, rather than conduct that hampered or impeded the officer. And without evidence of “hampering” or “impeding” beyond that twenty-second delay in apprehending Mr. Coffman, the state failed to show that Mr. Coffman hampered or impeded the officers’ breaking-and- entering investigation.

Conclusion and Holding

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Coffman’s running from police hampered or impeded the officers’ performance of their duties. Therefore, Mr. Coffman’s conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and we sustain Mr. Coffman’s assignment of error.

Information for this article was obtained from State v. Coffman, 2024 – Ohio – 1182.

State v. Coffman, 2024 – Ohio – 1182 was issued by the First District Appellate Court and is binding in Hamilton County, Ohio.

Lessons Learned:

  1. Not All Facts Matter – The First District Appellate Court overturned Mr. Coffman’s conviction focusing on the fifteen-minute time period for the supervisor to arrive at scene to investigate the taser. However, the court appears to have eschewed the salient fact that the supervisor arrived to investigate the taser deployment AND rule Mr. Coffman out as a suspect in the Breaking and Entering.  Specifically, the court opined “After approximately ten to fifteen minutes, the assembled officers verified Mr. Coffman’s identity and determined he was not the person of interest.” [emphasis added].  Later the court held “[A]ny delay caused by the officer summoning his supervisor cannot be attributed to Mr. Coffman. There must be a nexus between the defendant’s affirmative act and the alleged substantial stoppage of the official’s business.”.  I strongly agree that an administrative procedure should not be attributed to the criminal actions of Mr. Coffman.  However, the delay was not singularly for an administrative investigation but to also determine that Mr. Coffman was not the suspect.  The court never addresses this fact, rather it dismissively states “The nexus between Mr. Coffman’s flight and the alleged substantial stoppage of the police officer’s investigation ended after approximately twenty seconds— the time it took for the officer to spot, intercept, stop, and handcuff Mr. Coffman.”.  The investigation did not end when the second handcuff was applied but rather when Mr. Coffman was ruled out as a suspect.  Mr. Coffman’s refusal to identify himself was the delay required by Obstructing Official Business statute.
  2. Failure to Disclose Personal Information – The officers may have had another option for a criminal charge that would have likely been upheld – Failure to Disclose Personal InformationR.C. §2921.29(A)(1) “No person, who is in a public place shall refuse to disclose the person’s name, address or date of birth, when requested by a law enforcement officer who reasonably suspects either of the following: The person is committing has committed, or is about to commit a criminal offense.”. Keep in mind that the officer does not have to be right … only reasonable.  In this case Mr. Coffman “The officer believed that Mr. Coffman matched the description of the person of interest.”.  Because Mr. Coffman reasonably matched the description of the Breaking and Entering suspect, fled and refused to identify himself, Failure to Disclose Personal Information would have been a reasonable criminal charge. This charge may have also limited Mr. Coffman’s legal challenges to a conviction.
  3. Hardest Job in America – Law enforcement is THE hardest job in America and this incident is one more example of why it is so challenging.

Does your agency train on Laws of Arrest?

Don’t fail your training.

Don’t let your training fail you!

Be safe, smart and objectively reasonable!

Robert H. Meader Esq.