Putting all of these pieces together, Officer Lay had reasonable suspicion sufficient to delay the traffic stop a few minutes further while Officer Bierema led his Canine through a sniff of the car’s exterior.
United States v. Williams
Nos. 22 – 1024/1038
Sixth Circuit Appellate Court
May 17, 2023
Following Too Closely leads to a Canine Alert and Federal Narcotics Charges
One of the main interstate thoroughfares across the wrist of Michigan’s mitten, highway I-94 snakes up through the state’s southwest corner from Indiana. Michigan State Police Officer Stephanie Lay was stationed in the highway’s median, about 35 miles from where the Wolverine and Hoosier states meet. Officer Lay noticed a Chevrolet Tahoe driving northbound following closely behind another vehicle—a state law infraction. Officer Lay pulled out to follow the Tahoe. Enroute, she ran the vehicle’s plate through a computer database, which noted that the car had been in Houston, Texas, one day before.
Michigan State Police Officer Stephanie Lay observed Mr. Williams commit a traffic violation and stopped his vehicle with Mr. Bloom in the passenger seat on I-94. Later she would discover two gym bags containing cocaine and methamphetamine. Was the seizure and subsequent search of the bags lawful?
Officer Lay pulled the Tahoe over and approached on the passenger side. Van Williams was the driver, and Jamar Bloom was sitting in the passenger seat. Unprompted, Mr. Bloom handed over his driver’s license without making eye contact with Officer Lay. Officer Lay requested the same, as well as proof of insurance, from Mr. Williams. Mr. Williams produced his driver’s license and a rental agreement for the car. Officer Lay told Mr. Williams to exit the Tahoe (so she could hear him better) and asked about his itinerary. Mr. Williams stated that he had been on vacation in Indiana and was headed to Detroit to see his father. Officer Lay pressed Mr. Williams as to why he was in Indiana. Mr. Williams said he was a laborer and gave Officer Lay a business card. When Officer Lay asked additional questions, Mr. Williams became defensive. Returning to her cruiser, Officer Lay ran Mr. Williams’s and Mr. Bloom’s information through law-enforcement databases and radioed for assistance. Mr. Williams’s name came up clean. But as to Mr. Bloom, Officer Lay was notified that he was on probation for a prior crime. While Officer Lay was running these checks, Officer Byron Bierema, who had been patrolling a neighboring stretch of road, arrived on-scene with his drug-detection CANINE to assist. Approximately seven minutes into the stop, Officer Lay completed her database checks and again exited her cruiser, this time to speak with Mr. Bloom about his probation status.
Officer Lay has a Gut Feeling that is Spot – On … But was she Reasonable?
Mr. Bloom was less than forthcoming. When Officer Lay asked where Mr. Bloom was coming from, Mr. Bloom said “somewhere around the Indiana-Michigan border,” without additional specificity. And when Officer Lay inquired about his destination, Mr. Bloom answered “Saginaw” before later saying he was going to see an aunt in Detroit. Officer Lay returned to speak with Mr. Williams. He refused to tell her where he had picked up Mr. Bloom or whether Mr. Bloom had accompanied him in Indiana. At that point, Officer Lay decided she had seen and heard enough. She requested Mr. Williams’s consent to search the car, which he withheld. She then ordered him to stand back while Officer Bierema’s CANINE conducted a sniff of the Tahoe’s exterior. The CANINE alerted to the presence of drugs, prompting the officers to search the car. In the back seat, they found two gym bags containing cocaine and methamphetamine.
Indictment, Suppression Hearing and Plea
Defendants were indicted for possession with intent to distribute drugs, in violation of federal law. Invoking the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures,” defendants moved to suppress the drug evidence. They argued that the traffic stop was unconstitutionally prolonged. Mr. Bloom added that he was illegally arrested. After a hearing, the district court denied the motions. Each defendant then pleaded guilty under an agreement permitting us to review the suppression issues, to which we turn now.
Appeal
There is no dispute over the propriety of Officer Lay’s initial basis for the stop—the traffic violation. Returning to her cruiser, Officer Lay ran Mr. Williams’s and Mr. Bloom’s information through law-enforcement databases and radioed for assistance. Mr. Williams’s name came up clean. But as to Mr. Bloom, Officer Lay was notified that he was on probation for a prior crime. While Officer Lay was running these checks, Officer Byron Bierema, who had been patrolling a neighboring stretch of road, arrived on-scene with his drug-detection CANINE to assist. Approximately seven minutes into the stop, Officer Lay completed her database checks and again exited her cruiser, this time to speak with Mr. Bloom about his probation status.
Mr. Bloom was less than forthcoming. When Officer Lay asked where Mr. Bloom was coming from, Mr. Bloom said “somewhere around the Indiana-Michigan border,” without additional specificity. And when Officer Lay inquired about his destination, Mr. Bloom answered “Saginaw” before later saying he was going to see an aunt in Detroit. Officer Lay returned to speak with Mr. Williams. He refused to tell her where he had picked up Mr. Bloom or whether Mr. Bloom had accompanied him in Indiana. At that point, Officer Lay decided she had seen and heard enough. She requested Mr. Williams’s consent to search the car, which he withheld. She then ordered him to stand back while Officer Bierema’s CANINE conducted a sniff of the Tahoe’s exterior. The CANINE alerted to the presence of drugs, prompting the officers to search the car. In the back seat, they found two gym bags containing cocaine and methamphetamine.
Defendants were indicted for possession with intent to distribute drugs, in violation of federal law. Invoking the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures,” defendants moved to suppress the drug evidence. They argued that the traffic stop was unconstitutionally prolonged. Mr. Bloom added that he was illegally arrested. After a hearing, the district court denied the motions. Each defendant then pleaded guilty under an agreement permitting us to review the suppression issues, to which we turn now.
Did Officer Lay Detain the Suspects beyond the ‘Rodriguez Moment’?
The First Seven Minutes of the Stop is Evaluated
The Fourth Amendment confers protection against “unreasonable” searches and seizures by government officials. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. As one genre of “seizure,” Officer Lay’s traffic stop fell within the Amendment’s ambit. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). There is no dispute over the propriety of Officer Lay’s initial basis for the stop—the traffic violation. evidence of illegality on further investigation. That said, the officer must have more than a “hunch” or “gut feeling” that something illegal is afoot. In assessing whether reasonable suspicion existed, we “take the facts together,” giving due weight to the officer’s “experience and specialized training.”.
Suspects did not Travel the most Direct Route between Houston and Detroit … Is that Suspicious?
Court Labels this ‘Dubious Travels Plans’
What Officer Lay heard and saw during those initial seven minutes clears the not “particularly high” hurdle of reasonable suspicion. Start with the numerous oddities and inconsistencies regarding defendants’ travel. Before the stop began, Officer Lay knew the rental car had been in Houston the morning before, almost a 19-hour drive away. Mr. Williams told Officer Lay that he was on vacation in Indiana, but immediately thereafter produced a business card and explained that he was a laborer. Putting aside the peculiarity of this mixture of business and pleasure, Officer Lay knew that any R&R could only have lasted a few hours, given the distances involved. What is more, Mr. Williams claimed to be headed to Detroit, but was several hours off the most direct route between Houston and that city. And then consider the fact that Mr. Williams never proffered any information about Houston. Taking all of this together, Mr. Williams’s “dubious travel plans” are a weighty factor in establishing reasonable suspicion to extend the stop.
Entitled to somewhat less weight, though still relevant to the overall reasonable suspicion inquiry, are the other facts that Officer Lay learned before re-entering her cruiser. They include that defendants were traveling between what Officer Lay testified to be a known source and destination for drug trafficking, their use of a rental car, and the oddity of Mr. Bloom not making eye contact when he handed over his driver’s license. We have characterized as weak the significance of analogous facts in the reasonable inquiry calculus, suggesting that some could not independently support reasonable suspicion. United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651, 665–66 (6th Cir. 2012) (nervousness and rental cars); United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569, 576–77 (6th Cir. 2008) (travel on drug route).
The discovery that Mr. Bloom was on probation cemented Officer Lay’s burgeoning reasonable suspicion. Probation ordinarily restricts an individual’s ability to move out of state, at least without prior notice to a probation officer. Recall that Officer Lay pulled defendants over roughly 35 miles from the border, on an interstate highway, headed deeper into Michigan. So she was within constitutional limits to exit her cruiser and to inquire of Mr. Bloom whether he was in compliance with his probation conditions.
Court determines Officer Lay had a ‘Mountain’ of Reasonable Suspicion
Subsequent conversations with Mr. Bloom and Mr. Williams added another Officer Layer to this mountain of reasonable suspicion, warranting Officer Lay’s extension of the stop through the point when Officer Bierema’s CANINE sniffed the Tahoe. Almost immediately, Mr. Bloom added to the “dubious[ness]” of Mr. Williams’s earlier statements when he told Officer Lay that he was going home to Saginaw, with a stop in Detroit—though Mr. Williams had mentioned only Detroit. The picture became no clearer when Officer Lay asked for additional details about Mr. Bloom’s travel history. He told her, without elaboration, that Mr. Williams had picked him up “somewhere around the Indiana-Michigan border.” And when Officer Lay reapproached Mr. Williams, he refused to answer whether Mr. Bloom accompanied him in Indiana or where he had picked Mr. Bloom up, instead becoming increasingly defensive. Putting all of these pieces together, Officer Lay had reasonable suspicion sufficient to delay the traffic stop a few minutes further while Officer Bierema led his Canine through a sniff of the car’s exterior.
Defense Counsel Interprets Reasonable Suspicion Differently than the Court
Defendants see things differently. Mr. Williams argues that, despite properly considering the traffic stop to have ended when Officer Lay finished her database checks, the district court nevertheless improperly considered the officer’s subsequent actions to fit within the stop’s parameters. In so doing, Mr. Williams says, the district court permitted what amounted to a “de minimis” extension of the stop. Sanctioning that kind of brief prolongation would run afoul of Rodriguez, which held that any time (no matter the duration) added to a traffic stop beyond what was reasonably necessary to investigate the original cause for the stop must be grounded in independent reasonable suspicion. But Mr. Williams misunderstands the suppression proceedings. The district court held that Officer Lay asked appropriate “context-framing” questions of Mr. Williams during her first approach of his vehicle. And after checking her databases, Officer Lay “learned sufficient facts to give reasonable suspicion” justifying further detention. Her additional questioning, in other words, was not an illegal de minimis extension, but rather one supported by independent reasonable suspicion.
Mr. Williams also takes issue with the evidence the district court relied on in finding that reasonable suspicion developed during the stop. Acknowledging that an officer may rely only on evidence of reasonable suspicion apparent during the initial stop to validate a prolongation. Mr. Williams contends that the district court improperly counted evidence that Officer Lay discovered after the initial mission ended in deciding that the stop’s prolongation was justified. Not so. True, the district court’s list of relevant evidence included pieces that Officer Lay learned after her initial mission ended. But the court considered two categories of evidence: information known to Officer Lay before the initial mission ended, which allowed her to extend her interrogation of defendants, and, separately, facts that came later, which bolstered the reasonable suspicion that had already developed. Read as a whole, the district court’s opinion properly sanctioned a traffic stop, in the words of our sister circuit, “fairly responsive to the emerging tableau.”. United States v. Dion, 859 F.3d 114, 124–25 (1st Cir. 2017)
Mr. Williams also faults the district court for including Mr. Bloom’s probationary status in its reasonable suspicion analysis. It should not have done so, he argues, because Officer Lay testified that she did not consider Mr. Bloom’s status to be “part of my reasonable suspicion.” We have said before that our reasonable suspicion analysis should not turn on “a factor on which the officer did not actually rely.” United States v. Townsend, 305 F.3d 537, 541 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Lott, 870 F.2d 778, 783–84 (1st Cir. 1989)).
We likewise see no constitutional flaw in the search of the rental car and defendants’ subsequent arrests. Each search was required to be grounded on probable cause. The drug-sniffing dog’s positive indication to the scent of narcotics in the car established probable cause for the search. Where a dog is properly “certified,” its positive alert alone is sufficient. That is the case here. And the discovery of drugs in the gym bags on the back seat gave Officer Lay probable cause to arrest both defendants.
Holding
Mr. Bloom disputes the latter point. To his mind, “[C]onstructive possession” of the cocaine and methamphetamine was not established prior to his arrest. But remember the legal standard that we employ. Probable cause asks only whether what the officers saw established a “probability or substantial chance” that the suspect is engaged in criminal activity. Everything Officer Lay and Officer Bierema saw, up to and including the gym bags they found, cumulatively met that bar.
Information for this article was obtained from United States v. Williams, Nos. 22 – 1024/1038.
This case was issued by the Sixth Circuit Appellate Court and is binding in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee.
Lessons Learned:
- In Rodriguez United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015) the U.S. Supreme Court held “The critical question, then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket … but whether conducting the sniff “prolongs” – i.e. adds time to – “the stop”.”. In canine parlance the Rodriguezmoment is the threshold time limit that the officer must complete the mission of the traffic stop and extending the detention beyond that moment may be determined to be an unreasonable detention.
- Here, the defense counsel made the argument that Officer Lay extended the traffic stop beyond the ‘Rodriguez’ Moment in the first seven minutes of the traffic stop. The court held that Officer Lay was objectively reasonable in her extended detention because she had established reasonable suspicion that Mr. Williams and Mr. Bloom were engaged in criminal activity. Though not mentioned in the case analysis the Sixth Circuit has previously held that extending a traffic stop beyond the mission of the stop is reasonable IF reasonable suspicion is established. “Accordingly … under a totality of the circumstances … the district court did not err in finding that Deputy Whitlock had formed reasonable suspicion that Defendants were carrying contraband sufficient to justify extending the purpose of the traffic stop to allow Spanky to do a canine sniff of the U-Haul.”. United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258 (6th 1999) A significant part of Officer Lay’s analysis focused on the inexplicable travel of Mr. Williams and Mr. Bloom. Who would take an indirect route from Houston, Texas to Detroit, Michigan? These two defendants could not have even prepared a reasonable explanation for their travel and direction of travel!
- Most legal cases are won or lost by the performance of the law enforcement officer and here both Officer Stephanie Lay and Canine Officer Byron Bierema worked in concert to establish reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop. These efforts resulted in two gym bags full of cocaine and methamphetamine. Well done Officer Lay and Officer Bierema!
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